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Pragmatic word learning in monolingual and bilingually exposed children
Isabelle Lorge
Humans are highly adaptable to a variety of challenging situations, as shown for
example by increased echolocation abilities in the visually impaired (Schenkman &
Nilsson, 2010). Multilingual input and interactions arguably create a particularly
demanding environment, with added complexity and variation in the linguistic signal, a
higher risk of communication failures and an increased amount of word forms to acquire.
Despite this, and a lesser ability to rely on mutual exclusivity, bilingual children are
able to quickly acquire a similar, and often greater vocabulary than their monolingual
peers (De Houwer, Bornstein, & Putnick, 2014; Umbel, Pearson, Fernández, & Oller,
1992). A range of studies investigating attention to socio-pragmatic speaker cues found
increased reliance on speaker cues in bilinguals (Colunga, Brojde, & Ahmed, 2012;
Yow & Markman, 2011a, 2015). However, since these studies involved ignoring another
conflicting cue, the results could have been related to inhibitory skills or to better
attention to speaker generally, rather than to pragmatic inference per se, which relies
on reasoning about communicative intentions.
In five separate studies, we investigated the ability of a first (n=270, range=4;1-
6;2, mean age=5;3) and second (n=120, range=4;0-5;11, mean age=5;5) sample of
monolingual and bilingually exposed children to use pragmatic cues to learn the
viii
meaning of a novel word in five different tasks where success could not be achieved
by ignoring a salient cue. The tasks were: contrastive inference with prosodic stress,
inference based on relative frequency of a referent, ostensive teaching of a subordinate
category, ostensive teaching of an action word, and use of emotional affect. We found
several developmental effects, and bilinguals to be more adult-like and to significantly
outperform monolinguals (compared to a baseline control condition) in all tasks which
involved reasoning about communicative intentions (or why the cue was provided, i.e.,
the first four tasks) but not when word referent mapping could be achieved without
pragmatic reasoning (directly mapping emotional valence to referent valence, i.e., fifth
task).
We conclude that this thesis provides evidence for differences in the processing
of pragmatic cues by bilingual and monolingual children which are not due solely to
better inhibitory skills or to a general sensitivity to social cues such as prosody, eye
gaze and pointing, but to performing true pragmatic inference by reasoning about
communicative intentions in the context of word learning. In addition, we believe a
distinction needs to be made between using social cues and reasoning about intentions,
which might help provide insights about separate developmental timelines for exerting
different types of pragmatic competence, with early abilities demonstrated by the
bilingually exposed, particularly in acquisition contexts.
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‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what
I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.’ ‘The question is,’ said Alice,‘whether
you can make words mean so many different things.’
— Lewis Carroll
Glossary
Word learning cues are signals used to help determine the meaning of a novel
word. Social cues are non-linguistic cues provided by a speaker for the purpose of
communication.
Perceptual cues are cues linked to the perceptual characteristics (e.g., shape,
colour, etc.) of an object considered as a potential candidate for a novel word.
Prosodic cues are cues linked to the speaker’s voice inflexions, such as variations
in pitch (ie., fundamental frequency), emotional affect. or other acoustic features (ie.,
volume, rhythm etc.).
Lexical or prosodic stress is the emphasised accent placed on a word or part of
a word.
2 Pragmatic inferences
Emotional affect is the tone of voice typically indicative of a speaker’s emotional
state (ie., ‘sad’, ‘happy’ or ‘fearful’ tone).
Semantic cues are cues provided by the content of words, ie., their ‘dictionary’
meaning.
Inhibitory control refers to a subset of executive functions, namely the ability to
ignore or suppress an irrelevant signal.
Linguistic cues are cues related to language: semantic (word content), syntactic
(sentence structure), etc.
Contrastive inferences are pragmatic inferences based on assuming that a con-
trast in linguistic form indicates a contrast in meaning, for example using ’the red
cup’ instead of ‘the cup’ to describe an object potentially indicates that there are two
objects which need to be distinguished.
A frequency inference is an inference based on the contextual frequency of a
referent. For example, when hearing a novel word such as ‘the dax’.
Ostension is emphasis placed on an action so that this action is noticed by an
intended recipient. Ostensive teaching is the transmission of generic knowledge (eg.,
facts, language or skills) performed in a way that intends to make this intention known
to the receiver.
1.1 What is pragmatics?
If you hear or read the sentence ‘John is single’, you will be able to derive from it
‘John is not married’. This is called entailment and will be true by virtue of the
‘dictionary’ or semantic meaning of the words alone. It does not require you to have
access to any other type of information. By contrast, while you might come to the
same conclusion upon hearing ‘John spends a lot of time with young women’, this is
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not strictly entailed by word meaning. Evidence for this comes, for example, from the
fact that this interpretation can be cancelled, i.e., the speaker could then add: ‘But he
is married’.
The additional meaning drawn from the second example is called an implicature,
a term coined by language philosopher Paul Grice (1975). Grice was the first to try
and formalise that social communication cannot be achieved by means of semantic
meaning and logical rules alone. To derive the second meaning you had to take into
account your socio-cultural knowledge about the usual or socially acceptable behaviour
of single versus married people, and potentially what you know about the speaker and
their goals in sharing with you this piece of information.
Pragmatics is the study of language in context, and pragmatic inferences, or
implicatures, are meanings derived by using contextual information. Context includes
anything and everything that does not pertain to semantic or grammatical meaning, i.e.,
world knowledge, previous discourse, common ground/history between interlocutors,
prosody, physical/visual environment, etc.
1.2 The Cooperative Principle
According to Grice’s theory, implicatures are derived by means of the Cooperative
Principle, that is, by assuming that the speaker is being cooperative in communicating.
In this view, linguistic behaviour should generally follow certain rules or conventions
governing linguistic communication, which Grice calls ‘maxims’: Quality (be truthful),
Quantity (be informative), Manner (be clear) and Relation (be relevant). Speaker
utterances can then be assumed to be cooperative even when they appear to be
breaking the maxims, as in the case of metaphor and irony (John is a pig’ ; ‘At least
the weather is nice’ uttered in pouring rain), underinformativeness (‘This student is
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punctual and polite. Sincerely, X’ as recommendation), convoluted phrasing (‘She
vocally produced notes that resembled the tune of Au Clair de la Lune’ ) or unrelated
contributions (‘I have work to do’ in answer to someone asking if you are planning
to go to tonight’s party). Under this assumption of cooperativeness, the hearer can
then use context to derive the intended meaning (e.g., world knowledge about the
stereotypical characteristics of pigs, presence of pouring rain, incompatibility of work
and leisure, assumptions about speaker goals in writing a brief recommendation, or
refraining from using the simpler expression ‘she sung’, etc.)
1.3 Relevance Theory and pragmatic trends
Consider the following sentence, uttered by a mother after her child has fallen and
injured their knee (Bach, 1994):
(1) ‘You’re not going to die’.
Without pragmatics, this statement is doubly irrelevant, first because it seems
plainly untruthful (unless the child happens to be immortal), second because it is
unclear what the intention is in providing this particular piece of information. In
the first instance, the meaning of some of the words has to be further specified using
contextual information: ‘You [the child] are not going to die [today/from this cut]’.
The hearer then again makes use of contextual information to infer the goal of the
utterance (e.g., get the child to stop making a fuss).
One might wonder where semantics stop and pragmatics begin, or how much/how
often context contributes to linguistic meaning. Grice’s view, and the view of the
Neo-Griceans who adapted the original theory by merging some of the principles
together (e.g., L. Horn, 1984; Levinson, 1987) was to see pragmatics as an additional
system complementing semantics which would enter into action when the autonomous
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semantic system failed or proved insufficient, and would help ‘complete’ linguistic
meaning. By contrast, Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986) goes back in some
way to the core of the Cooperative Principle as originally formulated by Grice: ‘Make
your contribution such as it is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted
purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged’ (1975, p.45). In
this view, cooperation, and social communication in general, boils down to being ‘as
relevant as required’. For the speaker, this means providing a minimal amount of
linguistic signal that is enough to be reliably interpreted in the way intended, assuming
the hearer is using the available contextual cues.
1.4 Aims and hypotheses
The purpose of the current thesis is to investigate the way bilingual and monolingual
preschoolers learn words through pragmatic inferences. By ’bilingual’, we mean anyone
who is regularly and frequently exposed to two or more languages in their daily lives.
In this view, the closest definition could be that of Grosjean: ‘the regular use of two
or more languages (or dialects), and bilinguals are those people who use two or more
languages (or dialects) in their everyday lives’ (Grosjean, 2008). Furthermore, we define
as ‘bilingually exposed’ those who are regularly exposed to two or more languages,
whether or not they have productive fluency in those languages. That is, we use a
criterion of exposure rather than amount or fluency for including participants in our
experiments, while explicitly stating the type of bilingualism when citing other works.
In this way, we refer to early (prebubescent) or late bilingualism, and also mention
emergent bilingualism, that is the level of bilingualism at the very beginning of learning
a new language (i.e., when exposure has been a few months/less than a year). We
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discuss the inclusion criteria for studies more in depth in Section 2.2.2 and mention
works on emergent bilingualism in Section 2.3.1.
The reason for undertaking such research is twofold. First, this thesis seeks to
provide insight into an unresolved puzzle, namely bilingual children’s ability to efficiently
learn a greater amount of vocabulary than their monolingual peers within a similar
time frame and, as we will later see, while potentially being at a disadvantage in the
strategies they can use for that purpose. Second, we wanted to explore a potential
advantage in socio-pragmatic abilities which could help solve the puzzle but whose
nature has not been precisely defined in past research. Indeed, while some studies have
provided evidence for this advantage (Yow et al., 2017; Yow & Markman, 2011a), several
separate types of skills could account for these effects, and need to be distinguished.
One possibility is that this advantage is purely due to enhanced executive control
skills, that is the cognitive processes used to monitor behaviour when intending
to achieve specific tasks and goals (Green, 1998). Another possibility is that it
results from a bilingual attentional bias towards social or speaker cues. A third final
possibility resides in better pragmatic competence, that is the ability to reason about
communicative intentions through cues. This thesis aims at exploring these different
possibilities through a series of experiments.
Previous research has mainly focused on examining bilingual children’s use of
non-linguistic social cues such as eye gaze and pointing gestures (Yow, 2015; Yow &
Markman, 2011b, 2016) or pitching perceptual or prosodic cues against semantic ones
(Champoux-Larsson & Dylman, 2018; Colunga et al., 2012; Yow & Markman, 2011a,
2015) which arguably assesses attention to social cues (point, gaze, affect, etc.) or
inhibitory control rather than pragmatic competence per se. The use of linguistic
cues for contrastive and frequency inferences, emotional affect and prosodic stress in
the absence of conflicting semantics, and non-linguistic ostensive teaching have not
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been investigated. In the studies mentioned above, better performance could have
been achieved through better inhibitory control, ignoring the irrelevant semantic of
perceptual information in favour of the point or gesture without having to reason
about the intention behind the gesture. Alternatively, it could also have been the
result of increased attention towards social or speaker cues. However, reasoning about
communicative intention was not technically required, since the point or eye gaze had
the effect of making a referent more salient than the others, thus salience alone could
be used. In contrast, in our tasks the different conditions did not directly emphasise
a referent above the others. Rather, the learners had to reason about the intention
behind the cue that was provided in order to pick the correct referent.
The structure of the thesis is as follows.
In Chapter 2, we review the literature on word learning and on bilingualism and
provide some evidence for a solution to the bilingual lexicon puzzle by postulating
enhanced pragmatic abilities.
In Chapter 3, we examine the use of prosodic cues for fast mapping (one instance
word referent disambiguation), contrasting the use of one versus two cues relying on
overinformativeness and results in a task which relies on intention reasoning (contrastive
inference) against the results in another task where it is not required based on emotional
affect.
In Chapter 4 we examine the use of one word learning cue in the context underin-
formativeness in another intention reasoning task (frequency inference).
In Chapter 5 we examine two tasks relying on ostensive teaching (a subordinate
category and an action word), intention reasoning and extending the newly acquired
word to other instances.
In Chapter 6 we draw conclusions from our results and examine the impact of
our research on the fields of pragmatic inference and bilingualism. We also conduct a
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quantitative analysis of our results in the context of a Bayesian framework of pragmatic
inference.
If the previously found bilingual advantage is purely the result of heightened
attention to social cues or greater inhibitory control, there should be no differences in
performance between bilingual and monolingual subjects in our tasks. If, on the other
hand, it is the result of a better ability to make pragmatic inferences, we would expect
bilinguals to outperform monolinguals, even when inhibitory control alone could not
have lead to better performance, and even when less cues were available (as in our first
experiment), or extension had to be performed (as in our fifth and sixth experiments)
but not when pragmatic inference was not required (as in our second experiment). We
hypothesise that this difference might be most accurately captured in word learning
paradigms since, as we previously discussed, vocabulary acquisition constitutes one of
the major bilingual challenges and arguably the domain where this advantage would
be most called for. We would further expect children to perform better with two
available cues than one, better in ostensive than non-ostensive contexts, and better
when relying on underinformativeness than overinformativeness (as the former case
is generally penalised more strongly). Finally, we would expect children to perform
less well than adults, indicating a developmental effect, as our tasks were chosen to be
challenging so as to avoid ceiling effects.
Chapter 2
The bilingual word learning puzzle
You know, there are many people in the country today who, through no fault of their
own, are sane. Some of them were born sane. Some of them became sane later in their
lives.
— Monty Python
2.1 A gavagaiesque problem
In the following sections, we investigate the process of word learning, first by presenting
three theoretical views on the phenomenon (the constraints, social and associative
accounts of word learning) and discussing evidence in favour and against each of
the views. We then discuss the need to separate the different steps constitutive of
the process of word learning (fast-mapping or referent disambiguation, extension and
retention). Finally, we present a computational approach to pragmatic inference
(the Rational Speech Act Framework, or RSA) which proposes a Bayesian model for
pragmatic word learning and informativeness reasoning.
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2.1.1 Theories of word learning
A truly amazing feat which can nevertheless be witnessed on a daily basis in infants
and young children is their ability to acquire and become proficient in a language.
The learning of the very first words of a language often appears as a task of almost
insurmountable difficulty, as Quine (1960) famous ‘gavagai’ example demonstrates: if
a speaker of an unknown language points towards a rabbit scurrying by and utters
‘gavagai ’ how do we know what part of reality is being labelled: the rabbit, a leg,
furriness, the event of rabbit running, etc.? And that is of course assuming that the
hearer has already somehow managed to extract the word from the speech stream.
This ‘indeterminacy problem’ pointed out by Quine is the main obstacle that has to
be overcome for the learning to take place. Children nevertheless benefit from both a
variety of (external) sources of information and several (internal) tools and skills to
achieve this.
Three main sources of information help narrow down the hypothesis space of possible
referents: cross-situational information (gathered through computing referent and label
co-occurrences across different learning instances), social (‘speaker-related’) cues and
linguistic (semantic and syntactic) cues. Children can efficiently use one type of cue
when not all are available: they can learn without any linguistic support (as when
learning their very first words) or on the contrary using only linguistic information
(i.e., in the case of more abstract or functional words, Gleitman, Cassidy, Nappa,
Papafragou, & Trueswell, 2005), they can learn without physical co-presence of the
referents (as when blind or learning labels for absent referents, Bloom, 2000), using
only speaker-related and linguistic information, but also without social interaction or
even a speaker being present (Baron-Cohen, 1997; Scofield & Behrend, 2011; Smith &
Yu, 2008).
2.1 A gavagaiesque problem 11
Clearly, children will succeed in learning words in very diverse contexts and using
a variety of cues, either in combination or in isolation. Less straightforward are the
processes leading to referent identification and the type of abilities recruited or needed
for it to take place, which, contrary to cues, cannot be observed directly. We know
that the child has at her disposal several cognitive tools that can be drawn upon
for word learning. Those can be grouped into three main types: associative skills,
conceptual biases and inductive abilities. How do we make use of these skills in a typical
word learning situation? Take Hirsh-Pasek, Michnick Golinkoff, and Hollich (1999)’s
example, where a very busy host asks her guest to ‘get the caponata’ (gesturing vaguely
towards the refrigerator). There are several ways to reconstruct the process of referent
disambiguation. If this is the first time the guest hears the word (i.e., no previous
cross-situational information is available) the first cue to be used will be linguistic
knowledge (if there is any). In the caponata example, the hearer is an adult and knows
the syntax of the language and meaning of the other words. This tells us the caponata
is ‘something that you can get’. Some researchers have made a case for a crucial role of
‘syntactic bootstrapping’ in word learning (e.g., Gleitman et al., 2005). It is likely that
different parts of speech (verbs, prepositions, etc.) will be acquired in different ways
. Moreover, concreteness will play a role, with more concrete terms benefiting more
from the observational context and more abstract terms from the linguistic context/the
sentence structure (Gleitman et al., 2005). However, in most cases and particularly
in the early days, syntax is likely to be a relatively minor cue, and purely syntactic
information has been shown to be mostly uninformative for word learning (Ambridge
& Lieven, 2011). Once the learner has used the linguistic information, she is left with
everything else: the physical context, speaker-related information (the common ground,
the gesture) and, most importantly, the internal tools or cognitive abilities that can
help her exploit the information available to find the correct referent of the novel
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label. In all likelihood, the guest will follow the gesture towards the fridge, which
happens to fit a common ground goal of setting the dinner table, open the latter and
choose the unknown Italian dish, thereby learning the new word by linking the label
to its referent. What are the processes that lead to the successful identification of
the referent for the novel label? Learners might benefit from a set of higher-level
conceptual biases or constraints to help them with the mapping task: children tend
to assume that a novel word labels a whole object rather than a part, property or
action (Markman, 1990; Mervis, 1987) and that it applies to something they do not
yet have a name for (Markman, 1987; Markman & Wachtel, 1988; Merriman, Bowman,
& MacWhinney, 1989) . In the case described above, assuming that there was only
one unfamiliar dish in the fridge, the guest could have made use of these constraints to
find what caponata referred to. Alternatively, children from a very young age (about
10-12 months of age) can use social cues such as gaze, gestures, physical stance, and
speaker orientation to identify the speaker’s focus of attention (Tomasello, Moore,
& Dunham, 1995) and, possibly, make inferences about the intended referent of a
novel word that are informed by the shared common ground and hypotheses about the
speaker’s intentions (Theory of Mind) (Clark, 2009). Thus the caponata case could
be resolved by applying inductive skills to speaker-related information: the gesture
can be interpreted as expressing a desire for something in the fridge, the common
ground suggests it is a dish for dinner, and the use of an unfamiliar word suggests
an unfamiliar referent (otherwise the speaker would most likely have used a familiar
word). A final possibility is that the learner does not require any higher-level abilities
(i.e., a system of lexical constraints or some type of social cognition/Theory of Mind)
but is relying exclusively on lower-level mechanisms such as salience and associative
skills to disambiguate the referent and link it to its label. In our example, the salience
of the target referent will be higher than that of other possible referents, due to the
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pointing gesture, its whole object status (a whole object is more salient than a part
since its parts all move together against a ground, Clark, 2009) and its novelty.
The first hypothesis about the processes involved in recovering the referent of a
novel word is the constraints account, which postulates that children possess a set
of (lexical) constraints or conceptual biases that allows them to narrow down the
space of possible referents. Confronted with the need to disambiguate the referent
of a novel word, empirical evidence shows that the child will usually tend to assume
from very early on that the new word labels an object rather than an action or a
property, that it is a whole object (whole-object assumption) and that it applies to
something she does not yet have a name for (mutual exclusivity) (Markman & Wachtel,
1988). More specifically, mutual exclusivity is the tendency to map a novel word to
a novel referent that has no known label rather than to a familiar one that already
has a label (e.g., assuming that ‘dax’ refers to an unknown object rather than a cup).
This has been hypothesised as being a principle resulting from assuming that every
object has only one name (Markman & Wachtel, 1988), that no two words can have
the same meaning (Clark, 1987) or that each object has to have a label (Golinkoff,
Mervis, & Hirsh-Pasek, 1994). Another, more pragmatic possibility is reasoning that
the speaker shares conventional linguistic knowledge with the hearer, knows the familiar
word for the familiar object, knows that the hearer knows it too, and if wanting to
be communicatively efficient would have referred to the known object with the known
word (Diesendruck & Markson, 2001). One last, more recently suggested option is that
this ‘principle’ is not a principle at all, a bias present from the start or universal in all
learners, but simply tends to be the result of ad hoc language experience, continuous
exposure to a system which (at least in the early stages) tends to roughly stick to a
rule of one-to-one mappings, and the realisation for the child that this strategy results
in a correct interpretation of labels (i.e., no communicative breakdowns) in most cases.
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In terms of extension, the child will assume that it can be extended to other objects
(extendibility) on a taxonomic basis (taxonomic assumption) at a basic level/the same
level as the other words that have been introduced in the same manner (basic-level
and equal detail assumptions)(Markman & Hutchinson, 1984; Rosch, Mervis, Gray,
Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976; Shipley & Kuhn, 1983). Of course, these constraints
will need to be overruled in some cases for learning to take place (i.e., when learning
that superordinate terms such as ‘fruit’ can label an object they already have a
name for, e.g., ‘banana’), in this sense they are usually not presented as rules but
as probabilistic constraints: they help the child determine what is most likely to be
referred to (Golinkoff et al., 1999). However, proponents of this account have not been
clear about whether these constraints are innate and/or domain-specific (i.e., restricted
to word learning) and why they should be (Ambridge & Lieven, 2011) or, if they
are ‘default constraints’, when and where they would start to take effect/disappear
(Clark, 2009). Furthermore, they seem to be inconsistent with data on spontaneous
speech in children (Clark, 1997; Clark & Grossman, 1998) and some effects predicted
by this system (e.g., underextension errors, such as applying the word it to shoes
only) have not been found (Tomasello, 2003). Finally, if these constraints are neither
innate, domain-specific, or covering all possible wrong assumptions about naming (e.g.,
assuming that names for objects change from one day to the other), it is difficult to see
how it is still relevant to postulate them, instead of simply explaining the biases found
in the empirical evidence through general social and/or attentional mechanisms (Deák,
Flom, & Pick, 2000). As we have mentioned, a whole object is more salient because
all its parts move together against a ground (Clark, 2009), objects can be grouped by
similarity, often according to a salient feature (e.g., shape, giving rise to the shape
bias, which might then lead to taxonomic categorisation, as we will see), new words
will often refer to a basic-level category (e.g., cat), because they have more internal
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similarities than superordinate categories (e.g., animal) and contrast more with other
basic-level categories (e.g., cat vs. dog) than subordinate categories (e.g., labrador vs.
spaniel) (Tversky & Hemenway, 1984), and finally children will use contrasting words
to match contrasting objects or parts (mutual exclusivity). All of these constraints
thus seem like they could be the product of general perceptual/attentional processes,
such as salience (Samuelson & Smith, 1998).
The second theory offering an explanation for the process through which we
disambiguate the referent of a novel word is the socio-pragmatic account. According
to proponents of this account, the narrowing of the hypothesis space of possible referents
for a new word comes from interpreting the speaker’s communicative intentions (e.g.,
Clark, 2009; Tomasello, 2003). To achieve this, the speaker first needs to establish joint
focus of attention with the child through diverse means: gestures, gaze, orientation,
facial expressions, prosody, etc. (Clark, 2009) and the child will use these cues and
what she knows about other people’s communicative intentions in general to infer the
meaning that the speaker has in mind for a particular word. Some researchers have
indeed suggested that social interaction is necessary for word learning: according to
them, lexical acquisition could not happen from mere exposure, for example through
television (Kuhl, 2007). Following this view, the guest searching for the caponata
among the other objects in the fridge would not look to fill in a gap in her lexicon
(i.e., ‘I do not have a name for this object yet so I will apply this new label to it’) as
the constraints account would predict, but rather would make inferences under the
assumption that the speaker is observing two major principles in her use of language:
the principle of conventionality (‘speakers use the conventional form in use among the
community to convey their meaning’) and, as its corollary, the principle of contrast
(‘speakers using a different form wish to convey a different meaning’). Thus, hearing
the unknown word, the guest from our example might try and make an inference
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about the speaker’s communicative intentions using these two principles, i.e., ‘if the
speaker had had in mind any of the familiar objects in the fridge they would have
used the familiar word for it, so this novel word must refer to the unfamiliar dish’.
Children do appear to make use of social information in word learning situations when
it is available and, as a result, avoid mapping a new label to a referent that is not in
the speaker’s focus of attention: e.g. the toy they are playing with and not the one
the speaker is playing with, an object that is novel for them but not for the speaker,
an object that is physically present when the novel word is uttered while the target
referent is not (Baldwin, 1993; Tomasello & Kruger, 1992; Tomasello, Strosberg, &
Akhtar, 1996). This evidence suggests that, even though children might start applying
labels by relying exclusively on perceptual features and simple associating skills, they
rapidly start to use speaker-related information to override salience. A study by Moore,
Angelopoulos, and Bennett (1999) showed that 12 month-old children do not follow eye
gaze on a ‘boring’ object compared to an ‘interesting’ (lit up and spinning) one, but
that by 19 months they will associate a novel word with the ‘boring’ object the speaker
is looking at rather than the lit up, spinning one. Of course, the case might be made
that this simply means that from a certain age social cues such as eye gaze will be
more salient to the child than perceptual features such as colour or movement. Indeed,
social cognition and joint attention do not appear to be crucially necessary for word
learning. Studies such as Scofield and Behrend’s (2011) not only show that learning
is successful without intersubjective awareness, joint focus, or indeed a speaker being
present at all, but also that in the first two cases (and also in the case where the focus
of the speaker is ambiguous), the success rate is not significantly impaired compared
to a word learning instance where speaker and child have attained joined attention. It
has been found that at least some word learning could occur if children were presented
with novel objects simultaneously with a novel word uttered in a disembodied voice
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(Smith & Yu, 2008). Infants as young as 6 months are also able to recognise the
meaning of very familiar words (Tincoff, 2001), even though socio-pragmatic skills do
not seem to be used until 10 or 12 months of age, which is when joint attention can be
achieved (Bloom, 2000) and children with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) having
very reduced social skills do succeed at learning words (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997).
Similarly, if mutual exclusivity is the result of a socio-pragmatic process (i.e., trying
to infer the speaker’s communicative intentions), it is difficult to understand why it
would lead children to ignore very strong social cues such as pointing and gazing when
choosing between two potential referents for a new label (Jaswal & Hansen, 2006).
While differing in the perspective they take on the process of word learning, both the
constraint-based and the socio-pragmatic account have in common that they postulate
the need of higher-level abilities (a system of lexical constraints/some kind of inductive
ability or Theory of Mind for interpreting the intentions and actions of others) for
word learning. However, research in the past years has struggled to find higher-level
processes or abilities without which word learning would not be possible.
The associative learning account suggests that no abilities of this type are in fact
required, and that learning the meaning of words can be reduced to associative learning,
where the indeterminacy problem is solved using only perceptual and attentional
information (such as salience) and/or statistics (by tracking label and referent co-
occurrences) (Colunga & Smith, 2005; Samuelson & Smith, 1998; Wasserman, Brooks,
& McMurray, 2015). Many studies have shown that this type of statistical word
learning could be successfully achieved (e.g., Yu & Smith, 2008). Can we make do
with just associative learning? Associative processes have been shown to involve much
more that just ‘simple’ word-referent mapping or counting co-occurrences. Algorithms
based on associations display effects and properties encountered in more naturalistic
word learning situations, such as acceleration in the rate of learning, abstraction of
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generalizable dimensions or selective attention, rapid inference of new names, order-of-
presentation effects, and more generally expectations created by a series of low-level
factors (error factors, amount of experience with the object, appearance, spatial
location, etc.) (Wasserman et al., 2015). However, there are strong indications that
word learning cannot be reduced to associations. Several studies have shown that
infants do not make mapping errors in cases of discrepant labelling (hearing a label
when focussed on a non-target referent) (e.g., Baldwin,1993) and the vocabulary deficits
linked to autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997) seem hard to reconcile with a theory of
word learning as a mere associative process. As Waxman and Gelman (2009) put it,
‘words do not merely associate, they refer.’ (p. 258). There is indeed a principle (not
exactly a constraint) mentioned, among others, by Golinkoff, Mervis, and Hirsh-Pasek
(1994), and subsumed under Clark (1988)’s principle of conventionality, that seems
both to be at the foundation of word learning and not to be liable of a reduction to
basic perceptual or attentional mechanisms: the principle of reference, i.e., as Golinkoff
and colleagues put it, the knowledge that ‘things have a name’. This does not need be
an innate principle: it is possible, even likely, that children in the very first months
of their life learn associations between sounds and objects or events the way dogs do,
which is in a goes with manner (the bell goes with the door opening, the ring goes with
the telephone and the word daddy goes with that particular person) (Golinkoff et al.,
1999) and only later gain the insight that things have a name and that a word stands
for an object (or rather, in the case of a common noun and if the child understands
extendibility, a type of object). However, how the human child comes to experience
that insight and shift to a ‘smart’ associative functioning is quite mysterious.
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2.1.2 Fast mapping vs. learning
These different accounts of word learning (i.e., accounts that involve lower-level mecha-
nisms and accounts that involve higher-level mechanisms) could possibly be reconciled
by arguing that different phases of word learning will require different types of input
and strategies. An interesting result of Horst and Samuelson (2008)was that retention
of novel mappings was only made possible when followed by ostensive naming, i.e., the
experimenter designating the object and saying ‘This is X’, which they attributed to
counterbalancing the attention to the familiar competitors. Consistent with this, a
more recent study traces back children with ASD’s difficulties in learning vocabulary to
their failure to use feedback provided for retention (while they perform as well as nor-
mally developing children in the disambiguation task/fast mapping) (Adams-Bedford,
Wallis, & Backus, 2013). This stresses the importance of separating the mechanism of
first linking the word to the referenced object (whether through simple association or
through higher-order inference) and the actual creation of a permanent new entry in the
lexicon. These are two different steps, with one leading much less than systematically to
the other. Horst and Samuelson (2008) showed that two-year-olds were very efficient at
selecting a referent in a disambiguation task, but were not retaining any of the mappings
that had been performed (unless ostensive naming was added). In Bion, Borovsky, and
Fernald (2013), the number of (familiar) competitors in an instance of referent selection
did not influence fast mapping, but negatively impacted retention for these mappings,
which they attributed to the child’s attention being distracted from the novel object by
the familiar competitors. It is thus possible that two different processes (probabilistic
constraint-satisfaction mechanism and associative/connectionist learning) account for
these different phases of word learning, requiring different resources, operating at
different timescales and being interrelated without necessarily being causally linked. If
the number of (familiar) competitors present during referent selection can be argued to
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impair retention (providing that the child indeed attends to the familiar competitors
each in turn and does not ‘scan’ the room for a novel object, as Horst, Scott, & Pollard,
2010 hypothesise), a rich environment with diverse elements has been proven many
times to enhance memorisation by acting as a retrieval cue (Dautriche & Chemla,
2014). Indeed, in Zosh, Brinster, and Halberda (2013)’s study, children’s retention of
mappings created through inference in a disambiguation task (i.e., with one familiar
competitor: ‘point at the lorp’) were significantly better than mappings resulting from
direct instruction (only one object present: ‘this is a lorp’). While many explanations
could account for this result (i.e., more engagement or more motivation when the child
is more active in the task, more ‘processing depth’, etc.), there is a possibility that the
presence of a small number of competitors (one, in this case) helps remembering the
mapping by acting as a retrieval cue without constituting too heavy a burden in terms
of memory and attentional resources (and thus risking having the opposite effect).
This would reconcile tenants of statistical associative word learning and higher-level
inferential strategies: fast-mapping would constitute an instance of problem solving
through a socio-pragmatic or exclusion inference (ideally with an adequate number of
competitors balancing indeterminacy and availability of retrieval cues), while learning
and retention would happen through computing statistical regularities, with the help
of a social factor.
2.1.3 A Bayesian model: the RSA framework
In the past ten years or so, several frameworks were developed which attempt to
formally model pragmatic inferences using Bayesian statistics and principles derived
from information and game theory. The main idea behind this approach is that speakers
and listeners communicate by recursively thinking about each other’s intentions. Just
like in the classic prisoner’s dilemma (Rapoport, Chammah, & Orwant, 1965), the
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choice of behaviour in a social context is influenced by the other intelligent entities
involved. In this famous dilemma, two prisoners with no means of communicating
are given two choices: betray the other and walk free while the other prisoner serves
three years, or stay silent. If both prisoners stay silent, both serve one year ; if both
speak, both serve two years. A rational individual who does not reason about the
other prisoner as an intelligent being should choose to betray, since it provides a better
outcome whatever the other prisoner chooses. However, if both prisoners reason about
the other’s best individual choice and realise this leads to both betraying (and thus
both serving two years) and that the other prisoner will have come to this conclusion
too, they might decide to stay silent on the assumption that the other prisoner will
want to cooperate to avoid a rational equilibrium with a worse mutual outcome. This
is in effect what often happens when humans are presented with this dilemma.
The prisoner’s reasoning involves several steps of recursive reasoning (thinking
about what the other prisoner is thinking about what the first prisoner is thinking
etc.). Communication can be seen as a game where both interlocutors are seeking to
maximise their cost/benefit efficiency. A speaker choosing an entirely self-centered
behaviour (minimising their cost and maximising the listener’s) would not say or do
anything and leave all communicative cost to the listener. They would be assuming
very sophisticated, almost supernatural, mind reading powers on the part of the listener
(i.e., telepathy). On the other end of the spectrum, a speaker who assumed the listener
not to be performing any such mind reading would have to maximise their own cost by
being as explicit as possible (just like when interacting with a computer for example).
Efficient communication through pragmatic inference results from searching the space
of possible behaviours to reach a mutual equilibrium between these two extreme cases,
where speakers are providing listeners with just enough input for them to be reasonably
expected to correctly infer meaning (Franke, 2011).
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While in theory this could involve infinite recursion, in practice the Rational Speech
Act (RSA, Frank & Goodman, 2012) framework provides a starting point with a literal
listener L0 expected to calculate probabilities for referents based on semantic meaning
only.
Thus, in the classic scalar implicature example (e.g., ‘Some of the students failed’ ),
L0 computes the probability of some to be 0 for non compatible meanings and 1 for all
compatible meanings, equally divided between them, i.e., 0.5 for ‘all’ and 0.5 for ‘some
not all’. Similarly, L0 can compute the probability of all as 1 for the meaning ‘all’.
A pragmatic speaker is assumed to be rational and choose an utterance to maximise
benefit (or utility), i.e., the chance that the literal listener will infer the correct referent.
The word all has a utility of 1 for the meaning ‘all’ whereas the word some would only
have a utility of 0.5 for the same meaning.
Finally, a pragmatic listener reasons about a pragmatic speaker (who chose their
behaviour by reasoning about the literal listener) to infer the meaning of the word
or utterance used. Bayesian statistics come into play by providing the posterior
probability of each alternative referent as the product (or addition, in log space) of the
prior probability for the referent and the likelihood given the word used. Assuming a
uniform prior (i.e., equal prior probabilities for all meanings), since the utility of some
for conveying ‘all’ is half as high as that of all, it is half as likely to have been used to
mean ‘all’ than ‘not all’.
The extent of this recursive process is subject to debate. Indeed, studies examining
the issue find little evidence for humans reasoning beyond one recursive step (corre-
sponding to second-degree Theory of Mind, i.e., reasoning about what the interlocutor
thinks you are thinking) (Degen, Franke, & Jager, 2013) and, as we discuss in the next
sections, even first degree Theory of Mind might not always be required (Keysar, Barr,
Balin, & Brauner, 2000) which indicates that perhaps a more minimalist Bayesian
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model could be proposed (Muhlstein, 2016). Indeed, the ‘some not all’ implicature
could perhaps be arrived at by simply considering the specificity (or ‘narrowness’) of
each hypothesis: some is twice as specific for the meaning ‘some not all’ (which can
only be expressed using this word) than for ‘all’ (which can be expressed using a more
informative word).
However, the RSA framework has successfully modelled a wide range of pragmatic
phenomena, from choices of modifier (Frank & Goodman, 2012) to choices of reference
level (Graf, Degen, Hawkins, & Goodman, 2016), cross-situational word learning
(Goodman, Tenenbaum, & Black, 2008), ad hoc quantity implicatures (Stiller, Goodman,
& Frank, 2015), word learning based on frequency (Frank & Goodman, 2014) and
inferring properties of novel categories from referring expressions (Horowitz & Frank,
2016).
In one of their first studies of this kind, Frank and Goodman (2012) presented
participants with a referential language game where they had to refer to coloured
shapes (e.g., a blue square, blue circle and green square) using only one word. They
collected data both on prior probabilities of referring to each of the shapes (before
any words had been uttered) and on how likely listeners thought each shape was to
be referred to, given a single word uttered (e.g., ‘Which shape would you bet on if
you heard the word ‘blue”? ). The authors then built a model based on the Bayesian
framework mentioned, using the combination of prior probabilities and likelihoods of
each shape given the word uttered, as proportional to the utility, of informativeness
of the word for each shape (e.g., ‘blue’ is twice as informative for the blue square as
for the blue circle). They found participant’s responses to be closely quantitatively
matched to the predictions of the model. A similar framework was used in Frank,
Goodman, and Tenenbaum (2009) to model word learning by simultaneously combining
cross-situational information (as raising the prior probabilities of some referents) and
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reasoning about intentions, and found to outperform models which only used one
source of information.
In conclusion, it seems that theories of word learning can only be successful in
producing accurate models of performance when taking into account the diversity of
sources that children can draw upon and combining/weighting them in a probabilistic
way (a constraint-based, or cue integration approach, which we return to in later
chapters), but also the different developmental timelines involved in each type of
cue/source of information, and the varying weights given to these cues in each of the
steps leading to the creation of a novel entry in the mental lexicon.
2.2 Adding complexity
In the following sections, we present an overview of the problem of word learning in
a multilingual environment. We begin by describing how an environment involving
multiple languages has a potential impact on a number of cognitive, social and linguistic
aspects of development. We then outline how these differences might influence the
way children growing up with two or more languages build a vocabulary in each of
their languages. We finish by examining one attempt at modelling multilingual word
learning using a Bayesian framework similar to that of the Rational Speech Act, which
show poor performance despite some tentative adaptations.
2.2.1 The multilingual environment
While monolinguals are having to perform intricated bootstrapping to overcome a
seemingly unsolvable indeterminacy problem, a substantial number of children are
faced with the task of acquiring not just one, but multiple languages. These early
bilinguals will need to both quickly realise the presence of multiple systems and to
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learn to distinguish between them. Both early and late bilinguals will learn to switch
between and inhibit the languages (Green, 1998). In addition, no matter the age at
which a second language is learned (this includes late L2 learners), bilinguals have
to face greater complexity (syntactic, semantic, lexical, prosodic and phonological) in
the linguistic input they process as well as in the communicative interactions they
are involved in. For early, but also late bilingual learners, this greater complexity of
input might mean that some categories (semantic, phonological, and perhaps syntactic)
will tend to be built or to converge in a hybrid rather than separate fashion (Storms,
Ameel, & Malt, 2015) or, in the case of number of lexical items in each language, result
in some early delays (Bialystok, Luk, Peets, & Yang, 2010).
One correlate of bilingualism that has been given a lot of attention is the need
to exert some type of control over the two languages to allow the bilingual speaker
to switch between languages when needed and inhibit the irrelevant language while
using the other one (Green, 1998). An extensive body of experimental literature
has shown early bilingual children outperforming monolinguals on tasks related to
executive functioning skills, such as working memory, inhibition and cognitive flexibility
(Barac & Bialystok, 2011; Bialystok & Craik, 2010). Yet many studies have failed to
replicate these results and the very existence of this alleged advantage has recently been
questioned (Paap, Johnson, & Sawi, 2015). However, the inconsistency in the results
could be due to different types of bilingualism having differential influences: earlier
acquisition, higher proficiency and more frequent switching between languages are for
example likely to result in a higher need for control abilities (Green, 2011). Improved
skills in executive control could enhance the basic associative mechanisms underlying
instances of word learning by allowing the bilinguals to retain a greater number of
possible referents for a novel word and switching more easily between hypothesised
referents. This advantage could be mediated by verbal short-term memory (Papagno
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& Vallar, 1995) or inhibitory control (Bartolotti, Marian, Schroeder, & Shook, 2011).
The cognitive advantages experienced by bilinguals could also potentially have an
impact on word learning beyond simple associative mechanisms, by improving their
ability to combine cues to word meanings from different sources and ignore irrelevant
or contradictory information (Marian & Kaushanskaya, 2007).
Another obvious difference between bilinguals and monolinguals is that the former
possess not one but two different semantic systems, which appear to exert an influence
on each other at a lexical as well as a conceptual level. As a result, bilinguals appear
to experience facilitation in acquiring certain types of words. For example, vocabulary
checklists in simultaneous bilinguals (English-L2, aged 6-92 months) show that they
learn more easily words that they have already learned in one language, giving rise to
overproduction of translation equivalents (TEs) compared to hypothesised independent
systems, and resulting in sparser lexicons than monolinguals’ (Bilson, Yoshida, Tran,
Woods, & Hills, 2015). Early sequential bilinguals in a picture-naming task (Samoan-
English, aged 4.7-5.2) also learn more easily words that are conceptually closer in
both languages (Hemsley, Holm, & Dodd, 2013), whereas late proficient bilinguals
(English-Spanish, mean age= 24.91) are better at learning novel words with a higher
level of concreteness, probably due to the fact that they share more conceptual features
across languages (Kaushanskaya & Rechtzigel, 2012) . The two lexicons also appear to
interact at a conceptual level. Empirical evidence indicates that activation of a lexical
unit activates all conceptual features associated with it, including features from the
non-target language (Colomé, 2001; Costa, Miozzo, & Caramazza, 1999). For example,
in a French-English bilingual, the English word ‘finger’ is likely to activate information
related to both fingers and toes, given that the same word (doigt) is used for both
in French. In proficient late adult bilinguals, this co-activation can result in ‘in the
moment’ semantic transfer, where a word of phrase is used in a way that is consistent
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with its semantic content in the non-target language (Elston-Güttler & Williams, 2008;
Marian & Kaushanskaya, 2007)). Alternatively, it also appears to give rise to a deeper
change in lexical representations, creating overextended or ‘in-between’ categories
that do not correspond to either monolingual equivalent, revealing a bidirectional
influence for both balanced early bilingual adults (Dutch-French, Ameel, Malt, Storms,
& Van Assche, 2009; Ameel, Storms, Malt, & Sloman, 2005) and children (aged 5-14,
Dutch-French, Storms et al., 2015), whereas only an influence of L1 on L2 was found
in late bilingual adults (aged 18-25, Arabic-English, Gathercole & Moawad, 2010).
Early bilinguals have long been thought to have better metalinguistic skills (includ-
ing word awareness, grammatical awareness and phonological awareness) than their
monolingual counterparts (Ben-Zeev, 1977; Bialystok, 1988; Cummins & Mulcahy, 1978;
Ricciardelli, 1992). This would result from early insights about the explicit functioning
and arbitrary nature of language derived from the availability of two alternative lin-
guistic systems. As such, bilingualism is also likely to influence metalinguistic abilities
more particularly related to word learning mechanisms and principles. In terms of
word learning strategies, an important point where bilinguals and monolinguals have
been seen to diverge is application of mutual exclusivity. As we have seen previously,
when learning words, children (and adults) tend to disambiguate between referents by
applying a principle of mutual exclusivity (lexical constraints account) or, possibly, by
assuming that the speaker behaves according to a principle of contrast (socio-pragmatic
account). The mutual exclusivity results in a tendency to attribute a new name to a
new object rather than a familiar one, e.g. for children to decide to use a new label
like zav to refer to an (unknown) garlic press rather than to, e.g., a cup for which they
already have a name (Markman & Wachtel, 1988). This principle seems not to apply
between languages in simultaneous and early sequential bilinguals and to be gener-
ally weaker for bilingual than for monolingual children (3-6 years old, English-Urdu,
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Davidson & Tell, 2005; 2-4 years old, Danish-English, Healey & Skarabela, 2008; 2-5
years old, English-L2, Bialystok, Barac, Blaye, & Poulin-Dubois, 2010). Furthermore,
this tendency seems to correlate with number of languages (Byers-Heinlein & Werker,
2009) and lexicon structure in simultaneous bilinguals (17-18 months, English-Chinese,
Byers-Heinlein & Werker, 2013) with more translation equivalents (TEs) leading to a
less reliable application of mutual exclusivity. However, this difference might not lie
in the use of disambiguation itself but rather in the degree of acceptance of lexical
overlap. A study by Kalashnikova, Mattock, and Monaghan (2015) tested these two
tendencies separately in 3 to 5 year old simultaneous bilingual children (English-L2)
by having them perform a classic mutual exclusivity task and another task where
two labels were introduced for the same unfamiliar object, and found that bilinguals
were successful in performing the first task but showed a greater acceptance of lexical
overlap in the second task. A study by Rowe, Jacobson, and Saylor (2015) conducted
on simultaneous bilinguals (aged 3.5-5.11, English-L2) also showed that they were more
likely to accept two overlapping labels for one object given some pragmatic information
to that effect. In their study, children were presented with a familiar object including
a salient part (for example, a boat with a cabin), and a novel label was offered, either
without any extra information in the baseline condition, (e.g., ‘this is a skiff’ ), with
a small amount of pragmatic information encouraging the drop of mutual exclusivity
constraint in a second condition (e.g., ‘this is a skiff, it’s a boat’ ), or with a high
amount of pragmatic information in a third ‘rich’ condition (e.g., ‘this is a skiff, it’s
a kind of boat’ ). Bilinguals were above chance in the second condition in using the
label for the whole object rather than the part, whereas monolinguals needed a higher
amount of information to accept two names for the same object.
Bilingual experience also appears to have an influence on the application of other
principles of word learning, such as the principle of conventionality, and on patterns of
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categorisation. Henderson and Scott (2015) show that simultaneous bilingual infants
(M=13 months, English-L2) are more conservative in their assumptions of conven-
tionality, extending conventional meanings less both within and between languages
and speakers. In their study, bilingual and monolingual children were familiarized
with two speakers who both spoke the same language, or a different language, and
were then presented with an habituation word learning paradigm. Statistical analyses
of looking time measurements showed that bilinguals did not expect the same label
to be used by speakers of the same language, and were actually surprised (looked
longer) when two speakers of different languages used the same label to name a novel
object. As regards categorisation, Storms et al. (2015) tested simultaneous and early
sequential balanced bilinguals (aged 5-14 years, Dutch-French) in a container-naming
paradigm where they had to attribute a label (e.g., bottle, flask, etc.) to different
types of containers for which the label/type mappings do not systematically overlap
between languages. Not only did they find, as we mentioned above, that bilinguals’
categorisation patterns in both languages did not match either monolingual equivalent,
but bilinguals also appeared to rely for a longer time on similarity-based categorisation,
starting to produce language-specific exceptions to that principle around 14 years of
age, while they appeared around age 10 in monolinguals.
Some researchers (Byers-Heinlein & Werker, 2009; Houston-Price, Caloghiris, &
Raviglione, 2010) suggested that the presence of translation equivalents in the bilingual’s
lexicon could give rise to an early understanding that one referent can have two
labels, and thus to a less systematic application of the mutual exclusivity principle.
Disambiguation would then be directly influenced by lexical knowledge and more
particularly by the number of many-to-one (inter and intra-linguistic synonyms)
versus one-to-one mappings contained in the lexicon. This could explain both why
disambiguation does not arise concurrently with word knowledge but significantly
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later (Halberda, 2003; Markman, Wasow, & Hansen, 2003), and why there seem to be
differences in its application by multilingual infants. This could mean that there are at
least two lexical profiles for bilinguals: balanced bilinguals, having more translation
equivalents and thus also allowing (through a weaker use of mutual exclusivity) for
more intra-linguistic synonyms (amounting to more many-to-one mappings and a less
‘conceptually diversified’ vocabulary) and dominant bilinguals, showing the opposite
trend (and a maybe more ‘conceptually diversified’ lexicon). This increased reflective
perspective on language could also lead to a different perception of other word learning
principles, resulting in bilinguals making different linguistic ‘bets’ than monolinguals,
i.e., generalising certain principles less (such as conventionality or mutual exclusivity)
and other principles more (such as similarity-based categorisation).
Finally, bilinguals appear to show different sensitivities to cues for word learning and
segmentation. Gervain and Werker (unpublished results)’s study using a high-amplitude
sucking paradigm (HAS) shows that 7-month simultaneous bilinguals (English-L2 with
a different word order) are able to use prosody to segment noun phrases, whereas
monolinguals do not. Moreover, at 8 months they continue using cues such as face
movements in a task of language discrimination, whereas monolinguals can use this
cue to discriminate between languages at 4 and 6 months but no longer pay attention
to it at later stages (Werker, 2012).
2.2.2 Building a lexicon
Can we see in bilingual lexicons evidence of differences in word learning efficiency or
abilities? No matter the type of bilingualism, or indeed, multilingualism involved, a
common and defining feature is a reduced amount of input per language. Children
growing up in multilingual environments are by definition exposed to only a subset of
the input monolingual children receive for the same language. Even in cases where the
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multilingual exposure is very limited (say, 5%), this is still denting on the equivalent
input that would be entirely dedicated to a single language. It is, however, unlikely
that a perfectly linear correlation exists between amount of exposure and vocabulary
proficiency (an hour of exposure doesn’t equate an hour of ‘pure’ input, and the quality
of that input may vary widely, not to mention the subject’s learning abilities). So, to
what extent does this reduced input impact the bilingual’s word knowledge?
Unsurprisingly, receptive and productive vocabularies of bilinguals do seem to lag
behind those of their monolingual counterparts, at least at early ages. In terms of
scale, the most prominent study examining this effect is that of Bialystok, Luk, et
al. (2010), who collected standard vocabulary test scores data from different studies
for 1,738 children aged 3 to 10 years old. Of these, 966 were classified as ‘bilinguals’,
defined as children being schooled in English, speaking another language at home on a
daily basis, and reported by parents to be fluent in both languages. This description
highlights the importance of spelling out clearly the criteria for participant selection in
studies that include bilingual subjects. Failing to do so leads to the risk of generalising
to the whole bilingual population effects or advantages (such as cognitive advantages)
that may be the prerogative of a certain type of bilingualism only.
Bilingualism can be described along three (highly correlated) main dimensions:
frequency, amount and fluency. All studies agree that a child experiencing multilingual
exposure that is not regular, substantial, or resulting in any degree of linguistic
competence does not classify as bilingual. The most widely used entry criterion is
frequency: the exposure has to be regular. The rule of thumb is generally that one or
both parents speak another language than the school language (which approximately
ensures daily exposure to both languages). Additionally, many studies require that
a certain threshold amount of exposure be reached, generally 25% (Byers-Heinlein,
2017; Byers-Heinlein & Werker, 2009; Yow et al., 2017) or 20 hours a week (Junker
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& Stockman, 2002) and that the child be described by her parents as ‘fluent in both
languages’ (Akhtar, Menjivar, Hoicka, & Sabbagh, 2012; Bialystok, Luk, et al., 2010) or
‘being able to speak and understand both languages’ (Fan, Liberman, Keysar, & Kinzler,
2015). Older studies relied mainly on the frequency criterion, classifying as ‘bilingual’
any child who had regular exposure, even non-daily or minimal (less that 25%) to
another language (Pearson, Fernandez, Lewedeg, & Oller, 1997; Pearson, Fernández,
& Oller, 1993) . In more recent studies, however, there is a tendency to distinguish
bilingual from ‘bilingually exposed’ children using criteria of both amount of exposure
and fluency, and to label with the latter term a child that benefits from ‘minimal’
regular exposure to another language (e.g., weekly, or less than 20%) and cannot be
described as fluent in that language (Akhtar et al., 2012; Fan et al., 2015; Menjivar &
Akhtar, 2017). There does not appear to have been attempts to include and/or label
as bilingual individuals with opposite profiles, probably because multilingualism could
then not be described as enough of a part of the child’s daily life to be of consequence
(e.g., playing with Spanish cousins during the summer holidays) or because this profile
is unlikely to be encountered in children and/or constitutes an unstable situation liable
to attrition phenomena (e.g., having a high competence in French but hardly ever
putting it to use).
As we said, studies such as Bialystok et al.’s (2010) which examined the lexical
knowledge of bilingual children (as defined by the criteria we mentioned previously; i.e.,
regular exposure and fluency in more than one language) did find significantly lower
levels of performance in bilinguals. However, several points regarding these results
should be raised.
First, most of these studies, including Bialystok et al.’s (2010) have assessed
vocabulary knowledge in only one of the child’s languages, generally English, which
represents only part of the ‘bilingual picture’ and total vocabulary knowledge of the
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child. Second, this disadvantage is far from being as extended as would be expected
both from the reduced amount of input and the consequences of multilingual exposure
in terms of available learning strategies, as we will explain later. While Bialystok et al.’s
(2010) found performance to be only around 10% lower for bilinguals in English (with
a mean of 96.3 for bilinguals and 106.8 for monolinguals on the PPVT), most studies
which only assess English tend to find levels of receptive vocabulary for bilinguals to be
about 60 to 90% of monolinguals’, mostly in the upper end of this range (Byers-Heinlein
& Werker, 2009; Fan et al., 2015; Yow, 2015; Yow & Markman, 2015).
What about the other language? Do children reach these normal levels of English
vocabulary despite having about half the exposure of the monolinguals’ (most studies
average 50% exposure for each language) at dire cost in their other language? It appears
not. What we learn from the few studies which examined vocabulary knowledge in
both languages known by the child is that having about 60 to 90% as many words in
one language as monolinguals does not mean having only about 10 to 40% in the other
language (which would amount to a similar number of lexical items as monolinguals).
In the vast majority of cases, bilinguals simply have more words. Umbel et al. (1992)
studied 105 Miami first graders and found their performance on the PPVT to be
between 69.7 (Spanish only at home) and 88.0 (English and Spanish at home), while
their TVIP (Spanish equivalent of the PPVT) was on par with monolinguals’ at 97.
Junker and Stockman (2002) examined the productive vocabularies of ten German-
English (one person/one language) bilinguals with two carefully matched monolingual
groups and found that they could produce about 50% more items (approximately
300 words in total), while their conceptual vocabulary (calculated as the number of
concepts for which the child knows a word in at least one language, i.e., translation
equivalents referring to the same concept such as ‘cat’ and ‘Katze’ being counted as one
lexical item) was the same (about 200 concepts). Scheffner Hammer, Lawrence, and
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Miccio (2008) measured the receptive vocabularies of 83 Miami children in year 1 and
2 found their scores in both languages to be between 62 (for Spanish in homes where
both Spanish and English were spoken) and 87 (for English in the same situation).
Similarly, De Houwer et al. (2014) investigated the productive and receptive lexical
knowledge of 31 French-Dutch (one person/one language) bilinguals and found that,
when both languages were combined, they understood significantly (about 71%) more
words than monolinguals, while their production levels, either for Dutch only or both
languages combined, did not differ significantly from monolinguals’.
One exception to bilinguals knowing significantly more words than monolinguals
(and the only one known by us) is Pearson et al.’s (1993) seminal study, which found
levels of vocabulary in bilinguals to be approximately correlated with levels of input,
i.e., about 50% of monolinguals’ in both English and Spanish. However, the sample size
used was small (25), some bilinguals had very unbalanced levels of exposure (less than
25%), and the results are altogether surprising: the bilinguals’ conceptual vocabulary
was approaching monolingual levels, which means most of the words known in either
language had no translation equivalent in the other language, a situation that would
be both unlikely and communicatively inefficient. Indeed, while some words are bound
to be language and situation-specific (for example, restricted to the home or school
environment), many words will be relevant to all communicative settings.
Even if we make the conservative assumption that Pearson et al. (1993)’s results were
truly representative of their sample’s skills, these are still levels of performance that are
within the normal range and do not fall below what would be expected from the input,
assuming no other disadvantages compared to learning in a monolingual environment.
Can we actually make this assumption? Without even considering difficulties related
to greater variation, multilingual input potentially results in language learners being
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less able to rely on some of the most widely used word learning strategies, such as
mutual exclusivity, or some assumptions about conventionality.
The idea that mutual exclusivity is a direct consequence of specific language
experience derives from observing that it is not available from the onset of language but
later, around 17 months of age (Halberda, 2003) and that it appears to be less reliably
used by bilinguals (Bialystok, Barac, Blaye, & Poulin-Dubois, 2010; Byers-Heinlein &
Werker, 2009, 2013). Even more, it seems to be directly linked to the type of linguistic
input the child has experienced. Byers-Heinlein and Werker (2009) studied three
groups of 16 children aged 17 or 18 months old, either monolingual (no systematic
exposure to another language than English), bilingual (at least 25% exposure to other
language since birth, average 48% English) or trilingual (at least 20% exposure to
two other languages since birth, average 47% English). They found that monolinguals
significantly increased their looks towards the novel object when hearing a novel word,
whereas that tendency was only marginal in bilinguals, and absent in trilinguals. This
suggests that the type of language experience, but also, as demonstrated in a later study
(Byers-Heinlein & Werker, 2013) the type of lexicon already acquired, and whether it
contains many translation equivalents (resulting in one-to-many mappings), are directly
correlated to the use of mutual exclusivity. An interesting result of their study is that,
despite having similar or even lower levels of exposure and making significantly less
use of mutual exclusivity, trilinguals actually outperformed bilinguals on vocabulary
scores and knew about 77% of monolinguals’ words, showing that they were able to
learn as much if not more words without relying on this strategy. Studies have tended
to suggest that multilingual exposure affects expectations about conventionality more
generally: contrary to monolinguals, bilingual toddlers do not apply mutual exclusivity
between languages (Byers-Heinlein et al., 2013), expect the meaning of a word not
to be shared between speakers of different languages (Henderson & Scott, 2015) and
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bilingual infants appear not to share monolinguals’ expectations of one-to-one relations
between words and referents, i.e., that two labels should not refer to the same category,
or the same label to two different categories (Byers-Heinlein, 2017). This begs the
question of how these expectations relate to actual word learning performances; i.e.,
how necessary they are and what do children use if they are not using them?
2.2.3 Modelling bilingual word learning
As mentioned in section 2.1.3, some computational models have successfully used
Bayesian probabilities to build computational models of pragmatic inferences, including
those involved in word learning. Zinszer, Rolotti, Li, and Li (2018) recently attempted
to use a similar model to predict learning with multilingual input and obtained (as
would be expected) very poor performance with a strict rule of mutual exclusivity
arrived at through a requirement for scarcity (i.e., encouraging smaller lexicons).
However, even when spelling out mutual exclusivity in a more straightforward way
(by discouraging one-to-many mappings) and allowing it to be a flexible parameter
tuned by the algorithm to the type of linguistic input (monolingual or bilingual, in
accordance with Byers-Heinlein et al. 2009’s findings), the optimised version of the
algorithm still falls very short of the performance witnessed in most children’s data,
learning about the same number of mappings as with monolingual input (16.75 versus
15.5), when the number of items to be learned in the bilingual version of the input
is almost double (50 versus 34). As the authors agree, ‘in an experimental paradigm
using a comparable training period [. . . ] children who receive bilingual input would
learn many fewer words than their monolingual counterparts ’. As we have seen, this is
not what we observe in children’s data, where bilinguals generally achieve about 60 to
90% of the monolingual performance in each language, leading them to know about 50
to 70% more lexical items.
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Evidence from many studies investigating vocabulary scores in bilinguals indicate
that their performances are on par with monolinguals’ in each language, resulting in
them knowing a significantly greater amount of lexical items, despite much reduced
input and being less able to rely on widely used word learning principles such as
mutual exclusivity, or monolinguals’ assumptions about conventionality. However,
when trying to model pragmatic word learning with bilingual input, even using a
flexible parameter for mutual exclusivity, performances are very poor and do not
appear to replicate bilinguals’ success in learning a great number of words. In addition,
some studies carried on adult late (Papagno & Vallar, 1995) and early (Kaushanskaya
& Marian, 2007) bilinguals have suggested a general advantage in word learning tasks,
as well as better performance in learning transitional probabilities in a second language.
Simultaneous bilinguals also appear to be more efficient at learning speech structures:
Kovács and Mehler (2009b) tested 12 months-old infants in learning two different
patterns of regularities where the structure of a trisyllabic item predicted the location
of a toy and found that bilinguals were able to reliably learn two systems whereas
monolinguals could only learn one. However, a recent study by Byers-Heinlein et al.
(2013) using an eye-tracking paradigm to investigate associative learning in 12 and 14
months-old simultaneous bilinguals (English-L2, min 25% exposure) and monolinguals
did not find any significant differences of performance between the two groups.
The question is then the following: how do bilinguals manage these impressive
performances? We already mentioned some possible factors in section 2.2.1, such as
cognitive advantages, conceptual transfer or better ability to use cues such as prosody
to learn word transitions and segmentation patterns.
Another possibility, given that most studies show that bilinguals have a significantly
greater total vocabulary than monolinguals, and that vocabulary size has been shown
to be positively correlated with word learning performances, is that they are able to
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pull on the entirety of their lexical knowledge to help subsequent word learning and
thus have an advantage over monolinguals, which might also explain the better word
learning performances of bilingual adults (Kaushanskaya & Marian, 2009). However,
the relationship between vocabulary size and foreign label learning is uncertain, with
some studies showing a positive effect (Koenig & Woodward, 2012), while others do
not (Akhtar et al., 2012; Menjivar & Akhtar, 2017). Akhtar et al. (2012) found that
bilingually exposed children were able to learn foreign labels while monolinguals and
bilinguals were not, but it should be noted that the bilinguals in this study were of
significantly lower SES than the two other groups, and that in a subsequent study
were SES levels did not significantly differ between the three groups, foreign label
learning was positively correlated with level of bilingualism, with bilinguals significantly
outperforming monolinguals and bilingually exposed children’s performance falling in
between (Menjivar & Akhtar, 2017). Performance was, however, not correlated with
vocabulary scores.
In conclusion, multilingual input is a major factor in development, which has
consequences on many aspects of cognitive, social and linguistic skills. As a result,
constructing a lexicon might proceed differently in multilingual environments, as there
are differences in the skills which can be used for this purpose and the tools or principles
which can be relied on (such as the mutual exclusivity principle). Despite this, an
extensive review of the literature shows that bilingual children do learn words quickly
and efficiently, and do not display major or problematic gaps in their knowledge.
However, current multilingual adaptations of word learning models with integration of
cross-situational and social information, such as the Rational Speech Act framework,
do not appear able to model these performances. Thus, some other factor needs to be
taken into account to explain how children growing up bilingually adapt in order to
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perform efficient word learning despite a significantly different environment. We then
next turn to pragmatic skills as a potential solution to this puzzle.
2.3 A pragmatic solution?
In the next sections, we outline a possible solution to the puzzle of how bilingual
children manage to acquire vocabulary in an efficient way, namely by displaying an
advantage in pragmatic reasoning which would arise both from additional experience
with a diversity of social situations and challenging communication, and from the need
to compensate a lack in vocabulary knowledge and less ability to rely on some word
learning principles and strategies. We first describe research on pragmatic competence
and bilingualisms, which does indicate the presence of a potential advantage. We
then discuss the different types of pragmatic inferences, so as to introduce the issue of
defining the precise nature of this advantage, if it exists. We finally present the aims
of the current work and the three hypotheses put forward a potential socio-pragmatic
advantage, focusing on the last one as our main hypothesis.
2.3.1 Pragmatic skills and bilingualism
One possibility explaining the puzzle of bilinguals’ impressive success in building a
large vocabulary is that they use alternative strategies for word learning and rely on
more sophisticated socio-pragmatic skills fostered by their learning environment to
keep pace with their monolingual counterparts, rather than on word learning heuristics
such as mutual exclusivity (Byers-Heinlein, 2017).
Children growing up in bilingual environments have to face additional challenges
in communicative interactions, which arise from having to identify the linguistic
profile of any given interlocutor (monolingual in language A, monolingual in language
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B, bilingual without code-switching, bilingual who engages in code-switching, etc.)
and result in a higher risk of communication failures. Evidence shows that children
confronted to a more challenging, i.e. more varied and complex input (more phonetically
diversified, or provided by different adults) will map sounds to meanings more efficiently
(Graf Estes & Hurley, 2013) and attend more to the relevant aspects of a word-
learning task (Shneidman, Buresh, Shimpi, Knight-Schwarz, & Woodward, 2009). This
demonstrates that social experience can influence how children attend to and learn
from others (Shneidman, Gweon, Schulz, & Woodward, 2016) and that they will
learn to allocate attention more efficiently when faced with more uncertainty in their
environment. In line with this, bilingual toddlers (but not bidialectals, who might
experience less comprehension or communication issues) appear to be better at detecting
and attempting to repair communication misunderstandings (Wermelinger, Gampe, &
Daum, 2017) and exposure to code-switching (creating more linguistic complexity and
uncertainty) seems to increase attention to social cues and speakers in both monolingual
and bilingual children (Yow & Markman, 2016). Similarly, bilinguals have consistently
displayed enhanced Theory of Mind (Goetz, 2003) and perspective-taking abilities
(Greenberg, Bellana, & Bialystok, 2013; Rubio-Fernández & Glucksberg, 2012). Unlike
the potential early delay in vocabulary knowledge, this higher risk of communication
failure applies to both early and late bilinguals, and even to L2 learners. Yet, research
on what is sometimes referred to as ‘emergent bilingualism’ (limited bilingual exposure)
has mostly focused on finding a threshold for apparent cognitive benefits, in 9 month-old
infants (Kovács & Mehler, 2009a), children attending immersion programs (Bialystok
& Barac, 2012) and young adults learning a second language (M. D. Sullivan, Janus,
Moreno, Astheimer, & Bialystok, 2014). There have also been attempts to characterise
the cognitive differences between the effects of bilingualism and bidialectalism (Ross &
Melinger, 2017).
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The few studies who did use bilingually exposed children (i.e., who might not have
fluent productive ability) have found similar results as with productive bilinguals for
perspective-taking (Fan et al., 2015, Liberman et al., 2017) and for word learning
(Menjivar & Akhtar, 2017) as well as both bilingual adults and L2 learners adapting
their speech to a greater extent to avoid communication failures when talking to a child
or non-native speaker (Lorge & Katsos, 2018) . As we have seen, bilinguals have to learn
(and successfully do learn) a greater amount of total words while being less able to rely
on word learning strategies such as mutual exclusivity and also have to communicate
with less vocabulary at their disposal in each of their languages. In addition, the added
complexity and uncertainty in their learning environment appears to make them more
socially and communicatively aware. Could this situation result in enhanced pragmatic
abilities and could these abilities (as has been suggested, Byers-Heinlein, 2017) help
them compensate the obstacles they face to achieve efficient vocabulary learning?
A few studies have investigated potentially enhanced pragmatic abilities in bilinguals.
However, most of these tasks had a strong metalinguistic component, which makes
it harder to know precisely which skills are being assessed, or were conducted with
older, school-age children well after the age where efficient word-learning skills would
be assumed to be most needed. In three studies (Siegal, Iozzi, & Surian, 2009; Siegal,
Matsuo, Pond, & Otsu, 2007; Siegal et al., 2010), Siegal and colleagues conducted
acceptability judgments on scalar implicatures and presented children aged 3-6 years
old with statements from a CVT (Conversational Violations Test) uttered by two dolls
(e.g., ‘What did you get for your birthday? ‘A present’) asking them which of the two
dolls had said something ‘silly or rude’. Antoniou, Veenstra, Kissine, and Katsos (2018)
and Antoniou and Katsos (2017) used a combination of acceptability judgments (which
can sometimes require extensive world knowledge) and picture choices, however even
in the latter cases some metalinguistic component might still have biased the basis
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for answering. For example, in the paradigm adapted from Kronmüller, Morisseau,
and Noveck (2014), a character has a hidden and visible card and refers to the visible
item as ‘the open window’. The participant is then asked ‘what do you think was on
Martijn’s second card?’ which arguably both requires an extra step of reasoning but
also drives the participant to reason about the use of this question as well as the use
of the modifier in ‘open window’).
Other studies have investigated the use of ‘socio-pragmatic cues’ for word learning
and referential resolution in bilingual children. For example, a study by (Yow &
Markman, 2015) suggests that simultaneous bilinguals (aged 3.46-3.98, English-L2, min
30% exposure in non-dominant language) are better than monolinguals at combining
speaker’s cues to identify a novel words’ referent. In a replication of Nurmsoo and
Bloom (2008)’s paradigm, they presented 3-year old bilingual and monolingual children
with a word-learning task where they saw two objects while the experimenter could
only see one. In one condition, the experimenter would ask ‘Where’s the [novel word]’,
whereas in the other she would say ‘There’s the [novel word]’, and then ask the child
‘Can I have the [novel word]?. In both conditions, the experimenter’s gaze was fixed
on the visible object. While both monolinguals and bilinguals selected the visible
object above chance in the ‘there’ condition, only bilinguals selected the hidden object
above chance in the ‘where’ condition, using the speaker’s linguistic information in
combination with (or despite of) the gaze cue. Bilinguals also seemed to attend more to
speaker’s cues compared to monolinguals when confronted to incongruent information
for word learning. (Colunga et al., 2012) tested simultaneous balanced bilinguals
(aged 24-36 months, English-L2) in a word-learning paradigm pitching object property
cues against speaker’s cue (eye gaze). In this experiment, children were presented
with a novel word and a novel object and asked to find ‘another one’ among an array
of 8 different objects matching the target object in shape only, colour only, texture
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only, or a combination of these dimensions (i.e., shape and texture, shape and colour,
etc.). The objects were grouped in a way that all the shape matches (4) were on
one side of the table whereas all the remaining objects (2 matching in colour and
texture, one in texture only and one in colour only) were on the other side. In the
congruent condition, the experimenter’s gaze was directed at the shape matching side,
whereas in the incongruent condition it was directed at the other side of the table.
Results show that monolinguals chose shape matches significantly more often than
bilinguals, and that bilinguals chose the shape matching objects marginally more in the
congruent trials, whereas monolinguals showed no differences between the two types of
trials. Another recent study by Groba, De Houwer, Mehnert, Rossi, and Obrig (2018)
conducted on 3 to 5 year old simultaneous bilinguals (Spanish-German) using a similar
paradigm to investigate reliance on object property and pragmatic (gesture) cues in
adjective learning yielded no behavioural differences, but found higher activation in
bilinguals of an area related to gesture interpretation. Other studies by Yow and
colleagues also found bilinguals to rely more on speaker-related than other types of
cues for interpretation: emotional affect versus semantic content (Yow, 2015) and eye
gaze versus object salience and mutual exclusivity (Yow et al., 2017) compared to
monolinguals.
2.3.2 Types of pragmatics and pragmatic inferences
There is a growing body of evidence that pragmatic enrichments do not always require
Theory of Mind and that a distinction probably needs to be drawn between those that
typically do and those that do not (Kissine, 2012; Sperber, 1994). Hochstein, Bale,
and Barner (2018) recently found adolescents diagnosed with ASD (Autism Spectrum
Disorder) and neurotypical controls to perform equally well on scalar implicatures and
in a task where they were explicitly asked to reason about speaker’s knowledge state
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(‘ignorance’ implicatures). However, unlike neurotypicals, the ASD group continued to
compute the scalar implicature in a condition where it was not warranted by speaker
knowledge state. This suggests that these types of implicatures do not normally require
epistemic reasoning and that the ability to reason about epistemic states when explicitly
asked does not entail the ability to make spontaneous ‘online’ use of this skill when it
is required (i.e., for implicature cancellation).
While some authors have started distinguishing between ‘linguistic’ and ‘social’
pragmatics (Andrés-Roqueta & Katsos, 2017), the overlap between source of information
and use of ToM is, as we have seen, not necessarily perfect: some pragmatic processes
triggered by linguistic cues do require ToM reasoning (e.g., irony), whereas non-
linguistic social cues such as eye gaze and pointing can be used either directly or to
reason about speaker’s intentions.
This highlights the need to classify pragmatic processes using multiple, potentially
orthogonal, criteria. Triggers or sources of information can be linguistic (words, syntax,
previous discourse) or non-linguistic (eye gaze, pointing, object manipulation), some
enrichments involve ToM and reasoning about speaker’s mental state, some are more
inferential (‘calculated’) in nature, while others are more default (cf. generalised
implicatures, Levinson, 2000) or more akin to simple recognition. Finally, inferential
pragmatics can be based either on the specificity (i.e., ‘narrowness’), or relevance (i.e.,
relation with context/other cues) of a given meaning. Other important dimensions
discussed in the next chapters are emphasis, or the degree to which attention is directed
towards the provision of the cue (e.g., by means of prosodic stress), and ostension, or
the degree to which the cue appears to be provided with instructive purposes (e.g., in
a teaching setting). A cooperative and economical speaker is assumed to match utility
and effort (i.e., to be informative). Given a provided cue and level of effort, assuming
a more specific or more related meaning will raise utility. On the other hand, emphasis
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and ostension (which require additional energy/effort) will then raise the assumption
of utility for a particular cue1. In this work we focus mostly on inferences based on
specificity.
1This utility is often referred to as relevance, but the former term is ambiguous having both the
meanings of ‘relation’ and ‘usefulness’

Chapter 3
Prosody and fast mapping
All cats are mortal. Socrates is mortal. Therefore, Socrates is a cat.
— Eugene Ionesco
3.1 Pragmatic inference and alternatives
The need for pragmatic inference derives from the ambiguity which characterises
natural language, i.e., the presence of multiple potential meanings, or mappings
between linguistic expressions and referents. One way of assessing each meaning is
to assign probabilities to them according to the specificity of each hypothesis: all
things being equal, more informative or specific hypotheses will be preferred (the
Size Principle, Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001). In addition, like all living organisms,
humans are lazy. Linguistic communication is no exception to this rule and hearers can
generally assume cost/benefit efficiency in production to infer speaker meaning. For
example, if a professor utters ‘Some students failed the test’ after marking, the hearer
can infer that not all students failed by assuming that, at equal ‘price’ (i.e., linguistic
cost) said professor could have used the more specific ‘all’. This is an example of scalar
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Fig. 3.1 Contrastive inference (ad hoc implicature). Stiller et al., 2015
Fig. 3.2 Contrastive inference
implicature, a name which refers to the scale of semantic strength it is said to derive
from (none-some-all, etc. L. R. Horn & Ward, 2004). Following Grice’s (1975) first
Maxim of Quantity, the implicature is derived by assuming that the speaker is, at
equal cost, saying ‘as much as possible’. The maxim can also be used on a scale that is
not semantically formalised but has been generated from context to derive an ad hoc
implicature. For example, if presented with two characters, one with hat only and the
other with both items (see Figure 3.1), 3-4 year old children and adults asked to pick
the referent with prompt ‘My friend has glasses’ reliably choose the character with
glasses only, inferring that the speaker would have used the more specific feature ‘hat’
if referring to the character with both items, in a process similar to the classic ‘some
but not all’ scalar implicature )(Stiller et al., 2015).
Contrastive inference is another type of implicature using Grice’s second Maxim
of Quantity: ‘do not say more than you need’. Hearers presented with an array of
four objects and prompted with an utterance beginning with ‘Pick up the tall. . . ’ will
start shifting their eye-gaze towards the tall glass (which has a small glass counterpart)
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rather than the tall jug before hearing the noun, inferring that the modifier is more
specific, being required, for this referent (Nadig & Sedivy, 2002). Similarly, ‘the red
dax’ should be taken to refer to the leftmost rather than the rightmost object in
Figure 3.2. In all examples outlined above, the given expression is more specific to the
target referent by virtue of being the only possible choice for this referent (‘some not
all’ can only be expressed by ‘some’, the character with glasses by ‘glasses’ and the
leftmost object by ‘red dax’ ) whereas the alternative referent not only has an available
alternative expression sufficient for identification (‘jug’ ), but sometimes even a more
informative one (‘all’, ‘hat’ ).
Both types of quantity implicatures thus have in common that they appear to
be the result of dismissing other meanings or referents as having a more appropriate
available description than the one that was used (The Alternatives Hypothesis, Barner
& Bachrach, 2010). As hearers rapidly assess each potential referent in the relevant
array (or set of semantically compatible meanings), salient alternative ways of referring
to each candidate will come to mind and, if considered more informatively efficient,
lower the candidate’s probability to be chosen as the intended target. Which candidate
is assessed first is a matter of debate between two theoretical views: the two step
literal model (where the logical meaning is assessed first, Huang & Snedeker, 2009)
and the generalised/default implicature hypothesis (where the implicature is generated
by default and subsequently cancelled if not warranted by context, Levinson, 2000).
In the scalar/ad hoc implicature case, the expressions ‘some’ and ‘glasses’ would be
underinformative to refer to ‘all’ and to the character with hat and glasses, whereas
in the contrastive case the use of the modifier ‘tall’ for the jug would be considered
overinformative.
In the RSA (Rational Speech Act) framework (Frank & Goodman, 2012), which
models pragmatic inference as Bayesian inference, this translates into quantitative
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predictions of meaning assignment for a given referent r directly proportional to the
relative specificity of the target hypothesis or mapping with the linguistic expression e
(if we assume a uniform prior probability for all referents, i.e., that all referents have a
priori the same probability of being chosen/are equally salient, otherwise this likelihood
is differentially weighted by the prior to yield posterior probability). Thus, for each
potential referent/hypothesis we have
P (r|e) ∝ P (r)P (e|r) (3.1)
Where P(r|e) is the posterior probability of a referent r given an expression e, which
is proportional to the prior probability of the referent being referred to (in the absence
of any expression) P(r) multiplied by the likelihood P(e|r) of an expression being
uttered given that the speaker has a referent r in mind. Given that for both types
of inferences described above (scalar/ad hoc and contrastive) the target hypothesis
is twice as specific (i.e., the expression is used with half as many referents) as the
alternative hypothesis, it would be predicted to be chosen twice as often, i.e., 0.67 vs.
0.33.
3.2 Contrast, prosody and development
In a seminal study of contrastive inference, Gelman and Markman (1985) presented 3
and 4 year old children with a display of four objects: a modified target object among
three of its kind (e.g., a red butterfly next to a blue and a yellow butterfly) and a
modified single competitor (e.g., a red chair) and instructed them to select an object
with a modified noun phrase involving a pronoun (e.g., ‘Show me the red one’ ). While
4 year olds reliably chose the object with counterparts (e.g., the red butterfly) by
inferring that ‘the red one’ would be overinformative for the single competitor (the
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Fig. 3.3 Scalar and contrastive inferences (linguistic expressions in blue, referents in
white, dotted lines represent alternative meaning hypotheses)
red chair), 3 year olds performed at chance. This is in contrast with the results of
Kronmüller et al. (2014). In their study, Kronmüller et al. (2014) presented seven-year
olds, ten year-olds and adults with a paradigm whereby participants observed an
exchange between experimenter and listener. The exchange was about two unknown
cards held up by the experimenter. The cards were picked from a set of four cards
which were visible to the participant (i.e., the participant knew that the two unknown
cards were picked from a set of, e.g., a brown rabbit, a white rabbit, a goat and a
duck). The participant heard the experimenter ask the listener to point at one of the
two unknown cards they were holding up by referring to it using either a modified or
unmodified noun phrase (e.g., ‘Show me the brown rabbit or ‘Show me the rabbit’ ). The
participant was then asked ‘What do you think is on the other card?’. Adults made the
expected contrastive inference both in the modified condition (e.g., if the speaker used
‘the brown rabbit’ it means that the other card is the white rabbit) and the reverse
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exclusive inference in the unmodified condition (e.g., if they used ‘the rabbit’ it means
that the other card is NOT the white rabbit). Ten year olds, on the other hand, only
succeeded in making the inference in the modified condition, and at a much lower rate
than adults (54% vs. 78%). Seven year olds did not appear to make any inference at
all and performed at chance in both the modified and non-modified conditions.
The discrepancy between Gelman and Markman (1985) and Kronmüller et al.
(2014)’s results could perhaps be explained by the more complex nature of the task
in Kronmüller et al. (2014), which involved a metalinguistic component (‘What do
you THINK is on the other card?’ ) and an indirect question meaning the action
taken was not directly a result of the noun phrase used. Moreover, unlike in Gelman
and Markman (1985) where the choices were performed directly on the relevant set,
Kronmüller et al. (2014)’s paradigm involved having to visually project the content of
the cards displayed in front of the participant into the unseen ones in the experimenter’s
hands. Even though the contents were continuously visible to the participant in their
own set of cards, there was still a processing effort required to ‘make a copy’ of them
for the unseen cards and to reason by going back-and-forth between the visible and
invisible cards. As the authors noticed themselves, this could cause confusion, for
example regarding which set or subset was being taken into account by the speaker
(e.g., if the speaker was taking the whole set into account, the brown rabbit would have
had to be referred to as ‘the brown rabbit’ no matter what card was held up with it).
While the authors corrected this particular confusion by making it clear in a subsequent
experiment that only the participant had access to the full set, it is likely that the
projection and back-and-forth reasoning effort might have proven particularly difficult
for young children with limited processing abilities. However, other evidence indicates
that preschoolers do lag behind adults in terms of the strength and timing of contrastive
inferences: in an online eye-tracking study conducted by Sekerina and Trueswell (2012)
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with Russian speaking 4 to 6 year olds who were presented with a display similar to
Sedivy, Tanenhaus, Chambers, and Carlson (1999)’s, children did show facilitation of
processing in the expected contexts (e.g., a Russian split construction which highlights
a contrastive reading or a display where only one modified object has a counterpart)
but only after hearing the head noun, unlike adults who displayed anticipatory looks
towards the target as soon as they heard the adjective.
While structural constructions such as focus or modifier are one way of creating a
contrastive inference, another way involves the use of prosody and, in particular, lexical
stress (also referred to as emphasis)1. For example, while a hearer might not derive any
particular implicit meaning from the utterance ‘It’s a very nice garden’, they could infer
a contrast if prosodic stress is used to emphasise a particular word (‘It’s a very nice
GARDEN’ e.g., [as opposed to the house next to it]). The interpretation and realisation
of this prosodic stress appears highly dependent on context: the same noun-final stress
(‘Give me the yellow ROSES’ ) can take either a neutral or contrastive reading and
contrastive stress could be realised with either a simple H* target high or fall-rise
L+H* (according to autosegmental theories, cf. Pierrehumbert & Hirschberg, 1990).
However, when confronted with the emphasised noun (‘It’s a very nice GARDEN’ ),
adults reliably prefer a picture showing a nice garden and house falling down over one
with both a nice garden and house. 10 year olds, on the other hand, do not show such a
preference (Cruttenden, 1985). While Sedivy et al. (1999, Experiment 2) failed to find a
significant facilitative effect of prosodic stress on modifier for contrastive inference, they
did find signs of it in previous work (Sedivy, Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard,
& Carlson, 1995) and suggested that its absence in their later study might have been
due to ceiling effects, as some fillers did not include adjectives (drawing attention to
their presence) and the use of adjectives in a first preparatory instruction might have
increased attention towards the contrasted target object in the critical instruction.
1From now on we use capital letters in utterance examples to signify the use of prosodic stress.
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Indeed, other subsequent studies did find prosodic stress to positively impact early
looks towards target objects in adults when hearing the adjective (Sekerina & Trueswell,
2012; Weber, Braun, & Crocker, 2006) and to have the same effect in children after
the noun had been heard (Sekerina & Trueswell, 2012).
Despite young children’s well known general sensitivity to prosodic variation and
their preference for infant-directed speech(Fernald, 1985), what Cruttenden (1985)
and other similar studies seem to show is that prosody alone is not a reliable or
salient enough cue for children to derive a contrastive inference, but could facilitate
such inferences if presented with other converging or supporting cues. This is what is
suggested by other studies which found that preschoolers manage to perform contrastive
inferences which they previously failed at when given additional discourse support for
a contrastive reading (Horowtiz & Frank, 2014 Experiment 1) or explicit access to
alternatives in the previous discourse (Kurumada & Clark, 2017; Horowitz & Frank,
2014, Experiment 3).
Why did the preschoolers in these studies fail in first instance at deriving contrastive
inferences while they succeeded in Gelman and Markman (1985)? In Horowitz and
Frank (2014), children were given a description and picture of a specific individual
object from a novel category (e.g., ‘This is a broken tibu’ ) and had to extend the
novel category (e.g.,‘What do you think tibus usually look like?’ ) by choosing between
an unmodified option (e.g., an unbroken tibu) or an option modified as the training
example (e.g., another broken tibu). Besides containing (again) a metalinguistic
component, this task involves creating a mental representation of the novel category
from one exposure, but also inhibiting a salient response to select an object which is
similar or identical to the training object. Similarly, in Clark and Kurumada (2017),
four year olds heard an utterance which involved prosodic stress inducing a contrastive
interpretation (e.g., ‘It LOOKS like a zebra’ [but it isn’t]) or did not (e.g., ‘It looks like
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a zebra’ [and it is]) and had to select between a picture of the mentioned animal or a
(correct) contrastive picture depicting another animal (e.g., a picture of a zebra or a
picture of an okapi). Here again, participants had to not only recognise prosodic stress
and infer the alternative expression, which was not explicit (i.e., ‘the speaker could
have said ‘It is a zebra’ if they thought that it was’), but also to inhibit a response
based on matching noun and picture (i.e., selecting the zebra when they heard the
word ‘zebra’). Probably due to these additional processing demands, children in both
studies succeeded in making the inference only when provided with further cues to
support it: in Clark and Kurumada (2017), this was achieved by explicitly providing
an alternative expression (alternating between utterances of the type ‘It is a zebra’ and
‘It LOOKS like a zebra’, thus providing utterance forms which differed in two ways
and drew children’s attention to the contrast. In Horowitz and Frank (2014) better
children’s performance came from either making the modifier more salient (e.g., ‘This
is a special kind of tibu.This is a broken tibu’ ) or from explicitly providing alternative
modifiers in the previous discourse (i.e., reading a ‘book of opposites’ with the child
where objects were described in contrasting pairs, e.g., ‘dirty’/‘clean’, ‘wet’/‘dry’, etc.)
Contrastive stress serves the purpose of drawing attention to a particular component
of discourse, leaving the hearer to figure out the contextual relevance of the additional
energy expended to emphasise this component. By exploiting an asymmetry in energy
and resulting attention, it is in a sense one-directional (either the speaker drew attention
to this component or they did not). Emotional affect, on the other hand, is a prosodic
cue which does not require the hearer to compute a contextually relevant contrast
set, as there are (mainly) two possible options. Since it is (at least) bi-directional,
the affect’s meaning cannot be arrived at through the same type of reasoning used
to interpret contrastive stress. In other words, while the relation ‘energy>drawing
attention>importance’ can be inferred, the association between the particular prosodic
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characteristics of a sad or happy (or fearful) tone and the underlying emotions they
represent have to be learned in order to be recognised, just like we learn to associate
colour words with the range of wave lengths that each denotes. As Quam and Swingley
(2012) point out, children’s early sensitivity to pitch patterns does not entail an ability
to correctly understand or interpret these patterns. While 12 month old infants do
show sensitivity to a fearful sounding voice compared to a neutral one (Mumme &
Fernald, 2003), this is again a case of one-directional inference. Infants have been shown
to generally pay little attention to paralinguistic cues: they do not improve recognition
of face expressions in 5 month olds (D’Entremont & Muir, 1999) and children, unlike
adults, rely on lexical over prosodic information for interpretation until as old as 10
years old (Morton & Trehub, 2001). However, evidence shows that 5 year olds are at
least able to use negative affect to correctly infer the extension of a novel word given a
damaged versus enhanced version of a previously seen novel object (Berman, Graham,
Callaway, & Chambers, 2013).
3.3 Word learning and social cues
The socio-pragmatic theory of word learning holds that the process of word learning
is ‘inherently and thoroughly social’ (Bruner, 1985; Tomasello, 2000). As such, it
has traditionally encompassed as ‘socio-pragmatic’ cues everything in the context
of the utterance that could be used to retrieve the intended referent for a label,
including speaker-related and social information, prior and immediate, linguistic and
non-linguistic. Immediate socio-pragmatic information comprises everything that
is necessary to achieve precisely targeted joint attention, both linguistic (carrier
sentences) and paralinguistic (gestures, stance, facial expressions, prosody, actions).
Prior pragmatic information constitutes the common ground between speaker and
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hearer, determining givenness or novelty levels of referents, speakers and labels involved,
again both through linguistic (anaphoras) and non-linguistic (familiarity with potential
referents) means. Young children have time and again demonstrated efficient and early
capacity to use these social cues, learning words using eye gaze (Baldwin, 1993), gestures
(Horst & Samuelson, 2008) ; facial expressions (Tomasello, Strosberg & Akhtar, 1996),
adult intentional/accidental (i.e., clumsy) behaviour (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello,
1998) ; context in which the referent is presented (i.e., other objects/actions that
accompany it) (Tomasello & Akhtar, 1995; Waxman & Booth, 2001), novelty/givenness
status (Moll & Tomasello, 2007) and prosody (Grassmann & Tomasello, 2010).
However, talking about a ‘socio-pragmatic’ account of word learning might be
conflating two distinct sets of skills: on one hand the capacity to attend to these
types of social cues, on the other a separate competence in making ‘true’ pragmatic
inferences.
According to Grice (1975), communication proceeds successfully by assuming the
speaker is cooperative, i.e. behaves according to a set of maxims enjoining her to be
truthful, relevant, clear and informative. Building on these assumptions, listeners can
try and retrieve the intended meaning from the speaker’s utterance or communicative
behaviour. In the case of word learning, the purpose of the learner is to find which
referent is attached to the speaker’s label. Using the cues mentioned above, they could
possibly be doing so by computing a pragmatic inference (i.e., an inference that uses
hypotheses about the speaker’s communicative intentions to understand the meaning
of his words or actions): if the speaker is gazing or pointing at this object, it is probably
because they intend to refer to it ; if they are using a novel label, it is probably because
they have a new referent in mind or if they are pairing this pink elephant with other
animals, they probably mean the label to refer to a category; if they are pairing a pink
elephant with other pink objects, they probably intend to refer to the property, etc.
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Alternatively, in many of these cases it could be argued that they reach the same
conclusion by using these cues in a more direct manner, i.e. because they contribute
to raising the salience of one referent over the others, without any intention-reading
actually having taken place (Ambridge & Lieven, 2011). This is what is suggested by
Frank (2014) and Frank et al. (2009)’s model, which separates two dimensions for word
learning processes: the source of the cue (cross-situational or social) and the way the
cue is used (in a purely associative manner or through the computation of intentions).
Thus the social cues could contribute to contrasting the target referent with other
potential referents directly by highlighting it, or the contrast could be the result of a
pragmatic inference about what the speaker intended to highlight. Of course using both
sources of information and contrast will be most efficient. Indeed, cross-situational and
social information used directly will only contribute differentially to the contextual
salience of each particular referent, whereas using speaker’s intentions will allow them
to gauge the relative informativeness of the speaker’s utterance with respect to each of
the referents.
As we have seen, contrastive inference is a type of pragmatic inference where the
reason for providing a certain cue (e.g., an adjectival modifier, or prosodic stress) is
assumed to be for informative purposes (i.e., to distinguish one potential referent from
another).
Emotional affect (expressed via positive or negative intonation), on the other hand,
is a type of socio-pragmatic cue which, like eye gaze and pointing, could potentially
be used directly to identify a particular referent with a positive or negative feature
without the need to reason about why the speaker provided the cue. In this scenario,
the affect (or point, or gaze) would shift the child’s attention towards the target object,
raising its probability as a candidate for the novel word without any processes involving
Theory of Mind taking place (Frank, 2014). This can to a certain extent be related to
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Grice (1975)’s dichotomy between natural meanings (which can be used directly) and
non-natural meanings (which require the understanding of a communicative intention).
We have seen that children are able to use social cues for word learning from a very
young age (around 10-12 months). Yet they have been shown to have trouble with
computing some types of pragmatic inferences before 7 years old (Barner, Brooks, &
Bale, 2011; Katsos, 2009), even though they appear to be able to make contrastive
inferences similar to the ones described above around 3-4 years old (Gelman & Markman,
1985; Frank & Goodman, 2014). However, in some studies even these types of inferences
are not seen before 5- or even 10 years old (Kronmüller et al., 2014; Morisseau, Davies,
& Matthews, 2013)). It is possible that infant’s first use of social cues (and possibly
at least part of their subsequent use) relies on simple associative mechanisms and
salience and allocating attention efficiently and appropriately (i.e., focussing on speaker-
related information) without requiring intention-reading through Theory of Mind, or
the actual computation of a pragmatic inference. This is not to say that children
always use social cues as attentional devices and do not engage in inferences about
intentions (studies have repeatedly shown that infants are able to find the referent
of a novel word as the one the speaker has in mind but is not physically present or
accessible, e.g., Akhtar, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 1996; Tomasello et al., 1996), but
simply that they do not necessarily do so in each case. As Ambridge and Lieven
(2011) point out, while there have been many studies showing that infants are able
to understand other’s intentions, only a few have actually demonstrated that they
use this understanding to choose between potential referents for a word (Diesendruck,
2005; Diesendruck & Markson, 2001; Tomasello & Akhtar, 1995). It is possible that in
certain contexts, pragmatic understanding which has traditionally been seen as the
result of intention-reading is in fact obtained through more general mechanisms using
the linguistic information or social cues in a more direct way and ‘shortcutting’ the
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pragmatic process. The existence of such an ‘egocentric’ pragmatic competence would
then contribute to explain some pragmatic understanding displayed by children with
autism spectrum disorders (Kissine, 2012; Kissine et al., 2015). If this is the case, these
two sets of skills potentially need to be distinguished as requiring different types of
abilities (differential allocation of attention/ToM and inferencing) and having separate
developmental timelines. Moreover, using social cues (or speaker-related information)
should not be confused with exerting a pragmatic competence (or making inferences
about speakers’ intentions).
Given the emergent and growing evidence that bilinguals are more competent with
pragmatics than their monolingual peers, it is natural to ask at this point what underlies
the differences. We discern three possibilities which we outlined in Chapter 2. First,
because most of these paradigms used with younger children involved inhibiting an
irrelevant cue in order to focus on the socio-pragmatic cue, the results in these studies
might have been driven by enhanced general cognitive abilities, such as inhibitory
control. There has been suggestions that the constant switching and inhibition needed
to monitor multiple languages could lead to enhanced executive abilities in bilinguals
(Green, 1998). As we mentioned in Chapter 2, many studies have shown early bilingual
children outperforming monolinguals on tasks related to executive functioning skills,
such as working memory, inhibition and cognitive flexibility (e.g., Barac & Bialystok,
2011; Bialystok & Craik, 2010). These improved skills in executive control could
enhance the basic associative mechanisms underlying instances of word learning, both
by retention of a greater number of candidate referents for a novel word, or by allowing
easier switching between hypothesised referents. This advantage could be mediated by
verbal short-term memory or by inhibitory control (Papagno & Vallar, 1995; Bartolotti
et al., 2011). In addition, these cognitive advantages could also have an impact on word
learning beyond association by improving their ability to combine cues from different
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sources and ignore irrelevant information (Yow & Markman, 2015; Kaushanskaya &
Marian, 2007). Yow & Markman (2015)’s study suggests that bilinguals could indeed
have an advantage for ignoring irrelevant cues in general, not only in favour of a social
cue. They presented 3-year old bilingual and monolingual children with a word-learning
task where they saw two objects while the experimenter could only see one. In one
condition, the experimenter asked ‘Where’s the [novel word]’, whereas in the other she
would say ‘There’s the [novel word]’, and then ask the child ‘Can I have the [novel
word]?’. In both conditions, the experimenter’s gaze was fixed on the visible object.
While both monolinguals and bilinguals selected the visible object above chance in the
‘there’ condition, only bilinguals selected the hidden object above chance in the ‘where’
condition, using the speaker’s semantic information in combination with (or despite of)
the gaze cue.
However, while an advantage in pragmatics could in principle be related to enhanced
executive functions, there are two main reasons to doubt that this is the case. At
a general level, many studies have failed to replicate the bilingual advantages in
cognition and the very existence of this alleged advantage has recently been questioned
(Paap et al., 2015). The inconsistency in the results could be due to different types
of bilingualism having differential influences: earlier acquisition, higher proficiency
and more frequent switching between languages are for example likely to result in
a higher need for control abilities (e.g., Luk et al., 2011). However, more pertinent
to the literature that we are reviewing here, those studies which measured executive
control failed to find a difference between bilinguals and monolinguals which would
have explained the former’s higher performance in pragmatics (Yow & Markman,
2015;Yow et al., 2017; Champoux-Larsson & Dylman, 2018) or failed to find such
a difference for bilingually exposed children despite both bilingually exposed and
bilinguals outperforming monolinguals (Fan et al., 2015). Therefore, in line with Fan
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et al. (2015) we suggest that the bilingual advantage in pragmatics is not likely to be
due to enhanced executive functions.
The second possibility we consider is that bilingualism increases attention to speaker
or social cues (or preferential weighting of them compared to other types of cues).
Young children demonstrate efficient and early capacity to use social cues for word
learning (e.g., Baldwin, 1993; Tomasello et al., 1996). As we have seen, according to
standard pragmatic theory (e.g. Grice, 1975), communication proceeds successfully by
assuming the speaker is cooperative, i.e. behaves according to a set of maxims enjoining
her to be truthful, relevant, clear and informative. Building on these assumptions,
listeners can try and retrieve the intended meaning from the speaker’s utterance or
communicative behaviour. In the case of word learning, the purpose of the learner is to
find which referent is attached to the speaker’s label. Using the cues mentioned above,
they could do it by computing a pragmatic inference by reasoning about speaker’s
intentions. The other possibility is that they reach this conclusion by using these cues
in a more direct manner, i.e. because they contribute to raising the salience of one
referent over the others, without any intention-reading actually having taken place
(Ambridge & Lieven, 2011; Frank, 2014). Therefore, the second possibility that we put
forward is that bilingual children, because of the nature of their interactions with their
social environment, are better at paying attention to social cues.
Finally, the third possibility is that bilingual experience could contribute to enhance
pragmatic competence per se, i.e., the ability to reason about communicative intentions
and informativeness. This is a distinct possibility from the one mentioned above.
True pragmatic inference distinguishes itself from other types of inference in that it
requires not only recognition of the cue provided but also reasoning about the speaker’s
intentions in providing the cue. Take for example contrastive inference, a type of
implicature using Grice’s second Maxim of Quantity: ‘do not say more than you need’.
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In this type of pragmatic inference, the reason for providing a certain cue (e.g., an
adjectival modifier, or prosodic stress) is assumed to be for informative purposes (i.e.,
to distinguish one potential referent from another). As we have seen, hearers presented
with an array of four objects and prompted with an utterance beginning with ‘Pick
up the tall. . . ’ will start shifting their eye-gaze towards the tall glass (which has a
small glass counterpart) rather than the tall jug (which doesn’t have another jug as a
contrast) before hearing the noun, inferring that the modifier is more specific, being
required, for this referent (Nadig & Sedivy, 2002). Emotional affect, in contrast, can
potentially be used directly to identify a particular referent with a positive or negative
feature without the need to reason about speaker’s intentions, simply by raising the
salience of one candidate over the others. This difference, namely between the mere
recognition of a cue and the actual use of a cue into a chain of pragmatic inferential
reasoning, is related to Grice’s (1975) dichotomy between natural meanings (which
can be used directly) and non-natural meanings (which require the understanding of a
communicative intention). Therefore, the third possibility for bilingual children’s better
performance with pragmatics could be that the nature of their linguistic experiences
have made them more adept at pragmatic reasoning per se.
To take stock, better performance by bilingual children in the social cues word
learning studies previously mentioned could be the result of a bilingual advantage in
general cognitive abilities (and inhibition of irrelevant information) or to increased
attention towards speaker cues, or they could result from increased ability to reason
about speaker’s intentions in providing the cue. While there is growing evidence that
suggests the first possibility is not promising, the other two are very much up for
empirical scrutiny. The current study sought to investigate these last two hypotheses
by testing monolingual and bilingually exposed children’s performance on two different
word learning/fast-mapping paradigms in the absence of conflicting information (i.e.,
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where success could not be obtained by ignoring an irrelevant cue). These are a
contrastive inference task (which required reasoning about informativeness) and an
emotional affect task (which could be completed by simply attending to speaker cues).
We ask two interrelated questions. First, if bilinguals perform better than monolinguals
in these two tasks where attending to speaker cues does not require ignoring another
type of cue (which is unlike the tasks used in the bilingual word-learning literature to
date). Critically, we ask if bilinguals perform better in a word learning task where they
are required not only to attend to a speaker cue but also to reason about it (contrastive
stress) compared to a task that requires mere attention to a speaker cue (emotional
affect).
3.4 Experiment 1: contrastive inference
The purpose of this experiment was to investigate whether bilingual children would
outperform monolingual children in a fast mapping task where they had to pick the
referent of a novel word on the basis of reasoning about the communicative intention
behind a cue given by a speaker. In the experiment, children heard a prompt containing
a novel word which had been modified either with a non-stressed or a stressed adjective
(e.g., ‘Touch the WET/wet gorp’ ). They were shown a display with four novel aliens,
two of which were semantically compatible with the prompt (ie., two of the aliens
were wet). However, only one of the compatible aliens had a dry counterpart which
made the use of a contrastive modifier more likely. Given our hypothesis that the
previously evidenced socio-pragmatic advantage in bilingual children is not uniquely
the result of better inhibitory control or increased attention to speaker cues, we predict
that bilingual children would show a better ability to use the contrastive inference to
identify the referent of the novel word despite the fact that the modifier itself does
3.4 Experiment 1: contrastive inference 65
not raise the salience of either compatible referent above the other and thus inhibitory
control or better attention to the modifier would not lead to better performance.
The paradigm we used was similar to Gelman and Markman (1985) with the
difference that these authors used the word ‘one’ and familiar objects (in Study 1)
and novel adjectives and objects (in Study 2) (e.g., ‘the red one’ or ‘the fep one’ )
instead of novel nouns as we did. In addition, we added a condition where the modifier
was prosodically stressed to investigate whether performance would differ when this
additional cue was available.
3.4.1 Method
Participants
The study was approved by the Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Committee
and parents in participating schools were sent information about the study along with
a form allowing them to opt-in or opt-out depending on the school’s policy. In total,
270 children aged 4-6 years old were recruited through schools in Cambridge and
London. Demographic and language information was obtained through parental forms
for 74 children, while the information for the remaining participants was obtained
through school staff and proved to be highly reliable (over 98 % match with the 74
questionnaires) when compared to available parental information. Of the 270 children,
138 (66 females, 72 males, mean age=5;2, sd=6.9 months) had been exposed daily to a
second language for at least a year, including children in French immersion program
(n=26), children identified through parental forms as sequential bilinguals (n=18) or as
simultaneous bilinguals (n=26) and identified as bilingual by their teachers (for these
children the school described the child as having English as additional language (EAL;
n=68) which is a technical term used in the UK educational setting to signify children
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whose dominant language is not English). The remaining 132 children (62 females,
70 males, mean age=5;5, sd=8.2 months) had had no regular exposure to a language
other than English. The average percentage of free school meals (FSM) in each of
the participating schools was used as a proxy for socio-economic status (see Hobbs
& Vignoles, 2007, for a discussion on the use of FSM for this purpose). Languages
other than French (immersion and home, n=34) were Hindi (n=15), Gujarati (n=13),
Tamil (n=10), Romanian (n=10), Urdu (n=6), Polish (n=6), Arabic (n=5), Pakhto
(n=3), Portuguese (n=3), German (n=3), Cantonese (n=2), Czech (n=2), Somali
(n=2), Slovak (n=2), ESL (n=2), Albanian, Bahasa, Farsi, Greek, Hungarian, Italian,
Lithuanian, Malayalam, Mandarin, Punjabi, Persian, Russian, Serbian, Sindhi, Sinhala,
Swahili, Swedish, Thai, Turkish and Vietnamese (all n=1).
75 monolingual adult participants were recruited through Prolific Academic for pi-
loting purposes and to uncover any developmental effects. Adult participants completed
the study online for a reward of £0.87.
Receptive vocabulary task
Children first completed a computerised version of the BPVS-3 (Dunn & Dunn, 2009)
implemented on the touchscreen laptop to test receptive vocabulary. This is a picture-
matching task in which children are asked to point to one of four pictures that matches
the word uttered. The items are arranged in blocks of 12, and the test continues until
children have made 8 or more mistakes in a block. Children received two warm-up
trials. Raw scores rather than standardised were used in the analyses as they indicated
both vocabulary and developmental levels. Receptive vocabulary scores are also a
more direct measure of the impact of socioeconomic factors on language development
(the issue of interest here) than SES indices such as maternal education or household
income. Instructions were recorded by a female native English speaker.
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Stimuli
Stimuli were 12 pictures each with four unknown aliens, two of which were of the same
kind (e.g., two type A aliens, one type B alien, one type C alien). Pictures for the
critical conditions contained a target and distractor featuring the target property (e.g.,
a wet type A alien and a wet type B alien) and a counterpart which did not feature
the property (e.g., a dry type A alien). Pictures for the control condition contained
only one alien featuring the target property. The properties were chosen so that they
could be described by common adjectives, would be accidental/non-intrinsic (so that
one alien could feature the property while its counterpart did not) and could be used
to describe modified or unmodified creatures (e.g., a wet alien or dry alien) to account
for the potentially increased salience of modified aliens. Colours were avoided because
of the confusion often displayed by children around that age in reliably recognising and
naming them (Bornstein, 1985). An example stimulus for the stressed and non-stressed
conditions can be found in figure 3.4, and for the control condition in figure 3.5. A full
list of stimuli (utterances and pictures) can be found in Appendix 1.
Procedure
For adult participants stimuli were presented using the Qualtrics platform. For children
participants stimuli were implemented and presented on a touchscreen laptop using
Superlab version 5.0 (Cedrus, San Pedro, CA). Clicks were recorded as raw X and Y
pixel coordinates of the point where the screen had been touched and answers were
subsequently coded by matching the coordinates to the corresponding answer area
among the four possible choices on the picture. Children were tested in a quiet room
at their school. They were introduced through the computer to Mr. Puppet, who had
recently made some alien friends and lent them some toys which he now needed to get
back. They were then asked if they would like to help Mr. Puppet find the aliens, and
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Fig. 3.4 Example stimulus experiment 1 (non-stressed and stressed conditions) ‘Touch
the wet gorp/Touch the WET gorp’.
Fig. 3.5 Example stimulus experiment 1 (control condition) ‘Touch the wet gorp’.
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given a test trial where they had to find the ‘wet gloop’ and ‘dirty gloop’ (feedback
provided) before proceeding to the task. There were four trials of each type (12 total):
non-stressed condition (e.g., ‘Touch the wet gorp’ ), stressed condition (‘Touch the
WET gorp’ ) and control (similar instructions to the non-stressed condition but only one
alien had the target feature).When the participant had made their choice by touching
the screen, the next trial appeared. Each trial was preceded by a fixation cross centered
on the screen. Instructions were recorded by a female native English speaker using a
Sennheiser ME 64 cardioid microphone connected to a Tascam HD-P2 Compact Flash
Audio Recorder. Recordings were made in 24bit mono with a sample rate of 44.1kHz .
Experimental design was within-subject, with 4 target features/adjectives (‘wet’, ‘dry’,
‘clean’ and ‘dirty’) and 12 novel words (gorp, pitack, rapook, lep, plonk, yubba, moozie,
ral, flurg, dinkoo, patam and tweep). There were two lists of items counterbalanced for
word/alien pairings and target position. Trials were randomised.
3.4.2 Results
Final results can be seen in Table 1. Data from eleven monolingual children were
excluded from final analyses because of experimenter’s error or child fussiness or
failing to complete the task. We first conducted analyses with target and distractor
responses only (removing errors where the character selected did not semantically
match the instruction, e.g., children chose a dry character in response to a prompt for
a ‘wet gorp’) to be able to set chance performance at 0.5 and examine each group’s
performance in each condition (chance with four choices would otherwise technically
have been set at 0.25). In the regression model raw scores (including all types of
errors) were used to allow comparison with performance in control condition. We first
conducted t-tests on answers excluding non-distractor errors to evaluate performance
against chance in each group. This first set of analyses showed that adults were
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significantly above chance in selecting target in both stressed (m=0.66, sd=0.47, t =
3.19, df = 350, p= 0.001) non-stressed condition (m=0.58, sd=0.49, t = 6.35, df =
345, p<0.001) and control (m=0.92, sd=0.35, t=2.18, df=350, p<0.001). Children,
on the other hand, were significantly above chance in the stressed condition (m=0.56,
sd=0.49, t = 4.06, df = 947, p<0.0001) but not in the non-stressed condition (m=0.51,
sd=0.50, t = 0.59, df = 927, p= 0.55). This pattern applied to both monolinguals (non
stressed=0.50, p=0.3461; stressed=0.58,t = 3.66, df = 489, p=0.0003) and bilinguals
(non stressed=0.52, p=0.1543; stressed=0.55, t = 2.06, df = 457, p=0.04).
Preliminary analyses revealed that, compared to the monolinguals, the bilingual
group was on average significantly younger (5;1 vs. 5;5, t = 2.63, df = 364.9, p= 0.009),
had significantly lower English vocabulary (British Picture Vocabulary raw scores 76 vs.
68,t = 6.3, df = 377.75, p <0.0001) and significantly lower SES (as calculated through
averaging free school meal percentages previously normalised using national average
and standard deviation,-3.00 vs. -2.51, t = -3.95, df = 372.32, p <0.0001). These were
then entered as covariates in our regression model. As all these variables, chronological
age, SES and general vocabulary proficiency in the language of testing are known to
independently have an effect on performance on linguistic tasks, they were then entered
with gender (also shown to have an effect on pragmatic performance, cf. Stiller et al.,
2015) as a logistic regression mixed model (D. Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014)
with items and participants as random effects and starting with all design-relevant
fixed effects as random slopes, i.e., a maximal random effects model. Following a
procedure used in cases of over-parameterisation (Cane, Ferguson, & Apperly, 2017;
Horowitz, Schneider, & Frank, 2018), random effects were removed only when they led
to non-convergence. Because age and raw BPVS scores were highly correlated, only
BPVS scores were retained as they proved to be a better predictor of performance. The
final model included gender, normalised BPVS scores, normalised FSM percentages,
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bilingual status, condition and their interaction as fixed effects, and subject intercepts
as random effects. The control condition was used as the reference level.
Performance was significantly correlated with higher vocabulary scores (est=0.23,
se=0.04, z=5.45, p <0.0001), lower FSM percentage (est=-0.16, se=0.04, z=-4.35,
p <0.0001), bilingual status (est=-0.71, se=0.21, z=-3.39, p=0.0007) and gender
(est=-0.22, se=0.09, z=-2.46, p=0.01), with monolinguals and females performing
better. Performance was significantly lower in both stressed (est=-2.26, se=0.19, z=-
11.93, p <0.0001) and non stressed condition (est=-2.62, se=0.19, z=-13.83, p<0.0001)
compared to control. In addition, there was a significant interaction between condition
and bilingual status, with bilinguals performing significantly better than expected from
their control performance compared to monolinguals in both stressed (est=0.49552,
se=0.24059, z=2.060, p=0.04) and non stressed condition (est=0.70183, se=0.24063,
z=2.917, p=0.003). A graph showing the results for the adults can be seen in figure 3.6,
and for children in figure 3.7. The results broken down for bilingual and monolingual
groups can be seen in figure 3.8.
We conducted further analyses on a subset of children including only those who
had a maximum score on the control task. However, as this meant the removal of
data from over a hundred children, and given that the contrastive inference effect had
proven to be weaker than expected, it led to the bilinguals’ average score of 0.55 in
both conditions no longer being significantly above chance, which meant comparison
with monolingual performance was not possible with this subset of data.
3.4.3 Discussion
There was a developmental effect in that adults were above chance in both critical
conditions but children in stressed condition only. This might be due to the fact that
the inference is relatively weak and is reinforced by the additional cue of prosodic focus
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Fig. 3.6 Experiment 1: adults.
non-stressed=modifier without prosodic stress (e.g., ’wet gorp’), stressed=modifier with
prosodic stress (e.g., ’WET gorp’). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals
Fig. 3.7 Experiment 1: children.
non-stressed=modifier without prosodic stress (e.g., ’wet gorp’), stressed=modifier with
prosodic stress (e.g., ’WET gorp’). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals
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Fig. 3.8 Experiment 1: bilinguals and monolinguals.
control=one semantic match, non-stressed=modifier without prosodic stress (e.g., ’wet gorp’),
stressed=modifier with prosodic stress (e.g., ’WET gorp’), bil=bilinguals,
mono=monolinguals. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals
which helps direct children’s attention towards the use of the modifier, making it more
ostensive and raising its informative potential.
One important assumption to keep in mind for the target contrastive inference to
be possible is that the speaker is presumed not to be aware that the listener does not
know the meaning of the novel words used. Indeed, if this were not the case (if the
speaker was presumed to be aware they were using words unknown to the listener),
there could be no reasoning about alternatives leading to the inference. In this case,
the listener could not reason that ‘if the speaker were referring to one of the single
aliens they would have used a non-modified noun (e.g., ‘gorp’ )’ since the speaker would
have known this to be unhelpful to a non-knowledgeable listener.
Since vocabulary scores and SES were both shown to significantly impact target
choices, it was unsuprising to find that the bilingual group (who were younger, with
lower vocabulary scores and lower SES) was performing significantly worse in control
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Table 3.1 Experiment 1 and 2: summary of results
Condition Adults Monolinguals Bilingualsmean SD mean SD mean SD
(exp1) contrastive (control) 0.92 (0.29) 0.92 (0.27) 0.83 (0.38)
(exp1) contrastive (non stressed) 0.54 (0.49) 0.47 (0.50) 0.44 (0.49)
(exp1) contrastive (stressed) 0.64 (0.47) 0.56 (0.49) 0.47 (0.50)
(exp2) emotional (neutral affect) 0.61 (0.49) 0.65 (0.48) 0.60 (0.49)
(exp2) emotional (negative affect) 0.71 (0.46) 0.84 (0.36) 0.78 (0.41)
(exp2) emotional (positive affect) 0.36 (0.48) 0.60 (0.49) 0.58 (0.49)
Note: raw scores for the contrastive task include all types of errors, i.e., chance = 0.25
than the monolingual group. However, when this delay in structural language (and
potentially, given their young age, general attentional skills and ability to focus on
the task) was accounted for by examining target answers in both critical conditions
relative to perfornance in control, a signicant interaction between bilingual status
and condition was found, with bilingual children performing significantly better than
expected from control (‘doing more with less’) compared to monolingual children. This
means that, compared to the regular use of structural language and semantics for
reference resolution in control, bilinguals were particularly sensitive to and efficient
at using the pragmatic cue (i.e., the use of a modifier) to reason about the speaker’s
communicative intentions in providing that cue. This shows that the differences in
exerting pragmatic skills between bilinguals and monolinguals might go further than a
simple ‘pragmatic bias’ whereby this particular type of cue is preferred to other types
such as semantic content or object similarity. The closer-to-control performance in
bilinguals in the non-stressed task could simply be due to their worse performance in
control combined with chance performance in critical condition, however this does not
apply to the stressed condition given that both bilingual and monolingual groups were
shown to be reliably above chance in selecting target in this condition.
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3.5 Experiment 2: emotional affect
The purpose of this experiment was to examine the performance of bilingual and
monolingual children in a fast mapping task disambiguating the referent of a novel
word where learners had to use a similar type of cue as in our first experiment (ie., a
prosodic cue) but where there was no need to reason about communicative intentions
in providing this cue and, as in previous studies (Yow, 2015; Yow & Markman, 2015),
the cue could be used directly as it raised the salience of one referent above the
other. In this task, children were shown a display with two novel objects and heard a
prompt containing a novel word (eg., ‘Oh, look at the dax! Have you seen the dax?’.
They then were shown the two same objects, one of which had been negatively or
positively modified (ie., broken or dirtied, decorated with star or coloured pink, etc.)
and heard another prompt with the novel word this time uttered with sad, happy or
neutral emotional affect (eg.,‘(sad voice) Oh look at the dax! Can you touch the dax? ).
This word learning inference relies on the assumption that the speaker should not be
overinformative, ie., that they should not use a modifier or lexical stress if they are not
required to in order to uniquely identify the referent We predicted that there would
this time not be any differences in performance between the monolingual and bilingual
groups, since this task required simply to pair an emotional affect with a referent which
had been made more salient by said affect, and not to reason about the communicative
intentions behind providing the cue, ie., the cue was self-explanatory or self-sufficient
and there was no need to reason about its informativeness. Given previous literature
on the development of pragmatic competence, we also predict a developmental effect,
ie., that adults would perform better than children.
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Participants were the same as in Experiment 1.
Stimuli
The task was adapted from Berman et al. (2013). Stimuli were 12 pictures, each
displaying two novel objects, one damaged object (i.e.,dirtied or broken: mud splash,
green splash, hole or dismantled parts) and one enhanced object (i.e., featuring flower,
star or brightly lit up). An example stimulus can be found in figure 3.9. A full list of
stimuli (utterances and pictures) can be found in Appendix 2.
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Procedure
For adult participants stimuli were presented using the Qualtrics platform. For
children participants stimuli were implemented and presented on a touchscreen laptop
using Superlab 5.0 (Cedrus, San Pedro, CA). Clicks were recorded as raw X and Y
pixel coordinates of the point where the screen had been touched and answers were
subsequently coded by matching the coordinates to the corresponding answer area
among the two possible choices (left or right). Children were tested in a quiet room at
their school. The task was part of Mr. Puppet’s story and his meeting with aliens who
played with strange new objects and damaged some of them but also made some of
them ‘look prettier’. Children first completed two test trials, one mutual exclusivity
trial (to ensure they paid attention to the linguistic information) and one to test their
understanding of the task. In each trial they were presented first with the two novel
objects in an unaltered state and prompted with ‘Oh! Look at these, have you seen
these?’ then the altered objects along with an instruction of the type ‘Oh! Look at the
nurmy, can you touch the nurmy?’ recorded with a positive, neutral or negative voice
(emotional affect). The instructions were recorded by a female native speaker of English
in a soundproof room using a Sennheiser ME 64 cardioid microphone connected to a
Tascam HD-P2 Compact Flash Audio Recorder. Recordings were made in 24bit mono
with a sample rate of 44.1kHz and checked for the prosodic and amplitude features
characteristic of each type of affect (in addition to the adult study serving as control).
Experimental design was within-subject with four trials in each condition (positive,
neutral and negative, 12 in total) using twelve novel words (spoodle, nurmy, goti, fopal,
figoo, dazeel, grof, pilk, zarp, mook, slarp and klem). There were two lists of items
counterbalanced for word/object pairings and target position. Trials were randomised.
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3.5.2 Results
Final results can be seen in Table 1. A logistic regression mixed model with subject
and items as random effects for adults showed that negative responses (i.e., dirty
or broken object) were significantly above chance in control condition (reference
level) (m=0.61, sd=0.49, est=0.52, se=0.15, z=3.35, p=0.0008), significantly higher in
negative than control condition (m=0.71, sd=0.46, est=0.47, se=0.18 z=2.55, p=0.01)
and significantly lower in positive than control condition (m=0.36, sd=0.48, est=-
1.19, se=0.18, z=-6.52, p <0.0001). The regression model for children was again a
maximal random effects model adding all design-relevant effects as fixed and subject
and item as random effects, random slopes being removed only when leading to non-
convergence. Results showed that negative responses were above chance in control
condition (m=0.62, sd=0.48, est=0.69, se=0.20, z=3.46, p=0.0005) significantly higher
in negative condition than control (m=0.81, sd=0.39, est=1.18, se=0.28, z=4.11, p
<0.0001) but not in positive condition (m=0.59, sd=0.49, est= -0.05, se=0.28, z=-0.18,
p=ns). There was also a significant effect of vocabulary scores with higher scores
leading to a negative bias in control (est=0.20528, se=0.08591, z=2.389, p=0.0169).
No other effects were significant, the bilingual group performance did not differ from
the monolingual group. A graph showing the results for the adults can be seen in
figure 3.10, and for children in figure 3.11. The results broken down for bilingual and
monolingual groups can be seen in figure 3.12.
3.5.3 Discussion
There was a negative bias in the neutral affect control condition found in both children
and adults whereby negative choices (i.e., dirty or broken objects) were preferred to
positive ones (i.e., enhanced/decorated objects). This default preference for a negative
interpretation or outcome is found in the literature and potentially results from a higher
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Fig. 3.10 Experiment 2: adults.
control=neutral affect, neg=negative affect, pos=positive affect. Error bars show 95%
confidence intervals
Fig. 3.11 Experiment 2: children.
control=neutral affect, neg=negative affect, pos=positive affect, bil=bilinguals,
mono=monolinguals. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals
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Fig. 3.12 Experiment 2: bilinguals and monolinguals.
control=neutral affect, neg=negative affect, pos=positive affect, bil=bilinguals,
mono=monolinguals. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals
salience of negative versus positive events (Berman et al., 2013), which is why answers
in the negative and positive conditions were compared to performance in the control
condition rather than to chance performance in the regression model. There was also a
developmental effect, with adults performing as expected in both critical conditions
(i.e., making significantly more negative choices when hearing a new label uttered
with negative than with neutral and positive affect, and significantly less negative
choices when hearing a new label uttered with positive than with neutral and negative
affect), whereas children were succeeding only in the negative condition and seemed
to fail to perceive or use positive affect to direct their referent choices in the positive
condition. This is again something that has previously been found and is potentially,
like the negative bias mentioned above, the result of a higher salience of negative
versus positive. Just as negative events appear to be more salient that positive ones,
negative prosody or emotional affect might have higher salience than positive, which
would lead to children being able to interpret and use it earlier (Berman, Chambers, &
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Graham, 2010; Nelson & Russell, 2011). The higher salience of negative events and
affect appears rational from a biological/survival instinct point of view, since ignoring
warning about bad outcomes might have direr consequences than ignoring good news.
No interaction between bilingual status and performance in critical condition relative
to control condition was found this time. However, performance in this task relied
entirely in being able to recognise and associate the specific valence of the cue (negative
or positive) with the corresponding event (negative, i.e., damaged object or positive,
i.e., enhanced object). Since the prompts always had the same linguistic form, there
was no advantage of having a stronger vocabulary knowledge of modifiers as in the
first task, and contrary to specific language exposure, there is no principled reason
why bilingually exposed children should have had more or less experience with or
in interpreting different types of emotional affect. More importantly, unlike in the
contrastive task, success in this task did not require reasoning about why the speaker
was providing a certain cue since emotional affect, contrary to prosodic stress, has an
intrinsic value or valence (negative or positive) which can be directly linked to the
corresponding (damaged or enhanced) referent. We further develop this explanation in
the general discussion.
3.6 General discussion
The goal of experiment 1 and 2 was to investigate monolingual and bilingually exposed
children’s use of pragmatic cues and prosodic cues for reference resolution of a novel
word. Past literature had examined bilingual and monolingual children’s performance in
reference resolution tasks which involved using a socio-pragmatic cue such as pointing,
eye gaze or emotional affect and found bilingual children generally performing better
than monolinguals (Yow et al., 2017; Yow & Markman, 2015). However, given that the
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experimental paradigms used required ignoring an irrelevant cue (e.g., semantic meaning,
object similarity or object salience) in favour of the pragmatic one, it remained unclear
whether these results were driven by attentional biases (i.e., more attention towards
these types of cues or a preference over other types of cues) or by the activation of
pragmatic reasoning per se (i.e., reasoning about speaker’s communicative intentions).
To examine the latter hypothesis, we tested monolingual and bilingually exposed
children aged 4 to 6 years old in two tasks using different types of prosodic cues for
reference resolution of a novel word: contrastive stress (e.g., ‘Touch the WET gorp’)
and emotional affect (e.g.,‘[sad tone] Oh look at the figoo, can you touch the figoo?’)
where success did not rely on ignoring an irrelevant cue and could thus not be solely
the result of better inhibitory control abilities.
We replicate previous findings that both adults and children are able to use negative
affect to choose between damaged and enhanced referent for a novel label but young
children around the age of five do not seem able to reliably make use of positive
emotional affect for the same purposes (Berman et al., 2013). We demonstrate that
prosodic stress does significantly modulate performance of a contrastive inference
for novel word fast-mapping in children as well as in adults (an open question, cf.
Kronmüller et al., 2014), with children appearing to be unable to reliably perform such
an inference when the use of a contrastive modifier was not emphasised by contrastive
stress. This is in line with previous work with adults demontrating a facilitating effect
of intonational focus for contrastive inference in referent resolution (Sedivy et al., 1999).
We also find a gender difference, with males producing less pragmatic answers than
females, an effect which has been documented before (Stiller et al., 2015).
We found bilingually exposed children to perform significantly better than expected
in the contrastive stress task (i.e., close to monolingual performance despite being
younger, with lower SES and vocabulary levels) but not in the emotional affect task
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(where the ability to overcome a negative bias was as expected from demographic
variables in both groups). This indicates that bilingual exposure enhances not only
the attention to socio-pragmatic cues (as demonstrated in previous studies) but also
the ability to reason about speaker’s communicative intentions in providing the cue.
Indeed, the main difference between the two types of prosodic cues in our tasks was
the following: while contrastive stress required pragmatic reasoning to be interpreted
(since it had no intrinsic valence or meaning, i.e., the hearer will know that the modifier
‘wet’ has been emphasised but since there are two wet aliens this by itself will not be
enough to resolve reference without asking why it was emphasised), emotional affect
on the other hand intrinsically contained enough information for reference resolution
by simple association (i.e., pairing negative emotion with negative event). As we have
said, this can be related to Grice (1975)’s dichotomy between natural meanings and
non-natural meanings, the difference being the need to recognise a communicative
intention. The absence of a number of significant effects found to impact performance
in the first task (such as gender or SES) further emphasises that the two tasks involve
different sets of skills. While the finding of a bilingual performance closer to control
than monolinguals’ could be due to the former performing worse in control and at
chance in the non stressed condition, we do not believe this is the case in the stressed
condition, given that both bilingual and monolingual groups performed significantly
above chance in this condition.
In conclusion, we presented the results of two tasks investigating monolingual and
bilingually exposed children’s use of pragmatic inference for fast mapping a referent and
novel word. We found the bilingually exposed group to perform above expected levels
compared to monolinguals in the first task, where above chance performance could
only be achieved by using a prosodic cue to reason about speaker’s communicative
intentions. We conclude that this work provides evidence for differences in the processing
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of pragmatic cues by bilingual and monolingual children which are not due to better
inhibitory skills or to a generally higher sensitivity to social cues, but to performing
true pragmatic inference by reasoning about communicative intentions in the context
of word learning. We propose that these differences are the result of adapting to
the challenging aspects of a bilingual learning environment, such as higher risks of
miscommunication and the need to efficiently and quickly acquire words from complex
and variable input. This is therefore another instance where the highly adaptive nature
of child cognition is evidenced, a case of ‘doing more with less’. Moreover, empirically
validating the distinction between using social cues and reasoning about intentions
underlying social cues is a fundamental cornerstone of pragmatic theory and might help
provide insights about separate developmental timelines for pragmatic competence.
Chapter 4
Frequency inference and defaults
I’m like that. Either I forget right away or I never forget.
— Samuel Beckett
4.1 Pragmatics and costs
Consider again the classic scalar implicature example :
(1) Some [but not all ] of the students passed the test.
And compare it to the following exchange (Grice, 1975:32):
(2) A: Smith doesn’t seem to have a girlfriend these days.
B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately.
[Smith probably has a girlfriend in NY ]
B’s answer in (2) constitutes a typical example of implicature in a Gricean sense:
it arises from a specific context, probably through a process of conscious inference, it
involves reasoning about what the speaker wants to communicate, it is detachable (it
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would arise if using slightly different phrasing), cancelable, and global (it arises from
processing the entire utterance).
The implicature in (1), on the other hand, appears to be of a different nature.
While the implicated meaning in B’s answer only arises in a specific context (taken in
isolation, without the previous utterance, it would not carry the implicature), the one
in (1) appears to arise in the absence of a specific context which would cancel it, to
be more closely related to a particular word (to arise locally rather than globally) and
to require less, or perhaps no conscious inference. This prompted Grice to create a
category of GCI (Generalised Conversational Implicatures) which would be generated
by default, that is to say, normally, in the absence of special circumstances, by ‘the use
of a certain form of words in the utterance’. The idea of a category of default local
implicatures was endorsed by neo-Griceans such as Levinson (2000) and Horn (2004),
while relevance theorists (Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Carston, 1995) have insisted on
implicatures being a property of whole sentences or propositions and nonce (‘one-off’)
generated. Similarly, as we mentioned in the previous chapter, theories differ as to
whether the default meaning is generated first (Levinson, 2000) or only after the literal
meaning has been processed (Huang & Snedeker, 2009).
This debate has a number of implications for theories of meaning. The issue with
GCIs comes when trying to separate what is said from what is implicated. Such a
distinction is useful both from a speaker’s point of view (‘Can X be held accountable/said
to have lied about I?’) and from a hearer’s point of view (‘Which part of the meaning
can be considered as being directly conveyed through the words themselves?’). However,
it seems impossible to find a criterion to operate this separation in a definite way.
Truth conditional status seems to cut across categories: conventional implicatures (e.g.,
‘He is English but brave’ ) do not participate to propositional content yet are explicit,
whereas some GCIs have truth conditional effects (‘If the old king died of a heart attack
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and a republic was declared, Tom would be happy, but if a republic was declared and
the old king died of a heart attack, he would not’, Cohen, 1971). Defaultness (being
derived automatically) and locality (being tied to a specific lexical item) would tend to
suggest that such meanings are part of the explicit content, however neo-Griceans such
as Horn (2004) would argue that this category cannot include cancelable meanings.
A number of authors substituted the classic dichotomy with a tripartite distinction:
sentence, utterance-type, utterance-token (Levinson, 2000); explicature in Relevance
Theory (Carston, 2004), impliciture in Bach (1994). These categories seem to be based
on two main criteria: 1) is the meaning additional to sentence meaning and 2) is it
available consciously? They are particularly explicit in Recanati (2004) distinctions
between primary and secondary meanings, and between ‘saturation’ and ‘free enrich-
ment’. Consider again Bach (1994)’s example, uttered by a mother whose child has
just injured their knee:
(3) You [the child ] are not going to die [from this cut ].
[Stop making a fuss ]
Recanati defines primary pragmatic processes as non-inferential, associative-like
mechanisms providing the explicit content of the utterance, whereas secondary prag-
matic processes produce the implicit meanings/classic conversational implicatures.
Thus, in (3), the enrichment [from this cut ] is primary meaning whereas the final [Stop
making a fuss ] interpretation is secondary meaning. Recanati also distinguishes in the
primary processes between ‘saturation’ (for non-truth evaluable propositions, e.g., the
enrichment of the pronoun you) and ‘free enrichment’ (e.g., the enrichment of the verb
die).
However, there does not seem to be a principled distinction to be made between
cases of ‘saturation’ such as (4) and cases of ‘free enrichment’ such as (5), where the
difference in truth evaluability status seems at best incidental, at worst irrelevant, and
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in any case delicate to establish (could the broadly understood (4) not be considered
truth evaluable?)
(4) The fence isn’t strong enough [for anything ]
(5) I haven’t eaten [ever ].
Similarly, the distinction between primary and secondary meanings does not appear,
in fact, to align with an inferential criterion.
(6) John is a doorbell.
(7) A: Is John married?
B: He has a wife. [Yes ]
In (6), complex inference will be required to arrive at primary meaning, whereas
the full secondary meaning of B’s answer will require little or no inference. Thus, what
primary and secondary meanings seem to recover are the differences between steps
involving what has been said and why it has been said (i.e., which speech act or goal is
achieved through the utterance, e.g., getting the child to stop complaining in (3) or
answering A’s question in (7)).
Are there meanings derived by default? The difficulty resides in how these are
defined. It seems difficult to define them as context-independent (cf. Levinson, 2000),
in the view of examples such as (11), where the additional meaning does not arise
without there being a contradictory context (Carston, 1995). Similarly, while the
meanings of ‘fish’, ‘financial institution’ and ‘some not all’ might arguably be more
salient or frequent for a particular item in (8), (9) and (10), they do not seem to qualify
as the default meanings in these utterances.
(8) (pointing at man) John is a shark.
(9) The water flowed down the bank and into the stream.
(10) If some of the students passed, the teacher will be happy.
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(11) I did the dishes and gave the baby a bath.
One solution is to define defaults as meanings that are automatically derived in a
given situation of discourse (Jaszczolt, 2009), whereas salient meanings are simply the
most frequent, familiar or stereotypical ones (Giora, 2003). According to Jaszczolt’s
Default Semantics, utterance meanings are obtained by combining the output from a
variety of sources: word meaning and sentence structure (WS), situation of discourse
(SD), properties of the human inferential system (IS), stereotypes and presumptions
about society and culture (SC) and world knowledge (WK). However, in this theory
an utterance such as (13) would be processed defaultly (just as (9)), whereas (14)
would involve a ‘conscious pragmatic inference’ (CPI) to arrive at an attributive rather
than referential reading. Yet both (13) and (14) seem to involve a similar case of
something akin to an instance of ‘garden-pathing’. It is also dubious whether the
sources of knowledge need to be distinguished in so many categories, for example (e.g.,
cultural versus world knowledge), or could be subsumed under ‘hearer’s knowledge at
given time’. Perhaps a more crucial distinction could be the one between common and
privileged ground (Keysar et al., 2000), which we come back to in the next paragraphs.
What are defaults and why would some meanings be defaultly processed? As we
said earlier, humans are lazy. Some processes have evolved to be more or less default
and automatic, either as innate biases or from habit and experience, whereas others,
more controlled and costly, require reasoning (Kahneman & Egan, 2011). Defaults exist
to reduce costs. So when is meaning interpretation costly? In language processing as
in other domains, there is a strong tendency to go for the path of least resistance. In
the search for speaker meaning (or assessment of potential mappings between linguistic
expressions and referents), hearers will access both sources of information and referents
as they are ranked, i.e, on the basis of their availability. Consider utterances (12)-(16).
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Why are these utterances likely to be more costly/not proceed defaultly, compared to
(8)-(11)?
(12) John is a doorbell.
(13) The bank on which the water flowed was very steep.
(14) The first daughter to be born to Mr. and Mrs. Brown will be called Scarlett.
(15) He opened the door and she handed him the key.
(16) That professor is great.
In all above cases, the cost seems to arise from the intended meaning not being
sufficiently available at the time of processing the relevant items. As Default Semantics
and constraint-based theories suggest, we derive meaning through the integration of
multiple sources of information. Because of the temporal nature of language and
constraints on attentional window (e.g., a limited amount of visual information is being
processed at one time), we do this in a continuous and incremental way, taking into
account number, strength and convergence of cues. At any given point in processing
there is a default interpretation, which is the most available both in terms of source
and referent. For the intended meaning to be processed with little cost, it needs to
have been made more available or salient than other meanings by the cues processed
so far. Otherwise, costs will arise, both because some type of inference will be needed,
and because the default reading will have to be inhibited.
In (8), while the intended meaning of ‘shark’ is not technically literal, it is available
enough, as a conventional metaphor, once ‘John’ has been processed (and thus made
a human-compatible meaning more probable). Similarly, in (10), the presence of
the conditional clause introduced by ‘if’ is a strong enough cue for a non-upper
bounded meaning of ‘some’, which is available as a relatively frequent alternative to
the pragmatically enriched ‘some’. On the other hand, in (12), the presence of ‘John’ is
not enough to make available a human-compatible meaning for ‘doorbell’ to overcome
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its literal meaning, as such a meaning of ‘doorbell’ might never have been encountered
before and will require an inference. This inference may then be performed in an
associative manner (i.e., ‘What are doorbell traits that can be attributed to a human?’)
or by performing intention reading (i.e.,‘Why would the speaker compare John to a
doorbell?’). In (13), as opposed to (9), the intended meaning of ‘bank’ has not been
previously made more salient by ‘the water flowed down’ and thus is not available
enough compared to the more salient meaning ‘financial institution’. The same problem
arises in (14) and (15), though it seems harder to pinpoint the characteristics of the
previous context which make available an enriched meaning of ‘and’ in (15) (as it turns
out probably wrongly) and not in (11) (perhaps an event of opening a door leads to
expect something which temporally follows, whilst an event of doing the dishes does
not?). In (16), the cost comes from the fact that an ironic reading is less often readily
available (apart from very conventionalised forms) and will require speaker-specific
inference. Importantly, costs are not linked to type of process which led to an expression
having a specific meaning, but to whether an inference is required online. For example,
scalar implicatures such as ‘some but not all’ might progressively become more default,
which means they will be easier to process in certain contexts and might require less
inferential effort, but they can still be reconstructed as having been calculated from
assumptions of informativeness (just like the process of creating the ‘shark’ metaphor
could be reconstructed using the same assumptions, Kao, Bergen, & Goodman, 2014).
In this view, the question of whether literal meanings come first, or whether prag-
matic inferences are costly, becomes irrelevant. As Hanks (2004) says: ‘There are no
literal meanings, only varying degrees of probability’ (or, rather, varying degrees of
availability). Instead, Hanks distinguishes between ‘norm’ (or retrieval) and ‘exploita-
tion of norm’ (or inferential processes). Idiom processing constitutes a good example of
this balance. Indeed, for a long time views diverged on how idiomatic expressions were
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processed, between theories which considered them to be ‘long words’ simply retrieved
as such in memory (Chomsky, 1980; Gibbs Jr & O’Brien, 1990) and compositional
approaches driven by the evidence of syntactic flexibility and individual meaning effects,
which did not systematically end when the ‘idiomatic key’ (or point of recognition
of the idiom) had been reached. According to the compositional perspective, idioms
were ‘nonce’ built from individual meanings and immediate context (Gibbs Jr, Nayak,
& Cutting, 1989; Nunberg, 1987) . However, idioms benefit from certain properties
which do seem to distinguish them from other sequences (e.g., idioms which are ‘de-
composable’, that is to say whose logical form can be mapped to their meaning have
an advantage in processing speed, both over non-decomposable idioms e.g., Titone
& Connine, 1994, as well as over non-idiomatic speech and novel metaphors, Caillies
& Declercq, 2011), which differ in their ‘literal’ status but not in their inferential
versus retrieved status). In light of this, it appears once again that only models which
integrate both the analytic/inferential and retrieval/memory outputs together, such
as the hybrid model (Titone & Connine, 1999) and construction-integration model
(Caillies & Butcher, 2007; Kintsch, 1988) can accurately predict such effects.
Thus, rather than different strategies, or different sources of information/constraints
overriding each other, we can see meaning derivation as a probabilistic combination of
default and inferential processes, of retrieval and reasoning.
4.2 Cues, constraints and development
As we have seen, some interpretations are likely to be more costly than others. This will
depend on cue number, convergence and strength. That is to say, the easiest, default
interpretations will be the ones that have many strong cues and are unchallenged
by salient competitors. Cue strength is determined by a number of features which
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define availability: salience (e.g., visual, memory based, etc.), type of access (retrieval
or inferential) and experience. The strongest cues are then those that give the most
direct and easy access to meaning, with visual access likely to be be more direct
than retrieval in memory, direct retrieval being easier than associative, associative
easier than inferential, and inferential based on egocentric knowledge easier than that
requiring perspective-taking. Thus, deriving the meaning of a word used with a salient
visual referent present (e.g., ‘the cat’ ) will be easier than retrieving a representation
from memory. Similarly, associating two meanings (e.g., wife mentioned in answer to a
question about marriage) might be easier than inferring from a single known meaning
(e.g., enriching ‘some’ based on calculations about informativeness and alternative
expressions available). Finally, inferring meanings based on speaker-general assumptions
of informativeness should be easier than inferring meanings based on perspective-taking,
as in cases of irony such as ‘That professor is great’, since speaker-general knowledge can
be modelled on egocentric knowledge, and is thus more available than speaker-specific
knowledge.
Where do pragmatics lie? If defined as contextual contributions to linguistic
meaning, their status is uncertain, as they will most likely cut across the distinction
between default and costly processes, from automatic enrichments of individual words
(pronouns, etc.) to complex inferences based on the relevance of a particular utterance in
relation to the broader discourse context and speaker goals. But if we define pragmatics
as reasoning about informativeness, then pragmatic inferences will tend to fall on the
costly side of the default/resource-demanding spectrum. As such, they will be used
in an active manner when more default heuristics which filter obviously attractive
or implausible meanings have failed to provide the hearer with a straightforward
answer. Among inferences based on speaker-general knowledge, as we said earlier, the
ones which are based on reasoning about alternative expressions (as opposed to just
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alternative referents, as in size or frequency based inferences), such as ad hoc and
contrastive inferences are probably stronger and less costly since they benefit from
mutual reinforcement/multiple cues: in the ‘hat and glasses’ example from Stiller et al.
(2015), the target expression e1 (e.g., ‘glasses’) is more specific for the target referent
r1 (‘glasses’) AND in addition the alternative expression e2 (‘hat’) is specific to the
alternative referent r2 (‘hat and glasses’). In contrast, in the frequency inferences we
describe in the next section, there is no reasoning about alternative expressions (of the
type ‘if they had wanted to refer to alternative referent, they would have said X’).
Thanks to defaults, humans get to be lazy in communication: associations and
inferences do not have to always be computed online, and thus speaker model does not
have to be continuously actively updated either. This behaviour is rational and efficient,
since default heuristics (such as assuming a fixed speaker model, shared common
ground or relying on most cognitively available descriptions) apply successfully in a
vast majority of cases. However, this laziness comes with a price: it can sometimes lead
to communication failures and means that pragmatic reasoning is not quite optimal, in
comprehension or in production. Because people firstly rely on default mechanisms and
are not continuously reasoning actively about informativeness or updating their model
of the speaker, they for example fail to immediately notice non-optimally informative
descriptions (Engelhardt, Bailey, & Ferreira, 2006; Rubio-Fernández, 2016) or to adapt
their own in production (Horton & Keysar, 1996; Lane & Ferreira, 2008).
An example of the importance of defaults in experimental paradigms might lie in the
puzzling diversity of results in studies of scalar implicature using different paradigms.
Syrett, Lingwall, et al. (2017) and Syrett, Austin, et al. (2017), which we mention in
Chapter 2 tested children aged 3 to 6 years old on scalar implicatures. In these (as in
other studies), children (bilingual or monolingual) did not appear to perform the scalar
inference, and the form of the instruction had a major impact on children’s rates of
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pragmatic answers, with instructions mentioning the items of the scene biasing towards
a positive answer not only in pragmatic infelicitous cases (‘Some horses have carrots’
when all horses have carrots) but also in semantically incorrect cases (‘All horses have
carrots’ when only some do), particularly for bilingual children (37% positive answers
to semantically incorrect sentences). This is similar to findings in (Horowitz et al., 2018;
J. Sullivan, Davidson, Wade, & Barner, 2017) When a neutral instruction was used
(‘Did she do well?’ in Syrett et al., 2017a) the effect disappeared. This is probably due
to lack of experience with quantifiers, which means their meaning is not strong enough
to inhibit a tendency to answer an easier question (e.g., ‘Are there horses and carrots?’ )
and produce a positive answer based on the nouns only (cf. Horowitz et al., 2017).
This effect might be particularly strong in bilinguals since their vocabulary knowledge
and experience using quantifiers of each language is even weaker than monolinguals’
and could lead to an even stronger tendency to ignore quantifiers altogether in favour
of an ‘easy’ answer using nouns only. These various methodological caveats make it
difficult to interpret the result of these studies in terms of tasks that would purely
assess pragmatic competence in bilinguals, rather than world knowledge, metalinguistic
awareness or noun bias.
Does this mean people choose one strategy or type of cue over the others as default
and do not consider other, less readily available sources of information? Evidence
would in fact seem to indicate that all ‘channels’ of information stay open, but the
amount of attention given or effort spent on them varies. An example is precisely
the debate over the integration of common ground knowledge. It has been an open
question whether hearers consider common ground knowledge from the very beginning
of utterance processing, or rely first on egocentric knowledge by default, engaging in
perspective-taking or speaker modelling (i.e., Theory of Mind) only when failure occurs.
Indeed, it would seem that the interpretation of a definite referring expression such as
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‘the cat’ should be restricted to the shared ground between two speakers. Imagine a
friend telling a story and uttering ‘the cat’. It is unlikely that you will interpret this
as referring to your neighbor’s cat who got stuck atop a tree once and whom your
friend has never heard of. Yet, in an influential study, Keysar et al. (2000) showed
that listeners did not restrict their attention only to objects in the common ground.
In this study, Keysar et al. used a paradigm where a speaker (the director) and a
listener sat across each other in front of a wooden array formed of cubicles containing
objects. The director would give instructions to the listener to move objects (e.g.,
‘Move the big candle above the funnel’ ). Some of the cubicles were closed, so that the
objects inside them were visible to the listener but not to the speaker. In critical trials,
there were two objects which satisfied the target referring expression (e.g., one very
big candle, one big candle and one small candle) but the best match for the target
expression (i.e., the very big candle) was hidden from the speaker and thus should not
have been taking into consideration, yet listeners first directed their eye gazes at the
distractor object, and sometimes even reached out to it. Keysar et al. thus concluded
that listeners started with interpreting referring expressions according to egocentric
perspective.
However, other studies obtained contradictory results, that is, listeners integrating
common ground from the earliest moments of processing. In Hanna, Tanenhaus, and
Trueswell (2003) and Nadig and Sedivy (2002), when the privileged and common
ground matches were equally perceptually salient (e.g., two red triangles), listeners
did show early preferential looking towards, and faster processing of, objects in the
common ground.
One way of accounting for these results is to take a constraint-based approach,
similar to that of Default Semantics, where interpretation results from the combination
of outputs from a variety of sources. This is the approach taken by Hanna et al., (2003),
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who argue in favour of a common ground constraint, which favours objects in the shared
ground and perceptual constraint, which favours perceptual matches. These constraints
would then explain why listeners readily processed shared matches in Hanna et al.
(2003), while they did not in Keysar et al., as the output of the two constraints (shared
match and best perceptual match) diverged in the latter study. However, as pointed
out by Heller, Parisien, and Stevenson (2016), the results from a third study show
that this cue integration has to proceed in a simultaneous fashion. Indeed, in Heller,
Grodner, and Tanenhaus (2008), listeners were faced with a setup similar to that of
Keysar et al., where two contrastive pairs of objects were displayed (e.g., a big and
small funnel and a big and small candle) only one of which was in common ground (e.g.,
the big and small candle were both visible to the speaker, but the small funnel was
not). Eye-tracking analyses showed early preferential looking towards the match in the
shared contrastive pair, a result which would not be predicted by the output common
ground constraint or perceptual constraint processed separately and then weighted and
combined (as they would both predict the two big objects to the same extent, being
both in common ground and both equal perceptual matches). While other authors
have assumed different strategies of perspective-taking to explain these contradictory
results, Heller et al., (2016) propose a probabilistic model of simultaneous constraint
integration which can jointly account for the apparent behavioural differences.
Within the Rational Speech Act framework, Bohn, Tessler, and Frank (2019) propose
a similar Bayesian model to explain how listeners flexibly integrate speaker-general and
speaker-specific (common ground) knowledge, the first one as an inference which can
be calculated based on assumptions of informativeness and desire to avoid ambiguity,
the second as a modified prior to account for referent preferences.
How do children fare in performing this cue integration? Children have reliably been
found to struggle in deriving scalar implicatures of the ‘some-but-not-all’ type (Huang
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& Snedeker, 2009; Noveck, 2001) , with studies using different paradigms obtaining
varying levels of performance (Papafragou & Musolino, 2003; Papafragou & Tantalou,
2004; Skordos & Papafragou, 2016; Teresa Guasti et al., 2005). These difficulties have
been hypothesised successively as the result of a pragmatic deficit, an alternative
accessibility issue or, more recently, lack in semantic knowledge of quantifiers (Horowitz
et al., 2018).
In the case of pragmatic inferences such as scalar implicatures, one explanation
for the difficulties experienced by children resides in the salience or accessibility of
alternatives (the Alternatives Hypothesis, Barner & Bachrach, 2010; Barner, Brooks, &
Bale, 2011). Children, as adults, seem to perform interpretations on the basis of multiple
cues related to various constraints and to rank these cues according to their reliability
and availability or ease of perception (cf., constraint-based accounts of pragmatic
inference, E. Bates, MacWhinney, & MacWhinney, 1987; Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015;
Nappa, January, Gleitman, & Trueswell, 2004). However, the strength and weighting of
each type of cue in children might differ from adults given that they have less experience
with social reasoning and benefit less from processing capacities which would allow
them to inhibit salient but irrelevant cues. Given that they benefit both from less
processing capacity and less experience with meaning interpretation, perspective-taking
and pragmatic processes in general than adults (thus leading to weaker cue strength
for these sources of information), it would seem likely that they might experience some
difficulties.
4.3 Frequency inference
Following Tenenbaum and Griffith’s (2001) Size Principle, learners can base their
choices of referent for a novel word purely on specificity, i.e., relative frequency or
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novelty in context, even in the absence of salient alternative expressions more specific
to alternative referents (e.g., ‘all’ being more specific to the meaning ‘all’ than ‘some’
would be). For example, if presented with a character with one feature (e.g., a dinosaur
with bandanna) and another with two features (e.g., a dinosaur with headband and
bandanna) described as a ‘dinosaur with a dax’ hearers should infer that the novel
word refers to the target character’s most specific feature, or least frequent feature
in context, i.e, the headband rather than the bandanna (Frank & Goodman, 2014).
Similarly, children tend to map a new word to the most novel referent in context
(Akhtar, Carpenter & Tomasello, 1996). More generally, more frequent referents (such
as ceiling, floor, table, etc.) are given a lower probability as potential meanings for a
novel word due to their cross-situational ubiquity.
One perhaps important difference between scalar or frequency inference, and the
contrastive inferences examined in Chapter 3 is that the first relies on assuming that a
speaker should not be underinformative (e.g., using ‘some’ to mean ‘all’) while the
second relies on assuming that the speaker should not be overinformative (e.g., using
‘the tall glass’ when they could have said ‘the glass’ ). There are both theoretical and
experimental reasons for thinking that overinformativeness is not seen as infelicitous, or
unusual, as underinformativeness. Indeed, the former, unlike the latter, does not lead
to referent identification failures and is often witnessed in naturalistic speech, especially
for salient properties such as colour adjectives (Rubio-Fernández, 2016; Sedivy, 2003).
Moreover, both children and adults have been shown to penalise overinformativeness less
than underinformativeness in experimental setups (Davies & Katsos, 2009; Engelhardt
et al., 2006). However, in a study by Davies and Katsos (2013) where 3 and 4 year
olds were presented with referring expressions which were overinformative both with
regard to the visual context and in terms of typicality of modification (e.g., ‘the cat
with the tail’ when only one normal looking cat is present in the picture), 4 year olds
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did show signs of confusion, while 3 year olds did not, proving that even young children
are sensitive to overinformativeness.
The bilingual effect on deriving the contrastive inference in Experiment 1 was a
relative effect which did not reach numerical significance. However, there are reasons
to believe that this advantage would be most apparent in a stripped-down paradigm
when only one pragmatic cue is present. Indeed, in Rowe et al. (2015), there were no
differences between monolingual and bilingual children’s extensions of a novel word
to a referent which already had a familiar name when two pragmatic cues were given
(e.g., ‘This is a skiff, it’s a kind of boat’ but bilinguals, unlike monolinguals, were
above chance in a condition where only one pragmatic cue was given (e.g., ‘This is a
skiff, it’s a boat’ ). Thus we hypothesise that the differences between the monolingual
and bilingual group might be most apparent when a minimal amount of information is
given. However, the inference still needs to be accessible enough for young children
to be able to derive it, since, as we mentioned previously, children of this age tend
to struggle when pragmatic inference paradigms do not involve additional discourse
support for the target interpretation.
While children in Experiment 1, unlike adults, had failed at deriving a pragmatic
inference from a single cue (adjectival modifier), this inference was based on assuming
that a speaker should not be overinformative. As there are reasons to believe that an
inference based on penalising a speaker for being underinformative might be stronger,
this is what we investigate in the following experiments.
4.4 Experiment 3a: frequency inference
Experiment 3a intended to replicate adults and children’s performance of a frequency
inference for word learning by adapting a paradigm similar to Frank and Goodman’s
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(2014) as a computerised task. Given the finding that children in experiment 1, unlike
adults, did not seem to be able to use a single prosodic cue for word learning when
relying on the assumption that the speaker would avoid being overinformative, the
purpose of this experiment was to investigate whether a single cue was sufficient in
the context of assuming that a speaker should avoid being underinformative which, as
we have seen, is a more strictly penalised violation and thus probably more reliable
inference. In this task, children are shown a display with two similar characters (eg.,
two cats), one with one novel object (e.g., object A), the other with two novel objects,
including the same object (e.g., object A and object B). At training time, children
hear a prompt using a novel word (eg., ‘Oh, a cat with a dax!’ ), then at test time they
have to choose between two new characters (eg., two frogs), each of which only has
one of the objects (eg., a frog has object A and a frog has object B) after hearing
another prompt (eg., ‘Can you touch the frog with the dax? ). This inference relies
on the assumption that describing a specific character using the novel object would
be underinformative if both characters have the object (ie., if the speaker is referring
to the shared more frequent object A). We predict that children should be better
able to perform the inference in this context, and furthermore we predict that, as in
experiment 1, under the hypothesis that they benefit from enhanced abilities to reason
about informativeness, bilingual children should outperform monolingual children. We
also predict a developmental effect, ie., that adults would perform better than children.
4.4.1 Method
Participants
Participants in the adult study were students of the University of Cambridge (n=32)
who were recruited through email and completed the study online.
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Children participants were the same 270 children as in experiments 1 and 2 (cf.
Chapter 3).
Stimuli
Experimental stimuli for the critical trials were 4 pictures featuring 4 characters each
with novel objects: 2 training characters (one target character circled in red with target
and distractor object, one distractor character with distractor object only) which varied
between items (cats, birds, dogs and fish) and 2 test characters, which were always frogs
(one with target object only, one with distractor object only). The control condition
was a mutual exclusivity condition featuring 4 disambiguation trials with pictures
identical to critical items except the distractor character had a familiar object (e.g., an
apple) and the target character had an unknown object. The target character was not
circled in red in the mutual exclusivity condition. There were two lists counterbalancing
which novel object was the target and the distractor. The position of the target test
frog relative to the target training character (same/different) was also counterbalanced
between items. An example stimulus for the frequency inference condition can be
found in figure 4.1, and for the control/mutual exclusivity condition in figure 4.2. A
full list of stimuli (utterances and pictures) can be found in Appendix 3.
Procedure
The task was implemented on a touchscreen laptop using Superlab 5 (Cedrus, San
Padro, CA) with instructions recorded by a native English speaker. Clicks were
recorded as raw X and Y pixel coordinates of the point where the screen had been
touched and answers were subsequently coded by matching the coordinates to the
corresponding answer area among the two possible choices (left or right). Children
were tested individually in a quiet room at their school. After hearing a story about
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Fig. 4.1 Example stimulus experiment 3a and 3b (frequency inference), ‘Oh, a cat that
has a dax! Can you touch the frog that has a dax?
Fig. 4.2 Example stimulus experiment 3a and 3b (control/mutual exclusivity condition),
‘Oh, a dog that has a dax! Can you touch the frog that has a dax?
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Fig. 4.3 Experiment 3a results
ct=consistent target choices (all four trials), cd=consistent distractor choices. Error bars
show 95% confidence interval obtained through nonparametric bootstrapping
character Mr. Puppet meeting aliens and completing a first task, children were asked
if they wanted to keep helping Mr. Puppet by finding animals who stole some of the
aliens’ objects. Trials were randomised, with critical and control trials interleaved. For
each trial, children saw an image on the screen and heard an instruction of the type
‘Oh! A kitten that has a fep! Can you show me the frog that has a fep?’ using one of
eight novel words (fep, tuki, keef, razee, toma, zef, gabo and fid). They then responded
by touching the screen, which switched to the next trial. The experimenter sat next to
the child to ensure they understood what was asked of them and completed the task
appropriately, but provided only neutral feedback.
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Fig. 4.4 Experiment 3a results
bil=bilinguals, mono=monolinguals
Fig. 4.5 Experiment 3b results
bil=bilinguals, mono=monolinguals
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4.4.2 Results
Surprisingly, we found a distractor bias for children, with both monolinguals (m=0.25,
sd=0.43) and bilinguals (m=0.36, sd=0.48) selecting distractor more often than target,
whereas adults appeared to be at chance (m=0.47, sd=0.50) (see table 4.1). Interestingly,
bilinguals’ target choices were closer to adult scores than monolinguals’. Performance
in the mutual exclusivity condition was also higher in monolinguals (m=0.90, sd=0.30)
than in bilinguals (m=0.84, sd=0.37). To investigate the reliability of these effects,
we again fit a logistic regression mixed model (D. Bates et al., 2014) with items
and participants as random effects and starting with all design-relevant fixed effects
as random slopes and removing random effects when they lead to non-convergence
(Cane et al., 2017; Horowitz et al., 2018). As in experiment 1 and 2, the final model
included gender, normalised BPVS scores, normalised FSM percentages, bilingual
status, condition and their interaction as fixed effects, and subject intercepts as random
effects. The critical frequency inference condition was used as the reference level. For
adults, the model was simply specified with condition, subject and their interaction
Correct ∼ Condition+ (Condition|subject). (4.1)
Target choices were significantly below chance in children (est=-0.64, se=0.17, z=-
3.798, p=0.0001) and at chance in adults (est=-0.53, se=1.20, z=-0.44, p=0.66), with
significantly higher performance in the mutual exclusivity condition both in children
(est=2.25, se=0.16, z=14.45 p<0.0001) and in adults (est=2.97, se= 1.28, z=2.31,
p=0.02). There was a significant effect of vocabulary scores (est=0.20, se=0.057,
z=3.54 p=0.0004) and interaction with bilingualism, with monolinguals performing
significantly lower than bilinguals in critical condition (est=-0.67, se=0.15, z=-4.5,
p<0.0001) and significantly higher in mutual exclusivity condition (est=1.10, se=0.24,
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Fig. 4.6 Experiment 3a: adult’s bimodal answers
z=4.565, p<0.0001). Further exploration revealed that a substantial proportion of both
children and adults were consistently (i.e., in all four trials) choosing the distractor
object, while a similar proportion of adults, but not children, consistently picked the
target object, leading to a bimodal pattern of answers in adults verified by Hartigan’s
dip test (D=0.19, p <0.0001) (see figure 4.6). A graph showing the results for the
adults and children can be seen in figure 4.3. The results broken down for bilingual
and monolingual groups can be seen in figure 4.4.
4.4.3 Discussion
The results of Experiment 3a were contrary to model predictions and previous findings,
with adults performing at chance levels and children significantly below chance. How-
ever, a closer look revealed this was mainly the result of a large percentage of both adult
and children participants consistently choosing distractor over target object. What
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appeared as chance performance in adults was in fact due to an equivalent percentage
of adults consistently choosing target object, creating a bimodal distribution of answers,
whereas no alternative strategy counterbalanced distractor choices in children. One
explanation for these unexpected results is that participants misinterpreted which
training character (e.g., which kitten) was being referred to, despite the target character
being singled out with a red circle. While this would explain random choices, it did
not explain why both groups were displaying a consistent distractor bias. Furthermore,
there was a clear difference between the behaviour of children and adult participants
who were not consistently choosing the distractor, with non-CD children still answering
in a way biased towards the distractor, whereas a large majority of non-CD adults
were consistently choosing the target object. The examination of consistent patterns
of answers across trials answered some of our interrogations. However, the uncer-
tainty regarding which training character was being targeted added an additional prior
parameter which was not part of the original paradigm and made any attempts at
quantitative interpretations potentially circular (since the probability of choosing a
training character was not entirely independent from the probability of choosing an
object). For these reasons, we decided to run additional experiments. Experiment 3b
replicates Experiment 3a with the targeted character made explicit in the instruction,
while Experiment 4 explores whether a potential alternative quantity implicature drove
the consistent distractor bias in Experiment 3a.
Bilingual performance was significantly higher (and closer to adult scores) than
monolinguals’. However, given that neither group of children appeared to be performing
the frequency inference, this is most likely due to bilinguals performing closer to
chance/having less distractor bias than monolinguals.
While target object choices in Experiment 3a (consistent or not) could only come
from choosing target training character (the only one who had the target object) and
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Fig. 4.7 Experiment 3a: tentative reconstruction of inference probabilities. (top:
proportion choices of training kitten character after hearing ‘Oh, a kitten that has a
fep! bottom: transition probabilities for test frog after ‘Can you show me the frog that
has a fep?)
consistent distractor choices most likely resulted from choosing distractor training
character, it is not possible to identify the source of inconsistent distractor choices
(which could have resulted from choosing either training character, see Figure 4.7).
In addition, the target inference might have been too difficult for children because it
potentially required an extra step of probabilistic reasoning about the interlocutor (e.g.,
‘the blue object is probably the target since the right kitten is probably the training
target since it has the most specific object’ vs. ‘the blue object is probably the target
since the right kitten is the target and it is the most specific object it has’), which has
been shown too costly to be performed sometimes even in adults (Degen et al., 2013).
Given that the percentage of consistent distractor choices in children and adults
in Experiment 3a was equivalent (0.37 vs. 0.41), it seemed that the difference in
performance was mainly due to the absence of consistent target pragmatic inference in
children (0.02 vs. 0.38 in adults). However, since it was unclear to which extent the
uncertainty regarding target training character might have driven the results (increasing
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Table 4.1 Experiments 3 and 4: summary of results
Condition Adults Monolinguals Bilingualsmean SD mean SD mean SD
(exp3a) mutual exclusivity 0.84 (0.36) 0.90 (0.30) 0.84 (0.37)
(exp3a) frequency inference 0.47 (0.50) 0.25 (0.43) 0.36 (0.48)
(exp3b) mutual exclusivity 0.64 (0.48) 0.85 (0.36) 0.87 (0.34)
(exp3b) frequency inference (explicit) 0.64 (0.48) 0.51 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50)
(exp4) mutual exclusivity 0.81 (0.39) / / / /
(exp4) quantity implicature 0.81 (0.39) / / / /
the difficulty by requiring two steps of probabilistic reasoning instead of one) we remove
this prior uncertainty in Experiment 3b by referring explicitly to the target training
character in the instruction.




Participants in the adult study were native English speakers (n=28) recruited through
Prolific Academic who completed the study online for a reward of £0.37.
Children participants were 110 children aged 4 to 6 years old (m=5;5, sd=7;5)
recruited in a Cambridge middle class school. The study was approved by the Cambridge
Psychology Research Ethics Committee and parents in participating schools were sent
information about the study along with a form allowing them to opt-out if they
wished to. Since we used an opt-out policy, information regarding language status was
obtained through school staff and confirmation with child, a procedure which, while
unconventional, was found to be highly reliable when compared to parental forms (over
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98%match) in a former study. Half the children (n=58, 30 females, 28 males, mean
age=5;4, sd=7.2 months) had regular exposure to another language through one or
both their parents and could demonstrate some level of fluency. The remaining children
(n=52, 19 females, 33 males, mean age=5;5, sd=7.7 months) had no regular exposure
to a language other than English. Two bilinguals and eight monolinguals were excluded
from final analyses for fussiness, failure or inability (e.g., deafness) to complete the task.
Languages were Bengali (n=8), Chinese (n=7), Polish (n=6), Afrikaans (n=4), Spanish
(n=5), Urdu (n=5), French (n=3), German(n=2), Greek (n=2), Korean (n=2), Thai
(n=2) Vietnamese (n=2) and Arabic, Dutch Hebrew, Hungarian, Kurdish, Portuguese,
Romanian, Russian, Tamil, Telugu and Turkish (all n=1).
Receptive vocabulary
As for the first sample of children (experiments 1 and 2), participants also completed a
computer version of BPVS-3 (Dunn & Dunn, 2009) implemented on the touchscreen
laptop to test receptive vocabulary.
Stimuli
The stimuli were the same as in Experiment 3a.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 3a, with the only difference that
the instructions now made explicit mention of the target character, e.g., ‘Oh! The
kitten circled in red has a fep! Can you show me the frog that has a fep?’
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Fig. 4.8 Results Experiment 3b
ct=consistent target choices, cd=consistent distractor choices. Error bars show 95%
confidence interval obtained through nonparametric bootstrapping
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4.5.2 Results
Adults seemed to be performing the frequency inference (m=0.64, sd=0.48) whereas
both monolinguals (m=0.51, sd=0.50) and bilinguals (m=0.51, sd=0.50) were at chance.
Performance in mutual exclusivity condition was this time not higher in monolinguals
(m=0.85, sd=0.36) than bilinguals (m=0.87, sd=0.34). This could be due to the
sample of bilinguals having a different lexicon structure than the previous sample
(cf. Byers-Heinlein & Werker, 2013). As expected, preliminary analyses revealed that
the bilingual group had significantly lower vocabulary levels in English (m=65.18,
sd=15.16) than the monolingual group (m=79.09, sd=17.01) (t = 14.95, df = 499.2,
p<0.001). BPVS normalised scores were then entered in the regression model as a
covariable. We again fit a logistic regression mixed model with items and participants
as random effects and starting with all design-relevant fixed effects as random slopes
and removing random effects when they lead to non-convergence. The model included
gender, normalised BPVS scores, bilingual status, condition and their interaction as
fixed effects, and subject intercepts as random effects. The critical frequency inference
condition was used as the reference level. For adults, the model was again
Correct ∼ Condition+ (Condition|subject). (4.2)
Adults were indeed above chance this time in selecting target (est=0.70, se=0.29,
z=2.43, p=0.01) and did not significantly differ in mutual exclusivity condition
(est=0.04, se=0.48, z= 0.09, p=0.93) whereas children were at chance (est=0.16,
se=0.15, z=1.07, p=0.28), with significantly higher performance in mutual exclusivity
condition (est=1.88, se=0.24, z=7.89 p<0.0001). There was again a significant effect
of vocabulary scores (est=0.29, se=0.08, z=3.585, p=0.0003). No other effects were
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significant. A graph showing the results for monolinguals and bilinguals can be seen in
figure 4.5, for adults and children in figure 4.8.
4.5.3 Discussion
There were this time no differences between bilinguals and monolinguals, possibly
because choices appeared to be mostly random for all children.
The explicit reference to the target training character in Experiment 3b allowed
us to confirm that consistent distractor choices in Experiment 3a had been driven by
uncertainty regarding which training character was being referred to. However, we
found results to be equivalent to the trend in Experiment 3a (when excluding consistent
distractor choices) with adults, but not children, succeeding in performing the target
specificity inference and selecting the target object above chance. It therefore did not
seem that children’s failure in deriving the target pragmatic inference was due to the
increased difficulty of having to perform two steps of probabilistic reasoning, but it
remained unclear what had driven consistent distractor choices in children and adults
in Experiment 3a, and how this potentially related to performance in Experiment 3b.
Experiment 4 was designed to explore whether this bias was the result of performing an
alternative pragmatic inference which might have been easier for children to compute
compared to the target inference.
The consistent distractor bias in Experiment 3a could have been due to an alternative
ad hoc implicature (‘a kitten that has a fep [and nothing else]’, cf. Stiller et al., 2015)
or to a matching strategy consisting of pairing similar descriptions (kitten/frog ‘that
has a fep’) with similar-looking characters (kitten/frog that only has distractor object)
made possible by the semantic ambiguity (both characters could be referred to as
‘a kitten that has a fep’ if fep was the distractor object). Arguably, this ad hoc
implicature might have been easier to compute since it is based on reasoning about
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alternative expressions and thus benefits from multiple reinforcing cues which might
make it a stronger inference (‘if they had meant the kitten with two objects they
would have said ‘a kitten with a fep and a dax’, while there is no obviously available
alternative expression for the distractor training character based on the specificity
inference: ‘if they had meant the kitten with the most frequent object, they would have
said..?’)1. In order to test this, we ran a version of the experiment with an instruction
that was pragmatically ambiguous but semantically unambiguous. The choice of the
distractor character would then indicate that an alternative pragmatic inference had
been performed.
4.6 Experiment 4: quantity implicature
4.6.1 Method
Participants
Participants were students of the University of Cambridge (n=82) who were recruited
through email and completed the study online.
Stimuli
The stimuli were the same as that of Experiment 3a and 3b but included only the
training characters, and no red circle to indicate which character was being referred to.
An example stimulus can be found in figure 4.9.
1A crucial difference between ours and Stiller et al.’s (2015) paradigm is that the use of novel
words makes it impossible to reason about an alternative expression which might have unambiguously
referred to the unique object (‘a kitten that has a dax’ would not have been more informative than
‘a kitten that has fep’; unlike ‘my friend has a hat’ compared to ‘my friend has glasses’), thus the
alternative which refers to both objects (‘a fep and a dax’), despite being non-optimally informative,
is the only one that could have been considered here.
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Fig. 4.9 Example stimulus experiment 4,‘Oh, a kitten with a fep! Can you show me
which one of the kittens is the one that has a fep?’
Procedure
The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 3a and 3b, but the instructions used
were of the type ‘Oh, a kitten with a fep! Can you show me which one of the kittens is
the one that has a fep?’. The use of a reinforced definite article (‘the one’) ensured that
this instruction was semantically unambiguous with regard to how many characters fit
the description (one), thus the choice of the distractor character (with only one object)
could only result from performing a pragmatic inference ‘the one that has a fep [and
nothing else].
4.6.2 Results
We fit a logistic regression mixed model for each of the studies with random effects
for participants and condition using the lme4 package (D. Bates et al., 2014). Model
specification was
Correct ∼ Condition+ (Condition|subject). (4.3)
Participants were significantly above chance in choosing target character (b=2.66,
z=5.44, p<0.0001) and performance did not significantly differ in control condition
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Fig. 4.10 Results Experiment 4
ct=consistent target choices, cd=consistent distractor choices. Error bars show 95%
confidence interval obtained through nonparametric bootstrapping
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(b=0.35, z=0.60, p=0.54). There were no consistent distractor choices. A graph
showing the results can be seen in figure 4.10.
4.6.3 Discussion
There was no evidence of an alternative ad hoc implicature of the type ‘the kitten that
has a fep [and nothing else]’ (i.e., no consistent distractor choices) in Experiment 4 and
participants overwhelmingly picked the character that had two objects including the
(unique) target object. We conclude that the distractor bias could not have resulted
from the alternative implicature alone, since the removal of the test characters blocked
distractor choices, and that this bias was more likely the result of a matching strategy
consisting of pairing similar descriptions (e.g., ‘the kitten/frog that has a fep’) with
similar-looking characters (e.g., the kitten/frog that has one object).
4.7 General Discussion
Children demonstrate a range of pragmatic abilities in language processing and ac-
quisition and have been shown to be successful in performing pragmatic inferences
based on specificity or novelty, such as those in ‘ad hoc’ implicatures (Stiller et al.,
2015). Thus, their struggles in the derivation of scalar implicatures such as ‘some’ as
‘some-but-not-all’ have been hypothesised to be the consequence of difficulties specific to
this particular type of implicature, i.e., availability of the relevant scale or alternatives,
or trouble with the lexical family of quantifiers (Horowitz et al., 2018). Our failure to
find successful performance of a specificity inference for word learning in children in a
paradigm adapted from Frank and Goodman (2014) suggests that another explanation
might be in order. A main difference between ours and Frank and Goodman’s study
was the simultaneous presentation of training and test items for ease of computerisation.
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As the results in Experiment 3a demonstrated, this had the effect of biasing participant
responses towards the distractor. Since we found no evidence in a separate experiment
(Experiment 4) that this bias could be driven by an alternative ad hoc implicature
alone, we hypothesise that the simultaneous set up highlighted the similarity between
distractor training and test characters and made a ‘distractor matching’ answer a
readily available and easy default option. While the explicit mention of the training
character disallowed the consistent use of this strategy in Experiment 3b, we believe
that the salience and availability of the matching strategy still prevented children from
considering an alternative strategy and computing the pragmatic inference, resulting
in chance performance. Indeed, in their study Horowitz et al. (2018) found children to
struggle with both ‘some’ and ‘none’ statements and performance between the two to be
correlated, whereas performance with ‘all’ statements was very good and approaching
ceiling in 4-5 years old. As they themselves acknowledged, this could be the result of
a default matching strategy which pairs statements containing a certain noun (e.g.,
‘some/none of the cats’) with the picture that only features exemplars matching the NP
(i.e., the picture with only/all cats). If this is the case, it would explain why removing
‘none’ trials worsened performance in their last experiment, since it gave more strength
to the default matching strategy/less occasions for children to question it or consider
an alternative. Similarly, this application of a default strategy across trials might
have been reinforced in our study by the control condition, where the correct answer
did involve pairing similar training and test characters. More generally, this strategy
of simply disregarding quantifier in favour of an easier answer which only requires
processing of the NP might explain poor performance in scalar implicatures since
most studies use a paradigm where this option is salient (e.g., Some of the elephants
have trunks; Noveck, 2001). In a study such as Papafragou and Tantalou (2004),
where answers with implicatures did not match questions (‘Did you eat the oranges/the
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sandwich? -I ate some/the cheese’ ) and had to be penalised (because they implied
that the character did not complete the task), children performed above chance. This
possibility was recently investigated by J. Sullivan et al. (2017) who indeed found that
children, contrary to adults, withheld prizes when the surface form of Puppy’s reported
action did not match the form of the request even when the result entailed the request
(e.g. ‘Did you colour some of the stars?’ ‘I coloured all’ ). Crucially, children did
give prizes when the same result was shown in a picture rather than labelled with a
contrasting linguistic form, which suggests that these results were not due to them
first computing a scalar implicature but rather to the influence of surface linguistic
forms. An exception is a paradigm such as the one in Katsos and Bishop (2011), where
no binary answer (right/wrong judgment or picture choice) is required and ‘matched’
pairings are being explicitly compared in a qualitative way (using a graded reward
system), which draws children’s attention towards the relative appropriateness of the
default strategy (i.e., is pairing ‘some of the carrots’ with a picture containing all the
carrots as good as pairing it with ‘all of the carrots’?), resulting in increased pragmatic
sensitivity and better performance.
Why do adults succeed in performing these inferences? As Experiment 3a showed,
adults like children are sensitive to the presence of a salient ‘easier’ matching answer,
however the availability of this strategy does not prevent them from considering an
alternative pragmatic answer. Furthermore, when this matching strategy is explicitly
disallowed, the adults’ world knowledge/semantic filter will efficiently block it in favour
of semantically appropriate answers, whereas it will still exert some (albeit reduced) bias
on children (just like children’s answers on ‘some’ and ‘none’ trials are not quite on par
with ‘all’ trials, but still either at or above chance in Horowitz et al.). The tendency to
group things on the basis of similarity is most likely a cognitive bias which is part of the
set of domain-general learning tools children are readily equipped with: categorisation
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will primarily proceed in a similarity-based fashion, with language-specific exceptions
starting to appear as late as 10 years old (Storms et al., 2015). Pragmatic inference, on
the other hand, has to be learned and requires more computational effort. In the case
of scalar implicatures and lexical items, adults’ more extensive linguistic experience
probably means that processing quantifiers requires less effort as it has become more
default, and thus more likely to overcome a salient answer based on similarity. However,
our study seems to indicate that this adult advantage persists even in cases where the
inferences to be performed are not conventional or generalised, which could result from
more experience with deriving pragmatic inferences in general or from a better ability
to inhibit a salient answer to consider an alternative strategy. While Horowitz et al.
(2018) failed to find a correlation between performance on an inhibitory control task
(the Dimensional Change Card Sort or DCCS, Zelazo, 2006) and on some/none trials,
it is worth mentioning that this task requires only to inhibit a ‘learned’ response (i.e.,
answering based on shape or colour) which participants have been applying for a few
trials, rather than a ‘naturally salient’ answer based on matching or similarity. Given
this difference, a Stroop task or a task based on inhibiting a NP-picture matching
(such as the Day/Night task) where linguistic information is explicitly pitched against
a naturally salient answer might be more appropriate and future research should
focus on investigating a potential correlation with these measures. A recent study
showed no differences between a group of participants with ASD (Autism Spectrum
Disorder) and neurotypical controls on either deriving scalar implicatures or performing
epistemic reasoning when explicitly asked, however the neurotypical group proved to
be better at cancelling the implicature when it was unwarranted (Hochstein et al.,
2018). This suggests both that this type of implicature is at least partially defaultly or
grammatically derived, and that the difference between the two groups is not one of
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general theory of mind ability but rather flexibility in making spontaneous ‘online’ use
of their epistemic reasoning when required.
While children’s success in choosing target object above chance in Frank and
Goodman’s (2014) study is most likely due to the absence of a salient matching
strategy, another possibility has to be considered. The assumption in Frank and
Goodman’s model is that feature choices are proportional to the relative frequency of
each feature regardless of whether the feature is unique or not. However, even in adults’
responses, the relationship between frequency ratio and choices appears to be more
logarithmic than linear in nature, with uniqueness of one feature having a considerable
effect on participant choices (0.57 vs. 0.67) whereas when the feature is unique the
exact ratio (1/2 or 1/3) seems to matter little (0.70 vs 0.67). This suggests that there
might be a more qualitative difference between cases where the target feature is unique
and those where it is not. One explanation could be that the reference to the target
character is interpreted contrastively (i.e., ‘This is a ‘daxy’ dinosaur/dinosaur with
a dax [and these others are not]’). While Frank and Goodman (2014) do attempt
to control for this possibility by using neutral prosody and a control condition to
test whether uniqueness of the feature alone could have driven performance, this
explanation could only be completely ruled out by testing children on trials where the
target feature is not unique and/or the distractor training character possesses as many
features as the target training character2. The simultaneous presentation of training
and test characters in our study had the effect of eliminating the ‘uniqueness’ of the
target feature when the full array (all four characters) was taken into consideration
and ‘diluting’ the feature’s informativeness or frequency ratio from 1/2 to 2/3 (or 0.67
to 0.60 according to model predictions), which might have contributed to children’s
2In the condition designed by Frank and Goodman to control for this uniqueness/contrastive effect,
children are asked ‘can you find another one?’ after being told in training that ‘this is a dinosaur
with a dax’, which does result in chance performance, but this could have simply been interpreted by
the children as ‘can you find another dinosaur’.
4.7 General Discussion 123
failures and lower rates of consistent choices even in adults. Children in the original
study might have been performing a simpler exclusion inference (cf. J. Sullivan et al.,
2017), which would perhaps also explain why their performances were above model
predictions even with rationality parameter equal to 1. Informativeness reasoning in
children might thus proceed in a more ‘all or nothing’ than proportional fashion, with
a qualitatively different strategy (i.e., exclusion inference) in simpler cases.
When the distractor choice was not explicitly disallowed, bilinguals appeared to
have less of a distractor bias than monolinguals. This could be because they had
a weaker similarity bias, or because they were more attentive to all cues, especially
ostensive ones, and thus potentially more likely to have attended to or have been made
hesitant by the presence of the red circle, while still not being able to perform the
frequency inference. This could be related to an ability to inhibit irrelevant information
displayed by bilingual children in certain tasks , especially in favour of social cues
(cf. Chapter 2), i.e., bilinguals could be more flexible and more able to momentarily
inhibit a first response to examine all possible cues or responses available (particularly
ostensive cues such as the red circle).
In conclusion, we presented several experiments designed to investigate whether
a bilingual advantage in word learning using pragmatics would be more apparent
when only a minimal amount of pragmatic information (‘one cue’) was provided. We
hypothesised that children might be able to perform such word learning using only one
cue in a case where the inference was made stronger because it arose from potential
underinformativeness, rather than overinformativeness, on the part of the speaker.
However, contrary to our expectations and to previous results, we did not find children
to be able to succeed in this task. We then hypothesise that children might have
been performing a simpler type of exclusion inference in previous studies and that
their lack of experience with considering pragmatic information in balance with other,
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more salient sources of information might have led them to answer following an easier
‘default’ path based on similarity in our experiments. Given that bilinguals, as in other,
previous studies (cf., Brojde et al., 2012) did not display as strong a similarity bias
towards a ‘default’ matching answer, we hypothesise that they might exhibit a better
ability to flexibly consider and balance a diversity of alternative sources of information
and/or particularly when this involves taking into account pragmatic cues.
Chapter 5
Ostension and extension
That’s a beautiful speech, but nobody’s listening. Let’s go.
— Alfred Jarry
5.1 Ostensive teaching
If during a party you start yawning or looking at your watch while exchanging insistent
glances with your wife across the room, she will probably understand your intention
to communicate that you are bored and want to leave. If, on the other hand, she
witnesses the same yawn when coming into the living room where you sit reading, she
might not draw the same conclusions.
Communication is generally thought of as ostensive, in that it involves not only the
transmission of information (an informative intention) but also the recognition of this
intention by the hearer (a communicative intention) (Sperber & Wilson, 1986) which
contributes to the derivation of the intended meaning. The main purpose of this act of
communication will often be to transmit episodic information about a specific event or
entity or to get the hearer to identify a referent, and/or perform some action on the
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world. For example, in the experiments presented in chapters 3 and 4, the focus was
(seemingly) to get the hearer to select the correct referent to achieve some external
purpose that the speaker had in mind (e.g., help Mr. Puppet). In this context of a
one-instance ‘fast mapping’, the learning of the novel word’s meaning appears (at least
from the perspective of the hearer and what they have evidence to assume are the
intentions of the speaker) to be incidental or collateral. This type of communication is,
in fact, not limited to humans, as other species such as bees, birds and monkeys have
been demonstrated to be able to communicate episodic ‘here-and-now’ information
and to give injunctions (e.g., food location and warnings) (King, 1994).
There is, however, another type of communication which appears to be specific to
our species and might well be what most crucially distinguishes it from others: the
ability to perform a one-instance transmission of referential (e.g., ‘This is a dog’) or
generic (e.g., ‘Dogs bark’) knowledge, effectively shortcutting the slower, basic cognitive
process of induction (e.g., cross-situationally learn that ‘dog’ can be heard and mapped
to this particular animal more often that any other referent, or witness many instances
of dogs barking). According to Csibra and Gergely (2009), humans have developed a
specific system for the communication of this type of generic knowledge, which they
refer to as natural pedagogy. Their hypothesis states that there is a limited set of
ostensive signals, such as child-directed speech, eye gaze and pointing, which can be
used for the purposes of teaching referential knowledge. The particular sensitivity to
these specific signals then allows the learning of knowledge which would be difficult to
acquire by relying only on perceptual information. This bias would act as a catalyst
which ensured that information was quickly encoded as generalisable. However, other
works have suggested that any attention-grabbing cues, even those which do not have
a conventional communicative purpose (e.g., shivering), could be used to successfully
prepare children for the conveyance of referential information (Szufnarowska, Rohlfing,
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Fawcett, & Gredebäck, 2014). In this view, there would be no dedicated ostensive
system and the mechanisms for monitoring social cues would be purely attentional,
e.g., infants would learn to follow eye gaze because this allowed them to better predict
where interesting visual events were likely to occur (Triesch, Teuscher, Deák, & Carlson,
2006).
Putting aside the debate of whether there is a particular set of ostensive signals
dedicated and most efficient for teaching referential knowledge, our purpose was to
investigate the use of ostensive teaching for word learning with signals that could
not be used directly (as pointing and eye gaze could be) for finding the referent of a
novel word. The reason is that we wanted to examine the ability of monolingual and
bilingual children to perform true pragmatic reasoning about speaker’s intentions to
learn the meaning of a new word. As mentioned in chapter 3, there are at least three
hypotheses which could explain the previously found advantage of bilinguals versus
monolinguals in paradigms using ‘socio-pragmatic’ cues for word learning. The first
hypothesis is that, given that most of these tasks could be succeeded at by ignoring a
misleading cue to focus on the social cue, these results could simply have been driven
by a better inhibitory ability. The second hypothesis is that bilinguals are particularly
able to focus on these specific types of social cues or signals compared to other types
of cues. Finally, the third hypothesis states that bilingual children are particularly apt
at using pragmatic reasoning to learn new words, that is to say at reasoning about
the intentions of the speaker, or why they provided this particular cue. If we return
to the dichotomy between communicative and informative intention mentioned in the
first section, it is possible that bilinguals were able to understand the communicative
and ostensive intention behind the point or gaze (and understand that they had to
ignore other cues) and then simply better able to follow the point or gaze and ignore
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the irrelevant cues, without reasoning about how the evidence had been provided by
the speaker.
In chapter 3, we examined whether monolinguals and bilingually exposed children
were able to ‘pick up’ on the relevance of a pragmatic cue (adjectival modifier and
prosodic stress) to understand a particular communicative and informative intention
without an ostensive intention to teach a novel word. Here, on the other hand, the
ostensive teaching paradigm allows us to make this teaching intention clear to all
participants by using types of settings which children are familiar with (i.e., presenting
them with exemplars of objects). Thus the difficulty in such paradigms resides in
deriving the intentions underlying the particular way in which the cues were presented
by the teacher. Since we wanted to avoid ceiling effects in order to obtain enough
variability between groups to compare performance, we focused on paradigms in which
the correct answer was not the ‘default’ one as predicted by word learning biases:
extending a word to the subordinate level (rather than the basic level) and to a novel
action (rather than a novel object). It is worth noting that, while both of these
experiments involved an ostensive teaching intention and eaching setting (prompting
the awareness that a new word was being taught), as well as ignoring a ‘default’
response, (as in previous studies by Yow and colleagues), success (or ignoring the
salient/default response) could once again not be achieved by simply following eye
gaze or point, but had to involve reasoning about the speaker’s intentions or why the
cues had been presented in this way. In the next sections we briefly discuss research
investigating the use of ostensive teaching for learning subordinate categories and
action words.
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5.2 Learning categories using exemplars
Imagine you are learning words from a foreign language speaker. You witness them
search a bag which contains different types of apples (say, golden, braeburn and granny
smith), take out a golden apple, present it to you and say cabo, then take out another
golden, present it to you and say cabo again. In another scenario (featuring a less
sturdy bag), the same golden apple falls out of the bag, they pick it up and present it
to you saying cabo. Then, when another golden rolls out of the bag, you readily point
at it and enthusiastically utter cabo while they nod in approval.
At which hierarchical level should you extend the novel word? Does cabo mean
apple or golden? If you are sensitive to the source or sampling process of the exemplars,
you are probably more likely to attribute the meaning of ‘golden apple’ to the unknown
word in the first scenario. This would be extending the word to the subordinate
level, whereas ‘apple’ would constitute the basic-level in this case (‘fruit’ being the
superordinate level). This is indeed what research shows. While being presented with
one exemplar generally leads to a basic-level bias (extending the word to all subordinate
categories, e.g., all types of apples rather than to golden apples only, cf. Rosch et
al., 1976; Waxman & Kosowski, 1990), being given several exemplars from a specific
subordinate category drastically reduces basic-level choices of extension in favour of
subordinate ones, as per the ‘suspicious coincidence’ effect (Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007b).
In their study, Xu and Tenenbaum (2007b) presented children and adults with
either one or three exemplars from diverse category levels (e.g., one dalmatian dog,
three dalmatian dogs, one dalmatian, one labrador and one hush puppy, etc.) which
were given a new name by a puppet who was ‘learning a new language’ (e.g., ‘This is
a blick’ ) then asked to select among a large set of matching options from subordinate,
basic and superordinate levels (e.g., ‘Can you pick out the other blicks?’ ). They
found that being given one exemplar led to a graded pattern of choices based on
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similarity, with a bias for basic-level choices. With one exemplar as evidence for the
new category name, adult participants were selecting subordinate matches almost all
of the time (97%) and basic level matches most of the time (76%). On the other hand,
when given several exemplars, participants were generalising in a more all-or-nothing
manner, selecting all matches from the most specific or narrowest hypothesis (e.g.,
selecting all dalmatians after having seen three dalmatians) and almost no matches
from broader categories (e.g., no other dogs), as per the Size Principle and ‘suspicious
coincidence’ effect (Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001). Indeed, the exemplars have a
probability of being sampled which is proportional to the size of each category or
nested sets of entities, e.g., all animals, all dogs, all dalmatians, etc. Thus, given that
there are by definition more dogs than dalmatians in the world, the probability of a
sample including only exemplars from the subordinate category of dalmatians is low
(‘suspicious’) and decreases exponentially with each new exemplar, unless the label
only extends to this particular subordinate category. Xu and Tenenbaum (2007b)
model this ‘one-versus-three’ difference for word learning inferences using a Bayesian
model where prior probabilities for each category are approximated through branch
height in a taxonomic tree (i.e., the higher the hierarchical level, the more entities it
contains) and likelihoods are the combined probabilities for each additional exemplar
of having been sampled from this specific category. In a non-biased Bayesian model,
the prior probabilities are thus considered equal for all category levels, i.e., (given
that they are nested categories): 100% for subordinate, 50% for basic level, 25% for
superordinate. However, the authors found that they needed to modify the prior to
include a basic level bias in order to accurately model adult participants’ performances.
This bias towards extending a novel word at an intermediate ‘basic’ taxonomic level
was first described in the work of Rosch et al. (1976). The reason for this preference
is hypothesised to be that some intermediate categories are considered ‘basic’ from a
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cognitive perspective. These categories benefit from a privileged psychological status
by virtue of having a number of common attributes which is considered optimal in
terms of utility, that is they have sufficient predictive power and a sufficient level of
abstraction. More specifically, basic level category members are described as having
similar shapes and motor programs, which means for most predictive purposes they are
interchangeable (e.g., eating a golden or braeburn apple has roughly the same effect
and a dalmatian or labrador met on the street will behave in a similar way). As for
other word learning constraints, the question of whether this basic level bias is present
from an early age and contributes to reducing the hypothesis space of referents from
the very beginning is debated (cf. Callanan, Repp, McCarthy, & Latzke, 1994).
In addition to this, learners are more likely to extend a word in a narrow way
(e.g., at the subordinate level) if the multiple examples have been provided through
strong sampling (i.e., by a knowledgeable speaker who is sampling the true meaning
distribution) rather than weak sampling (i.e., randomly among the full hypothesis
space, or conservatively by an ignorant learner hoping for a reward) (Xu & Tenenbaum,
2007a).
5.3 Learning words for actions
Words for actions are generally considered more difficult to learn than words for objects.
Some have argued that this is due to conceptual reasons, because nouns, unlike verbs,
refer to units which are distinguished perceptually as well as consistent across time
and context (Gentner, 1982). As we have seen in the introductory chapter, there might
be a bias or default assumption which drives young children to prefer mapping a new
word onto a new unnamed whole object rather than onto any alternative referent,
including familiar objects, parts, properties and actions (Markman, 1994). This could
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lead to the apparent noun bias witnessed in early vocabularies across many languages
such as English (Jackson-Maldonado, Thal, Marchman, Bates, & Gutierrez-Clellen,
1993), French (Poulin-Dubois, Graham, & Sippola, 1995), Italian (Caselli et al., 1995)
and Hebrew (Dromi, 1999). Few studies have in fact examined the preference for
whole objects over new actions in morphosyntactically neutral contexts, probably
partially because of the difficulty in creating such contexts for languages which have
rich morphologies. The few studies which did directly investigate this preference
did find a bias towards object mappings in children (Imai et al., 2008; Katerelos,
Poulin-Dubois, & Oshima-Takane, 2011; Woodward, 1993). However, this preference
for object mappings appears to be overridden through the use of socio-pragmatic cues
(Tomasello & Akhtar, 1995). In Tomasello and Akhtar’s (1995) study, two year olds
were presented with a novel word, uttered while performing a novel action with a novel
object. In one condition, the previous context was designed to highlight the novelty
of the action relative to the common ground between child and experimenter (several
actions/manipulations were performed on the object for a length of two minutes before
performing the target action while uttering the novel word). In the other condition,
it was the novelty of the object which was highlighted by performing the same novel
action on several different objects before performing it with target object while uttering
the novel word. Results seemed to show that the two year olds were able to reliably
map the novel word to the novel action in the condition where the novelty of the action
had been highlighted through pragmatic cues.
Studies which more specifically investigated the acquisition of verbs found young
children to struggle in some experimental paradigms even when verbs were clearly
flagged as such with morphosyntactic markers (Golinkoff, Jacquet, Hirsh-Pasek, &
Nandakumar, 1996; Imai, Haryu, Okada, Lianjing, & Shigematsu, 2006; Imai et al.,
2008; Kersten & Smith, 2002; Maguire, Hirsh-Pasek, Golinkoff, & Brandone, 2008),
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whereas in other paradigms even two year olds could succeed (Gertner, Fisher, &
Eisengart, 2006; Noble, Rowland, & Pine, 2011; Oshima-Takane, Ariyama, Kobayashi,
Katerelos, & Poulin-Dubois, 2011). The main difference between these paradigms
seems to be the type of testing. In Naigles (1990) for example, two year olds were
taught a novel verb with a familiar object and object name (e.g., ‘The duck is gorping
the bunny’ ) and simply asked to pick between two different actions at test time. In
contrast, in Imai et al. (2008), three and five year olds were exposed to a video of an
agent performing a novel action with a novel object while uttering a novel word and
asked at test time to choose between a video showing the target action performed with
another object (Action Same) or a video of another distractor action performed on
the original novel object (Object Same). In this latter case, the child was required not
only to extend and generalise the verb to another object at test but also to ignore an
answer involving the original object used to demonstrate the taught action.
This shows that attentional aspects of a task are probably the main drivers of
performance for young children, who will only be able to succeed if processing load
is reduced to a minimum and there are no distracting features, which constitutes
a methodological issue in experimental designs where distractors are often needed.
Accordingly, length of exposure seems to override other effects, such as semantic
properties, in determining the difficulty for learning a given verb type. For example,
Abbot-Smith, Imai, Durrant, and Nurmsoo (2017) conducted a study examining
whether verbs for resultative actions (leading to a change in state) were more easily
learned than verbs for durative actions. Contrary to expectations, the reverse was
found to be true, which they hypothesised could be due to the visual brevity of punctual
actions making them more difficult to encode, especially for young children who have
slower visual processing speeds than adults (Liss & Haith, 1970).
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The goal of the following experiments was to examine whether young bilingual and
monolingual children showed differences in the way they use ostensive teaching to map
and extend a novel word when pragmatic reasoning (i.e., reasoning about the intentions
underlying the cues provided by the ‘teacher’) was required to select the target referent
rather than responding according to a default bias or preference. We wished to examine
1) whether children could perform a pragmatic inference on the basis of a single cue in
an ostensive teaching setting where the didactic/communicative intention was clearer
2) if bilingual children could, in such a setting, use the pragmatic reasoning ability
demonstrated in Experiment 1 to ignore a default response and correctly extend the
meaning of a novel word, 3) whether a better matched (in age and socio-economic
background) sample of bilingual and monolingual children would this time display
not just a relative but a numerical advantage and 4) whether the relative bilingual
advantage found in Experiment 1 would apply not just to fast mapping but also to
extending a novel word.
5.4 Experiments 5 and 6
Children were able to perform fast mapping for referent disambiguation using pragmatic
inference when two cues (modifier and stress) were available but not when only one cue
(modifier) was available as in experiment 1, even in the context of underinformativeness
as in experiment 3. In addition, bilingual children had a relative advantage over
monolingual children in performing contrastive inference for fast mapping in experiment
1. Given these results, we wanted to investigate the following: 1) are children able to
perform pragmatic word learning using only one cue in the more supportive context
of ostensive teaching? 2) In this more supportive context, do bilinguals display an
advantage, even in tasks where extension of the newly learned word is required?
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5.4.1 Experiment 5a: subordinate category teaching
The purpose of this experiment was to examine how bilingual and monolingual children
performed word learning of a subordinate category taught using ostensive teaching. In
the critical condition of this task, a ‘teacher’ character (ie., ‘Mr Puppet’) presented the
children with two exemplars of a novel object at training time and uttered a prompt
using a novel word (eg., ‘Oh, look, Mr Puppet wants to show you a dax. And look,
Mr. Puppet wants to show you another dax! ). In contrast, in the control condition the
exemplars were not provided by a teacher but randomly (eg., ‘Oh, look, a dax fell out
of the bag. And look, another dax fell out of the bag! ). At test time, the children were
presented with six objects, some of which were exactly identical to the original objects
(‘subordinate’ matches) while others were similar but differed in colour or orientation
(‘basic-level’ matches). The children had to pick which objects they thought were other
exemplars of the new word (eg., ‘Can you touch the other daxes?. The inference in
this task relies on the assumption that exemplars provided by a knowledgeable teacher
are more informative than randomly provided exemplars, ie., the children should be
more likely to extend the novel word to the subordinate matches in the critical, teacher
condition than in the control condition. In addition, given that bilinguals displayed a
relative advantage in pragmatic inference over monolinguals in our first experiment,
we hypothesise that they would display a similar advantage in this task.
The task was adapted from Xu and Tenenbaum (2007a) and implemented as a
computerised task.
Participants
Participants were the same 270 children as in experiments 1, 2 and 3a (cf. Chapters
3 and 4). 17 children (7 bilinguals and 10 monolinguals) were excluded from final
analyses for failing to complete the task (n=12) or loss of data (n=5). Experimental
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design was between-subject and participants were randomly assigned to either random
or teacher condition.
Stimuli
Stimuli were four sets of novel objects for the target ‘basic level’ categories characterised
by shape, each with three subordinate categories characterised by colour and orientation
(12 in total). In addition, there were two distractor objects from another category for
each target set (8 in total). Four novel labels were used (skol, liput, murbil and dax ).
A pilot study helped adjust the characteristics of the subordinate categories so that
they could be recognisable by children as one category but would not lead to ceiling
effects (i.e., only subordinate level answers), as the variability was needed to compare
the two language groups.An example stimulus for the teacher condition can be found
in figure 5.1, and for the random condition in figure 5.2. An example for the test phase
can be found in figure 5.3. A full list of stimuli can be found in Appendix 4.
Procedure
Stimuli were implemented and presented on a touchscreen laptop using Superlab version
5.0 (Cedrus, San Pedro, CA). Clicks were recorded as raw X and Y pixel coordinates
of the point where the screen had been touched and answers were subsequently coded
by matching the coordinates to the corresponding answer area among the six possible
choices on the picture. Children were tested in a quiet room at their school. They were
introduced through the computer to Mr. Puppet, who had recently made some alien
friends. They were then told that Mr. Puppet had acquired some new alien objects
and wanted to show these objects to them (in the teacher condition) or that the aliens
had left a bag with new objects (in the random/control condition).
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Fig. 5.1 Example stimulus experiment 5a (teacher condition), ‘Mr Puppet wants to
show you a dax. And look, Mr Puppet wants to show you another dax!’
Fig. 5.2 Example stimulus experiment 5a (random condition), ‘Look, a dax fell out of
the bag. And look, another dax fell out of the bag!
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Fig. 5.3 Example stimulus experiment 5a (test phase), ‘Can you show me the other
daxes?’
In the training phase of the teacher condition, children saw an image of Mr. Puppet
along with an object from the target subordinate category and heard a prompt of
the type ‘Mr. Puppet wants to show you a skol. Look, this is a skol!’, the screen
then switched and another exemplar of the same subordinate category then appeared
while the children heard another prompt of the type ‘And, look, Mr. Puppet wants to
show you another skol!’ (see Figure 5.1). In the training phase of the random/control
condition they first saw a picture of a bag and an exemplar of the target subordinate
category and heard a prompt of the type ‘Oh, look what fell out of the bag, it’s a liput!
A liput fell out of the bag!’, then the screen switched and they saw the bag again along
with another exemplar of the same subordinate category (see Figure 5.2) and heard a
similar prompt of the type ‘And look, another liput fell out of the bag!’
In the test condition the children were presented with a grid containing six objects:
two exemplars of the target subordinate category(e.g., bottom left and bottom right in
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figure 5.3), two exemplars of other subordinate categories(e.g., top left and top right) ,
and two distractors from another object category (e.g., middle top and bottom). They
were prompted with instruction of type ‘Can you touch the other skols?’. Subordinate
answers would involve picking only the target subtypes, whereas if the novel word was
interpreted at the basic category level all subtypes of the target category sould be
selected. The experimenter would switch to the next trial when they got a clear signal
by which the child manifested being done, either by looking at the experimenter or
by having placed their hands back at their sides and appearing to be waiting for the
next instruction. This procedure was used since more prompts from the experimenter
could have been misinterpreted as meaning that the right/complete answer was the
basic level category (‘Can you see another one/Can you see more?’, etc.) and ensured
minimal bias from feedback.
5.4.2 Experiment 6a: action word teaching
The purpose of this experiment was to investigate another type of ostensive teaching
where a default bias has to be overcome using reasoning about informativeness. In
this task, children were presented with a video of a ‘teacher’ manipulating objects in
different ways. In the control condition, the ‘teacher’ would perform a novel action with
a novel object while uttering a novel word with no morphological markers indicating
whether the part of speech was verb or noun (eg.,‘Dax’). In the critical condition,
the ‘teacher’ would perform a first action with the novel object before performing the
target action while uttering the novel word. The children were then presented with two
side-by-side videos of the same teacher, one where they performed the target action
with a different object and one where they performed a different action with the same
object. They were asked to choose between the two (eg., ‘Can you show me dax?’,
indicating in this way whether they believed that the word referred to the action or
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the object . The inference was based on the assumption that the fact that the teacher
had used the novel word in conjunction with the second action was informative, ie.,
that the most novel referent was the most likely(the novel target action was more
novel when they word was uttered than the object which had already been seen and
manipulated). Given bilingual and monolingual performance in experiment 1, we
predicted that bilinguals would outperform monolinguals in using pragmatic inference
for word learning.
The task was inspired from Tomasello and Akhtar (1995) but we used a neutral
control condition instead of a object-enhancing condition to obtain a reliable measure
of object bias. Testing method was adapted from Imai et al. (2008).
Participants
Participants were the same 270 children as in Experiment 6a. 12 children (8 bilinguals
and 4 monolinguals) were excluded from analyses for fussiness (n=6) or loss of data
(n=6). Experimental design was within-subject.
Stimuli
Stimuli for training were 8 videos picturing a young woman (not the experimenter)
performing a novel action with a novel object while looking at the camera. In the
four videos of the control neutral condition the woman would perform the novel action
with the novel object once while uttering a novel word. In the four videos of the
action-enhancing condition two actions would be performed on the object: first a
distractor action and then, while uttering the novel word, the target action (see Figure
3). While this meant that the videos differed in length, pilot studies showed that video
length tended in general to increase the object bias (by means of longer exposure)
regardless of condition, which meant a measure of action answers in this condition was
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Fig. 5.4 Example training (top, ‘Dax’ ) and test (bottom, ‘Can you show me dax?’ )
stimuli experiment 6a
conservative. An example stimulus can be found in figure 5.4. A full list of stimuli
(novel objects used, the videos can be provided if needed) can be found in Appendix 5.
In addition, there were 4 sets of two test videos where the woman would perform
the target action with a different object (Action Same or AS) and a distractor action
(different from the training) on the target object (Object Same or OS). Four novel
words were used (pef, dalp, squel and wige) The objects were unusual or assembled
from parts of other objects so as to be unrecognisable to children (see Figure 5.3). A
full list of stimuli can be found in Appendix 5.
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Procedure
Stimuli were implemented and presented on the same touchscreen laptop using Su-
perlab version 5.0 (Cedrus, San Pedro, CA). Clicks were recorded as raw X and Y
pixel coordinates of the point where the screen had been touched and answers were
subsequently coded by matching the coordinates to the corresponding answer. The
children were told that they were going to watch Mr. Puppet’s friend play with some
new toys he had received from the visiting aliens. They first completed two warm
up trials where they were asked ‘Can you show me balloon?’ and had to choose
between a video of the experimenter manipulating a balloon and another video of her
manipulating a pencil, then children were asked ’Can you show me clap?’ and had
to choose between a video of the experimenter clapping and another of her swaying
from left to right. This was done to ensure that children knew that both object and
action choices were possible. As in Tomasello and Akhtar (1995), no articles or tenses
were used as they would act as morphological markers giving away the word’s part
of speech. For each of the four trials, the child would first watch on the screen the
training video (neutral or object-enhancing depending on the condition they had been
assigned), then the screen would switch to the test videos (Action Same and Object
Same), which were placed side by side and played on repeat (the position of AS and
OS videos left or right was counterbalanced). They were asked a similar question as in
the warm-up, e.g., ‘Can you show me dalp?’. The child then made their answer by
touching one of the videos and the screen switched to the next trial.
5.4.3 Results
Answers in the subordinate category teaching were coded as ‘basic level’ if all four
objects from the target category had been selected and as ‘subordinate level’ if only
the two objects from the target subordinate category had been selected. Answers
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Table 5.1 Experiment 5a and 6a: summary of results
Condition Monolinguals Bilingualsmean SD mean SD
(exp5a) subordinate category (control) 0.23 (0.43) 0.29 (0.45)
(exp5a) subordinate category (teacher condition) 0.28 (0.45) 0.38 (0.49)
(exp6a) action verb (control) 0.44 (0.50) 0.44 (0.49)
(exp6a) action verb (teacher condition) 0.44 (0.50) 0.42 (0.49)
which did not fit either pattern of response (24%) were excluded from analyses. Target
responses in Experiment 5a were higher in teacher than random condition, but not
in Experiment 6a where action responses were equal in both conditions (see final
results in Table 5.1). A preliminary t-test indicated a significant effect of condition
in Experiment 5a (t=2.52, df=815.56, p=0.01). To investigate the reliability of these
results when taking into account subject and item effects, we again ran a logistic
regression mixed model (D. Bates et al., 2014). Model included task, gender (shown to
have an effect on pragmatics, cf. Stiller et al., 2015), bilingual status, condition and their
interaction as fixed effects, and subject and item intercepts as random effects (BPVS
standardised scores were removed for convergence reasons after confirming through a
separate analysis that they had no effect on performance rather than removing items
intercept which comparison between t-test results and mixed model showed to have
significant impact). The control non teaching condition was used as the reference
level. As expected, there was a bias for basic-level answers in the random condition
of experiment 5a (est=-10.95, se=1.80, z=-6.06, p<0.0001), but no effect of teacher
condition in Experiment 5a (est=0.01, se=1.48, z=0.01, p=0.995) or Experiment
6a (est=-0.14, se= 0.52, z=-0.26, p=0.791) once items and subjects were taken into
account. There was also no interaction with bilingual status, and no other effects were
significant.
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5.4.4 Discussion and follow up
We were surprised to find no significant effect of condition in either Experiment 5a
or 6a. There was a numerical trend for such an effect of condition in Experiment 5a,
but a mixed model showed that this trend was not statistically robust when random
effects for subjects and items were taken into account.
This failure to find an effect of condition could have occurred for several reasons.
Firstly, for the action teaching task, a major difference between ours and Imai et al.,
(2008)’s design is that they conducted their experiment between-subject while ours
was within-subject. This could have led to carry-over effects (i.e., children failing to
notice the difference between conditions and consistently responding with the choice
of either action or object that they had made in their first trial). Some investigation
examining patterns of answering between the two lists (one of the lists started with a
control trial while the other started with an action-enhanced video) indicates that this
might have been the case.
Secondly, when we implemented a computer version of Xu and Tenenbaum (2007a)’s
experiment, we made several changes which might have had a significant impact on
answers. One major difference was that the control condition in Xu and Tenenbaum’s
study was a ‘learner-driven’ rather than random condition. In this condition, the
learner was first shown an exemplar of the target subordinate category, then asked to
themselves point to two more examples of the label used and promised a reward (sticker)
to maximise conservatism in choosing an object from the same subordinate category
(the ‘safe’ choice that would ensure reward regardless of whether the participant thought
that the true extension of the label could be at the basic-level). While we believed
that the suspicious coincidence effect should apply whether the two examples in the
non-teacher condition were chosen by an ‘ignorant’ learner or provided randomly,
this prediction had not been tested before. If this ‘random versus teacher’ effect
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exists, it would expected to be of smaller size than the ‘learner-hoping-for-reward
versus teacher’ effect. Indeed, two randomly sampled subordinates should still be
considered more informative with respect to the true meaning/distribution of the
category than an ‘ignorant’ learner’s choice driven by an effect entirely unrelated to the
true meaning/distribution (i.e, conservatism to maximise the opportunity of a reward).
Furthermore, while we expected a basic-level bias, the percentage of subordinate
answers was low even in the teacher condition. We hypothesised that this could be
due to the form of the test prompt which might have biased participants towards a
basic-level interpretation through the use of the word ‘other’. Indeed, ‘Can you touch
the other skols?’ could have been interpreted as exclusive (i.e., not the ones like the
skol you have just seen).
Finally, another difference between ours and Xu and Tenenbaum’s study was that
the two subordinate exemplars in teacher condition in our study were presented one
after the other rather than simultaneously, which has been shown to negatively impact
the suspicious coincidence effect (Lewis & Frank, 2018; Spencer, Perone, Smith, &
Samuelson, 2011).
For these reasons, and also to investigate whether the relative bilingual advantage
found in experiment 1 would replicate numerically in a different and better matched
sample (i.e., from a single school and of same age), we conducted follow-up experiments
after making some changes to the experimental designs according to the above mentioned
concerns. However, the smaller sample size and use of between-subject designs in
both tasks reduced statistical power, which is why, after confirming that there were
no significant differences between the results for the two experiments (i.e., no effect of
task), we collapsed both ostensive teaching experiments in our analyses.
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5.4.5 Experiment 5b: subordinate category teaching with
learner-driven condition
The purpose of this experiment was to investigate whether the relative bilingual
advantage evidenced in experiment 1 would be numerical in a better matched sample
of bilingual and monolingual children.
The task was again adapted from Xu and Tenenbaum (2007a) and implemented as
a computerised task but this version was constructed to be more similar to the original
study. This meant that instead of having a ’random’ condition where the exemplars
were provided randomly, we created a learner-driven condition where the participant
was given an exemplar of the subordinate category and then provided the second
exemplar themselves. A reward incentive ensured that they would be conservative and
choose a subordinate rather than basic-level exemplar while feedback ensured that the
information given was the same as in the teacher condition(ie., two positive exemplars
of the subordinate category).
Participants
Participants were the same 120 children as in experiments 3a and 3b (cf. Chapter
4). One bilingual and four monolingual children were excluded from analyses for not
completing both tasks. The task designs were between-subject and participants were
randomly assigned to critical or control condition. There were 60 children in each
condition.
Stimuli
Stimuli were the same as in Experiment 5a, with the changes we mentioned. An
example stimulus for the teacher condition can be found in figure 5.5, and for the
learned condition in figure 5.6.
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Fig. 5.5 Example stimulus experiment 5b (teacher condition), ‘Mr Puppet wants to
show you a dax. And look, Mr Puppet wants to show you another dax!’
Procedure
Procedure was the same as in Experiment 5a except for three differences. First,
exemplars in teacher condition were presented simultaneously rather than one after
the other: in the training phase of the teacher condition, children saw an image of
Mr. Puppet along with an object from the target subordinate category and heard
a prompt of the type ‘Mr. Puppet wants to show you a skol. Look, this is a skol!’,
another exemplar of the same subordinate category then appeared next to the first
one and the children heard another prompt of type ‘And, look, Mr. Puppet wants to
show you another skol!’ (see Figure 5.5).
Second, the random condition was replaced by a learner-driven condition as in Xu
and Tenenbaum’s (2007) original study: in the training phase of the learner-driven
condition they first saw a picture of the target subordinate category and heard a
prompt of the type ‘Oh, look what fell out of the bag, it’s a liput! A liput fell out of the
bag!’ and then were asked to ‘pick one more’ among the three subordinate categories
on the picture and told that they would receive a sticker if they were right (see Figure
5.6).
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Fig. 5.6 Example stimulus experiment 5b (control condition), ‘Look, this is a dax. Can
you pick another dax? If you get it right you get a sticker’
Finally, the test prompt ‘Can you touch the other skols?’ was replaced with ‘Can
you touch the skols?.
Results
As in Xu and Tenenbaum (2007a), a reward (sticker) had been promised in the learner
condition of experiment 5b to maximise conservatism in choosing an object from the
same subordinate category and the few children (n=3) who chose a different subordinate
at training time were excluded from analyses. This number of non-conservative choosers
(i.e., participants who did not choose exemplars from the same subordinate in the
training phase of the learner-driven condition) is higher than in the original study
(n=1) but similar to the percentage of adults who made this choice in Lewis and Frank
(2016)’s replication of Xu and Tenenbaum’s study (n=21 out of 296).
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Answers in the subordinate category teaching were coded as ‘basic level’ if all four
objects from the target category had been selected and as ‘subordinate level’ if only the
two objects from the target subordinate category had been selected. Answers which did
not fit either pattern of response (30%) were excluded from analyses. As expected, there
was a bias for basic-level answers in the control (learner-driven) condition of experiment
5b (t=-2.18, df=180, p=0.03) but no bias in control (action neutral) condition of
experiment 6b, where object and action answers were equally likely (t=-0.13, df=219,
p=0.89).
We ran a logistic regression mixed model to investigate the reliability of these
results (D. Bates et al., 2014) with items and participants as random effects and
starting with all design-relevant fixed effects as random slopes, i.e., a maximal random
effects model. Following a procedure used in cases of over-parameterisation (Cane et
al., 2017; Horowitz et al., 2018), random effects were removed only when they led to
non-convergence. Model included task, gender (shown to have an effect on pragmatics,
cf. Stiller et al., 2015), bilingual status, normalised BPVS scores, condition, and their
interaction as fixed effects, and subject and item intercepts as random effects.
There was a significant bias towards basic-level choices (est=1.18, se=0.23, z =5.14,
p <0.001) and significant effect of condition, with subordinate choices significantly
lower in learner than teacher condition (est=-1.62, se =0.38, z =-4.96, p <0.001).
There were no other significant effects.
5.4.6 Experimend 6b: action word teaching between-subject
The purpose of this experiment was to investigate whether the relative bilingual
advantage evidenced in experiment 1 would be numerical in a better matched sample
of bilingual and monolingual children.
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The task was the same as in Experiment 6a but was conducted between rather
than within-subject to avoid carry-over effects.
Participants
Participants were the same 120 children as in experiments 3a, 3b (cf. Chapter 4) and
6a.
Stimuli
Stimuli were the same as in Experiment 6a.
Procedure
Procedure was the same as in Experiment 6a.
Results
We ran a logistic regression mixed model to investigate the reliability of these results
(D. Bates et al., 2014) with items and participants as random effects and starting
with all design-relevant fixed effects as random slopes, i.e., a maximal random effects
model. Following a procedure used in cases of over-parameterisation (Cane et al.,
2017; Horowitz et al., 2018), random effects were removed only when they led to
non-convergence. Model included task, gender (shown to have an effect on pragmatics,
cf. Stiller et al., 2015), bilingual status, normalised BPVS scores, condition, and their
interaction as fixed effects, and subject and item intercepts as random effects. No
effects were significant.
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Fig. 5.7 Results experiment 5b (subordinate category teaching)
Fig. 5.8 Results experiment 6b (action word teaching)
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5.4.7 Collapsed results
Results showed that target choices (subordinate category or action) were higher in
teacher condition in both experiments. Additionally, bilinguals’ target choices in teacher
condition were higher than monolinguals’ in both tasks, and bilinguals, contrary to
monolinguals, were significantly above chance in the action teaching task (t=2.02,
df=135, p=0.04) (see table 5.2). A graph showing the results of the subordinate
teaching task can be seen in figure 5.7 and the results of the action teaching task in
figure 5.8.
As mentioned in chapter 4, preliminary analyses revealed that the bilingual group
had significantly lower English vocabulary levels (m=65.18, sd=15.16) than the mono-
lingual group (m=79.09, sd=17.01) (t = 14.95, df = 499.2, p<0.001). BPVS normalised
scores were then entered in the regression model as a covariable. Answers in the
two tasks were collapsed after confirming that there was no significant effect of task.
Bilinguals’ scores in the non teaching condition (m=0.44, sd=0.50) were numerically
similar to monolinguals (m=0.48, sd=0.50), however they performed higher in the
teaching condition (m=0.66, sd=0.47) (monolinguals: m=0.57, sd=0.49). We ran a
logistic regression mixed model to investigate the reliability of these results (D. Bates
et al., 2014) with items and participants as random effects and starting with all design-
relevant fixed effects as random slopes, i.e., a maximal random effects model. Following
a procedure used in cases of over-parameterisation (Cane et al., 2017; Horowitz et al.,
2018), random effects were removed only when they led to non-convergence. Model
included task, gender (shown to have an effect on pragmatics, cf. Stiller et al., 2015),
bilingual status, normalised BPVS scores, condition, and their interaction as fixed
effects, and subject and item intercepts as random effects. The control non teaching
condition was used as the reference level. There was a significant effect of condition
(est=1.04330, se=0.41, z= 2.52, p=0.01), with target choices significantly higher in
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Fig. 5.9 Results ostensive teaching
teacher condition, and a significant interaction between bilingual status and condition,
with monolinguals’ performance significantly lower than bilinguals in the teaching
condition (est=-0.74, se= 0.37, z= -1.981, p=0.04). No other effects were significant.
Table 5.2 Experiment 4: summary of results
Condition Monolinguals Bilingualsmean SD mean SD
(exp5b) subordinate category (control) 0.45 (0.49) 0.39 (0.50)
(exp5b) subordinate category (teacher condition) 0.68 (0.47) 0.76 (0.43)
(exp6b) action verb (control) 0.51 (0.50) 0.48 (0.50)
(exp6b) action verb (teacher condition) 0.48 (0.50) 0.57 (0.50)
average control 0.48 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50)
average teacher condition 0.57 (0.49) 0.66 (0.47)
154 Ostension and extension
5.4.8 Discussion
The goal of this study was to investigate the use of ostensive teaching for word learning
by children who were monolingual or regularly exposed to another language. While
children can use pragmatic inference to ‘fast map’ a novel word to a referent when the
primary goal of the communication is not overtly didactic (as in Experiment 1, 2 and
3), humans have developed more specific and direct ways to convey referential content
and allow the learner to be more confident in subsequently extending the novel label
according to the teaching they have received (cf., natural pedagogy, Csibra & Gergely,
2009). Overall, we found that children were able to make use of the ostensive cues to
extend the meaning of the novel label, as their choices of the taught (subordinate or
action) category were significantly higher in teacher than in control condition. However,
contrary to monolingual children, billinguals were able to reliably extend a novel label
to a novel highlighted action in experiment 6b, and bilinguals’ target choices in teacher
condition were significantly higher than monolinguals in teacher condition, despite
a significantly lower structural language ability (as measured by passive vocabulary
scores). Importantly, the cues provided with the novel words were the same in teaching
and control conditions in both experiments (i.e., two exemplars from a subordinate
category/ a new word uttered while performing a novel action with a novel object) but
a crucial difference was the ostensive context leading to these cues. Another important
feature of this paradigm is that the ostensive cues given could not be used directly
(as point or eye gaze could be) to select the intended referent. Instead, the child had
to reason about why these cues had been provided, i.e., about the intentions of the
speaker/teacher in order to select the correct referent for the new word.
As a consequence, even though the tasks were likely to involve ignoring a bias
towards non-target answers (extension to object or basic-level), participants could only
overcome this bias by reasoning about the intentions behind the context of each word
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teaching instance rather than by simply following a salient point or eye gaze. Going
back to the three hypotheses which could potentially explain the better performance
of bilingual children in socio-pragmatic word learning paradigms, our results could not
have been solely due to better inhibitory abilities or to increased attention to ‘direct’
and salient social cues such as eye gaze or point, but only to a better ability to perform
true pragmatic reasoning for inferring the referent of a novel word.
There are several developmental effects found in the literature both in the learning
of action words and in learning hierarchical levels from ostensive teaching. In Imai et
al. (2008), Chinese children were unable to extend a novel label to a novel action before
8 years old, even when it was presented as a verb with arguments, and displayed a
strong bias towards object choices (3 year olds gave 33% of action answers and 6 year
olds 52%, with no differences between bare word and verb with arguments), whereas
Chinese adults actually displayed an action bias for bare words (73% action choices).
Time of exposure to the object during the training video appeared to have a strong
effect on object bias: when a short object-holding sequence was removed from the
training video, 5 year olds became able to reliably extend a novel label to a novel action
in a ‘verb with argument’ condition (88% action choices). This might contribute to
explain why there was no object bias in our study, as the videos in our ‘action neutral’
control condition were slightly shorter, which resulted in shorter exposure to the novel
object.
This effect might also explain why monolinguals’ action choices in the ‘action
highlighted’ teacher condition were similar (or even slightly lower) to those in the
control condition, as the teacher video was of greater length, resulting in object exposure
which was on average twice as long as in the control condition, whereas exposure to
target action (which shared time with the distractor action) was about the same in
both conditions. Thus, if relying on pure salience (and without reasoning about which
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referent was more novel and thus more likely to be referred to), longer exposure to
object in the ‘action highlighted’ video could have led to more object choices, while
the highlighting of the action should lead to more action choices. If these effects were
of approximately similar strength, they could potentially cancel each other and result
in action choices remaining at chance level, which is what we see in monolinguals.
Why did two year olds succeed in mapping novel word to novel action in Tomasello
and Akhtar’s (1995) study but four to six year old monolinguals failed to extend a
novel word to a novel action when given similar pragmatic cues in our study? There
are several possible reasons. First, Tomasello and Akhtar’s study involved an act-out
paradigm with real objects which both child and experimenter manipulated and played
with. This type of task and setting is likely to be more engaging and to lead to
increased levels of attention. In addition, the context surrounding the naming of object
and action was highlighted in a much more insistent manner, with two minutes of
preparation highlighting either object or action and a total of 10 instances of the new
word heard by the child for each trial. Finally, our test of extension of the novel action
word was more stringent and more cognitively demanding, as it involved generalising
the novel word to a new object while simultaneously ignoring the original object used
in teaching the action word.
Both groups of children were able to reliably extend the novel label to a subordinate
category when they had been provided with two exemplars from a same subordinate
category by a knowledgeable speaker/teacher. This is due to the ‘suspicious coincidence
effect’, cf. Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001; Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007, 2009) whereby
two exemplars of the same subordinate category (e.g., two dalmatians) are considered
relatively unlikely to have been randomly sampled from a basic-level distribution (e.g.,
dogs) and even more unlikely to have been picked as a representative sample by a
knowledgeable speaker with didactic intent (i.e., who wants to teach a hearer that the
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new word extends to the basic-level, e.g., to all dogs). In addition, while bilinguals had
a numerical tendency to extend the novel word according to the expected basic-level
bias slightly more often than monolinguals, they were significantly more efficient in
overcoming this bias in the teacher condition by choosing to restrict the extension of
the label to the subordinate category only. Here again, bilinguals performed in a more
adult-like way than monolinguals (in Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007a, children with mean age
4;0 extended the label to the subordinate level 71% of the time after being presented
with three exemplars whereas adults did so 93% of the time).
Given the significant difference in English lexical knowledge between the two
language groups, it is possible that the minimally verbal nature of the two tasks
(particularly the action teaching task) actually helped in ‘levelling the playing field’
between the groups and gave them an opportunity to perform on equal grounds,
allowing the bilinguals to display enhanced ability to use ostensive cues provided by a
teacher to identify and extend the meaning of a novel word.
Contrary to experiments 1, 2 and 3, the two tasks discussed here involved not only
forming a mapping between word and referent but extending the novel word during a
test phase where training and test items were not simultaneously available (as they were
in experiment 2). Participants thus needed to retain the mapping formed between the
training and (immediately following) test phase after the screen had changed and was
not displaying training items anymore. This could have been somewhat influenced by
working memory capacity, which has sometimes been found to be higher in bilingually
raised children (e.g, Morales, Calvo, & Bialystok, 2013)1. Because we do not have
working memory measures for this sample of children, we cannot rule out this possibility.
However, as we mentioned in the introduction, there is a debate about the so-called
1Making training items available at test time in Lewis and Frank (2016, Experiment 2) did not
appear to have a significant effect on results, but this might have been due to participants being
adults with better short term memories.
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‘executive control’ advantage in bilinguals, and this advantage in working memory (as
for other executive control skills) often does not replicate (e.g., Engel de Abreu, 2011).
In conclusion, while both adults and children display prior biases for the extension
of a novel word, such as basic-level or object bias, these are generally stronger in
children, possibly because they are still at a stage of vocabulary acquisition where these
heuristics are particularly needed and helpful for constraining the hypothesis space of
referents. However, compared to monolinguals, bilinguals appear to apply these biases
more flexibly and to more readily agree to bypass them when given pragmatic cues to
that effect by a knowledgeable teacher.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
Parents of young organic life forms should be warned that towels can be harmful if
swallowed in large quantities.
— Douglas Adams
6.1 Implications for theories of bilingual language
acquisition
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate the ability of monolingual and bilingually
exposed children to perform pragmatic inference in the context of word learning. The
reasons for undertaking such investigations were twofold. First, the thesis sought to
examine the nature of a previously found advantage in socio-pragmatic word learning
displayed by bilingual children (Yow, 2015; Yow & Markman, 2011a, 2011b, 2015,
2016). Second, it sought, through examining the formal aspects of this advantage,
to help solve a research puzzle: the ability of bilingually exposed children to acquire
vocabulary quickly and efficiently, and the precise way they achieve this.
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In Chapter 2 we introduced the research questions, the main types of word learning
theories (pragmatic and associative), the specific characteristics of a bilingual envi-
ronment (more varied input and higher risks of miscommunication) and the puzzle of
the bilingual lexicon (which is not half the size of a monolingual’s despite less reliance
on mutual exclusivity), as well as previous evidence of a bilingual advantage in socio-
pragmatic word learning and in pragmatic skills more generally. We then described the
aims of the thesis, namely to find out whether this previously found advantage in word
learning involved a better ability to perform true pragmatic reasoning, i.e., reasoning
about speaker’s intentions, as opposed to simply better inhibitory control or better
attention to social cues such as prosody, eye gaze or pointing.
In Chapter 3, we conducted a first experiment (Experiment 1) whose goal was, as
we said before, to investigate the ability of a group of monolingual and bilingually
exposed children to use pragmatic inference to perform fast mapping between a novel
word and referent when 1) success could not be achieved by ignoring or inhibiting an
irrelevant cue 2) success could not be achieved by simply making direct use of a social
cue (such as following eye gaze or point). This first experiment involved a display
of four characters, two of which were modified, and the need to use the presence of
a stressed adjective to infer the referent of a novel word. We found that, while the
bilingually exposed group had a worse performance on tasks involving purely lexical
knowledge (as verified in the control condition and in their vocabulary scores), they
performed significantly better than monolinguals in the pragmatic condition task when
taking this baseline into account. We concluded that the bilinguals displayed a relative
advantage in using pragmatic inference for fast mapping even when there was no
irrelevant cue to be inhibited (and thus that results could not have been driven purely
by inhibitory control ability).
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This conclusion was further strengthened by the contrast between the results of the
first and the results of the second experiment In this experiment (Experiment 2) we
examined the ability of the same group of monolingual and bilingually exposed children
to perform fast mapping using, again, a prosodic cue (emotional affect). However, a
crucial difference between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 is that emotional affect,
unlike stress, is a social cue which, once it has been learned, can be used directly in an
associative fashion without the need to reason about speaker’s intentions. Accordingly,
we found no difference in performance between the monolinguals and bilingually
exposed, and performance appeared to rely on a different set of abilities/predictor
variables (e.g., no effects of gender or vocabulary scores which had been found in
Experiment 1). This is in line with previous research showing that, unlike it has
been claimed before (cf., Yow & Markman, 2011a), there is no bilingual ‘advantage’
for recognising emotional affect but rather a bilingual ‘bias’ (Champoux-Larsson &
Dylman, 2018) whereby bilinguals are biased towards an answer which is consistent
with affect whether it is relevant to the task or not. From the results of Experiment 1
and 2 we concluded that the previously found differences in pragmatic word learning
between monolinguals and bilinguals are not solely due to better inhibitory control or
a better ability to use social cues in a direct, associative way, but to a better ability to
reason about speaker’s communicative intentions.
In Experiment 1 we found that children, unlike adults, were not able to perform
the fast mapping task in a condition where the adjectival modifier did not also feature
contrastive stress (thus providing two cues for performing the pragmatic inference).
In Chapter 4, we describe another experiment (Experiment 3) which allowed us to
investigate whether this difference between monolingual and bilingually exposed groups
would appear more clearly in a paradigm where only one pragmatic cue was available,
but this cue was based on assuming the speaker not to be underinformative rather
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than assuming them not to be overinformative, as in Experiment 1, which arguably
might result in the inference being easier to perform. In this task, participants were
asked to infer and extend the meaning of a novel word based on frequency alone. A
character with two objects was described using a novel word and participants had to
infer that the novel word referred to the least frequent of the two objects (i.e., the one
that was not featured on the other training character). They then had to extend the
word by choosing between two new characters which each had one of the objects. Since
children, unlike adults, had failed at deriving a pragmatic inference from a single cue
using overinformativeness in Experiment 1, Experiment 3 examined performance of a
pragmatic inference from a single cue based on underinformativeness.
Given that children of the same age had been shown to succeed in a similar
task before, we were surprised to find that children, unlike adults, did not perform
above chance in our task and were biased towards choosing the non-target object.
We concluded that this was due to our paradigm introducing an unexpected salient
alternative and conducted further follow up experiments to investigate this possibility,
which we discuss in the next section. However, we noted that, while neither the
monolingual nor the bilingually exposed group could perform the target pragmatic
inference, bilinguals were significantly less biased than monolinguals towards the non-
target object. This could have been the result of a lesser tendency to answer according
to a visually salient, non-pragmatic cue, or to a better ability to pay attention to a
diversity of available cues and/or particularly the presence of socio-pragmatic cues
(while perhaps not being yet able to perform full pragmatic reasoning with the support
of only one cue). This would be in line with other works (Colunga et al., 2012; Yow et
al., 2017; Yow & Markman, 2015) which tend to indicate that bilinguals are better able
to follow socio-pragmatic over visually salient cues and to integrate multiple referential
cues. This also aligns with recent work on pragmatic development which suggests that
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inferences are performed in a constraints-based manner, with performance, especially in
children (who struggle to derive them with one cue only, see next section), moderated
by number, strength, and reliability of cues (e.g., Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015).
In view of the results of Experiment 4, we wished to examine 1) whether children
could perform a pragmatic inference on the basis of a single cue in an ostensive teaching
setting where the didactic/communicative intention was clearer 2) if bilingual children
could, in such a setting, use the pragmatic reasoning ability demonstrated in Experiment
1 to ignore a default response and correctly extend the meaning of a novel word, 3)
whether a better matched (in age and socio-economic background) sample of bilingual
and monolingual children would this time display not just a relative but a numerical
advantage and 4) whether the relative bilingual advantage found in Experiment 1
would apply not just to fast mapping but also to extending a novel word. To this end,
in Chapter 5 we present the results of two further experiments (Experiments 5 and
6) conducted with a different sample of monolingual and bilingual children. In the
latter experiments, participants were asked, after being given a pragmatic cue by an
ostensive teacher, to extend the meaning of a novel word to the subordinate rather than
basic level (Experiment 5) or to a novel action rather than a novel object (Experiment
6). In previous work by Yow and colleagues, bilinguals were better able to ignore a
default or salient response by focusing on a salient social cue (such as eye gaze or
point). In our Experiment 1, we showed that bilinguals displayed a relative advantage
in making use of a pragmatic cue (stressed adjective) for fast mapping when there was
no need to inhibit an irrelevant cue. Here we wanted to see whether bilinguals could
use this pragmatic reasoning ability in order to inhibit a default response and extend
the meaning of the novel word to a new instance of the referent. Crucially, unlike in
previous work by Yow and colleagues, success (or inhibition of the salient response)
could not be achieved by simply using another (salient) social cue in a direct way,
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but participants had to perform true pragmatic reasoning about speaker’s intentions
in order to achieve it. In line with our predictions we found that 1) children were
able to use a single pragmatic cue for word learning and extension in a supportive,
ostensive teaching context, 2) bilinguals were significantly better than monolinguals
in using ostensive pragmatic cues to inhibit a default response in word learning, 3)
in a better matched sample, this bilingual advantage became a numerical one and 4)
this advantage applied in a paradigm which required not only fast mapping but also
extending the meaning of the novel word.
What wider implications can we draw from these results? It might be useful to go
back and consider the reasons we study bilingualism and bilingual individuals. First,
since a bilingual environment is in many parts of the world the rule rather than the
exception, it is of crucial importance to study both the short and long term impacts
of multilingual input on language acquisition and socio-cognitive development more
generally. This is done in the hope to verify that there are no long-term detrimental
effects on language and other abilities, or that the overall balance taking into account
socio-cultural and emotional benefits is a positive one. Failing this, such studies give
parents and educators the opportunity for making a conscious and informed choice.
Second, bilingual input should act as a compulsory and stringent test for any model
of language acquisition or language processing. In general, multilingual input provides
an alternative environment for testing theories of language acquisition, for example
when theories make different predictions regarding syntactic transfer effects (Paradis &
Genesee, 1996). In our case, as we mentioned in Chapter 2, even hybrid computational
models of word learning (i.e., using both pragmatic and cross-situational information)
fail to mimick the performances witnessed in children when faced with multilingual
input (Zinszer et al., 2018)). Thus, bilingual studies constitute an efficient and practical
way of challenging assumptions made by a number of linguistic theories and models.
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Third, bilingualism offers a privileged ground for examining how experience and the
constraints of a specific environment contribute to shaping the development of cognitive
and social skills. More specifically, bilingual studies can shed light upon which skills are
indeed impacted by certain environmental variables, and which are not. Humans are
famously good at adaptation and flexible learning (Fazey et al., 2007). However, the
extent and nature (in terms of domain-generality) of each postulated adaptation needs
to be thoroughly investigated and replicated empirically before any definite conclusions
can be reached. For example, while it might be intuitively appealing to endow the
visually impaired with better hearing, this does not appear to apply to general auditory
abilities (e.g., differential auditory sensitivity and acoustic reflex thresholds) (Starlinger
& Niemeyer, 1981). However, blindness does seem to have a significant positive impact
on echolocation skills (Schenkman & Nilsson, 2010). Here we see a contrast between
changes in a very general ability, versus a specific skill which might result from the
existence of an imperative and primary need (i.e., to move safely from one place to
another). Once again, as organisms who depend on efficiently managing a limited
amount of energy, we appear to use and develop resources on an ‘as-needed’ basis; no
more and no less than is required.
Language acquisition and understanding arguably constitute some if not the most
important enablers of social interaction and knowledge transmission. As such, their
facilitation is likely to be prioritised, and adaptive compensatory strategies to be
developed in environments which are linguistically ‘hostile’ or challenging. One such
example are noisy environments, giving rise to the ‘cocktail party effect’, whereby
hearers strain to process speech in the presence of interfering auditory background
(Cherry, 1953; Yost, 1997). Conversational partners in such situations tend to dis-
play different pragmatic strategies in the form of changes in discourse structure and
patterns of interaction. While regular pragmatic behaviour in conversation involves
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the cooperative development of themes, general coherence, cohesion and efficient turn-
taking, the pragmatics of noisy environments present a number of patterns which bear
striking resemblance to the strategies used by the deaf and hard of hearing (D/HH) in
interactions with hearing peers: avoidance of talk, requests for clarification, for repair
and repetition, for louder or slower speech, body repositioning, less discussion of shared
topics, shorter turns or monologues and ‘artificial’ acknowledgments (i.e., pretense
of comprehension) (McKellin, Shahin, Hodgson, Jamieson, & Pichora-Fuller, 2007).
Visual cues and lipreading can also help support speech comprehension in environments
with high levels of background noise (Sumby & Pollack, 1954).
In the face of this evidence, it would seem reasonable to assume that people who are
hearing impaired might have enhanced pragmatic and visual speech processing abilities.
However, while D/HH do demonstrate reliability enhanced lipreading skills (AuerJr &
Bernstein, 2007), face recognition skills (De Heering, Rossion, & Maurer, 2012) and
even general visual processing (i.e., texture segmentation and visual search) under
certain conditions (Rettenbach, Diller, & Sireteanu, 1999), this does not appear to be
true for pragmatic skills. Indeed, D/HH children were found to perform no better than
hearing children on detecting violations of conversational maxims (Surian, Tedoldi, &
Siegal, 2010) and to be generally at equal levels of performance as children with ASD
(Autism Spectrum Disorders) on theory of mind and false belief tasks, results which
were believed to follow from a significantly lower amount of conversational experience
(Peterson & Siegal, 1995). Despite this, D/HH do display a wider range of pragmatic
skills than their hearing peers, asking more questions, taking longer turns and initiating
more topics (Paatsch & Toe, 2013). By contrast, ASD children are more likely than
neurotypicals to respond inappropriately to requests for clarification (Volden & Phillips,
2010) and have a reduced ability to perceive speech in noisy environments (Alcántara,
Weisblatt, Moore, & Bolton, 2004)
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What about bilingualism? It might be argued that bilinguals, like the hearing
impaired, evolve in an environment which is linguistically and communicatively challeng-
ing. However, unlike D/HH children, bilingual children do not experience a significantly
reduced amount of conversational opportunities. Because of this, it might be expected
that they would be able to display compensatory abilities in related domains, some
of which would naturally result from the higher variety they face in their input. For
example, bilingual children show less perceptual narrowing (Byers-Heinlein & Fennell,
2014) and are more accurate at face recognition (Kandel et al., 2016). Bilingual
8-month-old infants, unlike monolinguals, are able to distinguish between two silent
videos of unknown languages (Sebastián-Gallés, Albareda-Castellot, Weikum, & Werker,
2012) including bimodal bilinguals (ASL/English) (Palmer, Fais, Golinkoff, & Werker,
2012) In addition, bilingual 12-month-olds, unlike monolinguals, continue to monitor
mouth movements for both native and non-native speech (Pons, Bosch, & Lewkowicz,
2015).
These differences between bilinguals and monolinguals are consistent with an effect
of type of input (perceptual narrowing) and an ‘as needed’ basis, since bilinguals are
likely to have a greater need for face recognition (as a language cue), for distinguishing
between languages and for monitoring speakers’ mouths (at least in early stages of
language acquisition) to support weaker phoneme discrimination due to lesser exposure
in each language (Fennell, Byers-Heinlein, & Werker, 2007). In contrast, bilinguals do
not perform better at processing audio-visual speech and benefit less than monolinguals
from the addition of visual cues compared to an audio-only condition (Kandel et al.,
2016). This is consistent with other works showing a general delay in word recognition
for bilinguals (Gollan, Salmon, Montoya, & Galasko, 2011; Shook, Goldrick, Engstler,
& Marian, 2015) , an effect which results from both lack of exposure and a greater
number of potential candidates and would be expected to apply to both audio and
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visual mediums. Indeed, contrary to an intuition of ‘inverse effectiveness’ whereby
visual cues would be most effective as SNR (Signal-to-Noise) ratios decrease, these
cues are actually most effective at intermediate levels of sound quality (i.e., they are
useless at levels that are too low and not needed at very high levels) (Kandel et al.,
2016). This means that humans, which appear to behave in a near Bayes-optimal
manner in combining cues for a variety of multisensory tasks such as audiovisual
speech (Kandel et al., 2016), visual-tactile integration (Rach & Diederich, 2006) and
texture/motion depth assessment (Jacobs, 1999) benefit most from several cues of
intermediate strength. And, as Marian (2009) points out, SNR ratios are likely to be
lower in bilinguals because of their decreased ability to perceive sound contrasts (Bent
& Bradlow, 2003).
The worse performance displayed by bilinguals in audiovisual speech interpretation
would tend to suggest that their environment does not foster a general advantage
in integration of linguistic and paralinguistic cues, at least not of cues for which
monolinguals have a net advantage resulting from greater exposure. However, as we
said previously, there is no principled reason to believe that this should be the case, as
the effect of experience might not extend to domain-general abilities and, unlike visual
language discrimination, there is no particular bilingual need for better audiovisual
processing.
Going back to the three hypotheses we put forward for explaining the previously
found bilingual advantage in socio-pragmatic word learning, we do not further examine
the first (i.e., better inhibitory control or better selective attention), precisely for the
same reasons mentioned above, namely that the exertion of a specific competence
(inhibiting and switching between languages) may not lead to broader changes in all
aspects of cognition (Warmington, Kandru-Pothineni, & Hitch, 2018) and because
in such a heterogeneous population the amount of exertion of this competence may
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vary widely depending on the type of bilingual environment (home/outside home, one
person/one language, etc.)(Green & Abutalebi, 2013). It will suffice to say that the
results of our Experiment 1 suggest that this advantage is not purely due to better
inhibition of an irrelevant cue.
Turning to the second hypothesis (i.e, increased attention to social cues), if we
assume that this skill does not involve any theory of mind or intention reading, we
are forced to classify it as a special case of the inhibition/attention hypothesis. In
this view, rather than (or in addition to) enhanced domain-general executive abilities,
bilinguals would also have developed a specific sensitivity to social (speaker-provided)
cues such as eye gaze or pointing. This would be the consequence of experiencing
higher risks of communication failures (Wermelinger et al., 2017) and a higher level of
uncertainty in the signal provided by the speaker, for example frequent code-switching
(Yow & Markman, 2016). As a result, these cues would prove particularly salient for
bilinguals, who would be biased to pay particular attention to them compared to other
types of cues. As we said, while we do not rule out this possibility, the results of our
experiments show that this previously found advantage cannot be due only to increased
sensitivity to social cues and the ability to use them directly to find the referent of a
novel word.
Coming to our third and final hypothesis (i.e., true pragmatic reasoning which
involves intention reading), two questions arise about the research undertaken in the
current thesis. First, if the intention-reading is the component distinguishing between
second and third hypotheses, why not directly study perspective-taking and theory of
mind as the means used by bilingual children to achieve efficient word learning? Second,
why should we postulate that the bilingual environment would foster pragmatic skills
for word learning over and above the enhanced sensitivity to social cues described in
the second hypothesis?
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To answer the first question, we draw attention to work described in the introduction
which shows that the ability to perform intention-reading (e.g., in ASD individuals)
in a task which explicitly examines this competence does not necessarily entail the
ability to use this skill in a naturalistic context, for example to cancel a pragmatic
implicature (Hochstein et al., 2018). We would further extend this idea to claim that
differences which may not be consistently apparent in general pragmatic inference
paradigms might become clearer in the context of word learning, as per the previously
mentioned ‘as needed’ principle.
To answer the second question, we turn to the word learning model described in
Frank (2014) and Frank, Goodman and Tenenbaum (2009). This model combines both
inferred meanings (pragmatic reasoning) and cross-situational associations (sometimes
achieved using social cues such as eye gaze and pointing) in a parallel manner using
Bayes’ rule, and achieves far better performance than models which use only one
source of information. Thus, it is likely that the higher risks of miscommunication
and uncertainty in input would drive an increased use of intention reasoning as an
added cue for word learning. As we have seen, inference seems to proceed through
near-Bayes-optimal cue integration (cf., Kandel et al., 2016; Rach & Diederich, 2006;
Jacobs, 1999). This could explain why speakers and hearers are often found not to
behave in an optimally Gricean way (Engelhardt et al., 2006; Rubio-Fernandez, 2016;
Horton & Keysar, 1996; Lane & Ferreira, 2008), as they might only prove optimal
when integration of all available contextual cues is taken into account. We come back
to this idea in the next section. If we define pragmatic competence as precisely the
ability to perform cue integration of both intentional and other contextual sources,
and given the evidence from ours and other works that bilingualism increases flexible
use and balanced weighting of these cues, we might hypothesise that bilinguals benefit
from enhancements in both aspects of pragmatic skill, i.e., intention reasoning and
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cue integration involving intentions. Indeed, pragmatics is a domain which is likely
to be less strictly tied to exposure. Further work will have to examine this claim. It
would appear that a bilingual environment makes children more cautious and prompts
them to weigh all cues available rather than ‘jump to conclusions’. By contrast, it
was hypothesised that the struggles of ASD children (who are known to experience
pragmatic difficulties) in noisy speech perception might be due to less effective cue
integration from discontinuous sources (Alcántara et al., 2014).
We conclude that this thesis provides evidence for differences in the processing
of pragmatic cues by bilingual and monolingual children which are not due solely to
better inhibitory skills or to a general sensitivity to social cues such as prosody, eye
gaze and pointing, but to performing true pragmatic inference by reasoning about
communicative intentions in the context of word learning. We believe that these
differences are the result of adapting to the challenging aspects of a bilingual learning
environment, such as higher risks of miscommunication and the need to efficiently and
quickly acquire words from complex and variable input. We finish by adding that
making this distinction between using social cues and reasoning about intentions might
help provide insights about separate developmental timelines for exerting different
types of pragmatic competence, with early abilities demonstrated by the bilingually
exposed, particularly in acquisition contexts.
6.2 Implications for theories of pragmatic inference
In the introductory chapter we began with the question ‘what is pragmatics?’. If we
adopt a cognitive and epiphenomenal perspective (Perkins, 1998):
The consequence of interactions between a set of linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive
subsystems which determine the crucial balance between how much information is encoded
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linguistically and how much is left unsaid on the grounds that it is recoverable from the
linguistic and non-linguistic context of the utterance.
Pragmatics is thus very much the study of pragmatic inference, rather than signal
processing. In a communicative context where interactions take place between intelligent
and purpose-driven beings, we can use assumptions of informativeness to retrieve
meaning: efficiency or specificity (i.e., at equal cost, assume the most specific meaning)
and relevance or coherence (i.e., assume the most related or closely associated meaning).
In this thesis we focused on specificity inferences as inferences which require a lesser
amount of conceptual and world knowledge.
In view of this, our first and second experiments (Experiment 1 and 2) allowed us
to explore whether word learning inferences previously described as ‘socio-pragmatic’
could involve two distinct sets of skills underpinned by different processes, predictor
variables and displaying different types of individual patterns. We showed how a similar
prosodic cue would lead to differences in performance between a group of monolinguals
and bilingually exposed children in one fast mapping paradigm, but not in the other,
and would yield a different set of predictor variables (namely, vocabulary, gender and
language status in Experiment 1, but not in Experiment 2). Indeed, in Experiment 1,
the pragmatic inference could be calculated and predicted quantitatively using Size
Principle (Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001) and reasoning about what the speaker would
use for each potential referent, i.e., at equal cost, choosing potential referents according
to the specificity of the expression used (‘the wet gorp’ being more specific in the case
of several aliens of the same type). Thus, the cost of using a modifier and prosodic
stress was assumed to be contextually justified, and predictions were made according
to this assumption. By contrast, no such calculations on the basis of cost incurred
by the speaker could be made in Experiment 2, where emotional affect (positive or
negative tone) represented a cost which was constant, and thus had to be recognised and
6.2 Implications for theories of pragmatic inference 173
associated with an object’s valence (positively or negatively modified). Interestingly,
these two sets of skills (pragmatic and associative) are also the ones which underlie
the competing theories of word learning outlined in the introduction. As we said in
the previous section, we expect, in accordance with a hybrid model such as Frank,
Goodman and Tenenbaum’s (2009), that both skills would be involved in cases of
‘socio-pragmatic’ word learning, i.e., learning words by using ‘direct’ social cues such as
eye gaze or pointing. We also expect associative abilities, as a lower-level competence,
to be acquired and used earlier, which would explain some of the discrepancies between
young children’s successful performance in socio-pragmatic word learning as opposed to
false-belief tasks (Wellman & Bartsch, 1988; Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and pragmatic
inferences such as scalar implicatures (Noveck, 2001; Guasti et al., 2005; Huang &
Snedeker, 2009). In our case, children in Experiment 1, unlike adults, appeared unable
to perform a contrastive inference by reasoning about the communicative intentions of
the speaker on the basis of the adjectival modifier alone (i.e., ‘the wet gorp’ vs. ‘the
WET gorp’ ).
As stated in the introduction, we do not wish to say that even very young children are
never able to attribute mental states to others. Indeed, recent work using spontaneous
response such as violation-of-expectation (VOE) or anticipatory-looking (AL) have
shown that infants responded according to false belief attribution (Song & Baillargeon,
2008; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). Rather,
what ours and other works seem to suggest is that developmental differences arise
from differences in the ability to make spontaneous use of pragmatic cues which
may not have a high level of salience, especially when other, more salient cues are
available. This explains why paradigms which enhance attention to these cues show
children succeeding in false belief tasks (Rubio-Fernandez & Geurts, 2013; 2016), scalar
implicatures (e.g., Pouscoulous et al., 2009; Katsos & Bishop, 2011) and other types
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of pragmatic inference where success in children is only achieved when a number of
converging cues is provided (Kurumada & Clark, 2017; Horowitz & Frank, 2014).
Similarly, as we said before, individuals with ASD who were able to reason about
knowledge states in one task proved unable to use this competence to spontaneously
to cancel an implicature (Hochstein et al., 2018).
This brings us to our third experiment (Experiment 3). This experiment was meant
to be a slightly modified version of a paradigm in which children had previously been
found to succeed (Frank & Goodman, 2012). However, to our surprise, we found that
children in our experiment failed at deriving the expected pragmatic inference based on
referent frequency and displayed a strong bias towards the non-target, distractor referent.
Following other works (Horowitz, Schneider & Frank, 2018) and examining paradigms
leading to children’s successes (Papafragou & Tantalou, 2004) or failures (Noveck, 2001),
we suggested that the availability of a salient cue (such as a match between question
and answer, or between linguistic description and visual stimuli) disrupted pragmatic
reasoning. The reason, we hypothesise, is that processing such matches constitutes a
more automatic and default process than reasoning about communicative intentions,
especially for children who might have similar lower-level associative abilities to adults,
but less experience in using intentions to infer meanings. In addition to this, some types
of inference such as reasoning by exclusion might be easier to perform and similarly
provide a more easily available answer. Indeed, given the results in our version of this
paradigm, we would like to suggest that children’s success in Frank & Goodman’s (2014)
study might precisely have been due to the performance of such an exclusion inference
which was not warranted in the new paradigm. This conclusion is strengthened by
results such as those of Sullivan and colleagues (2017) who show that children, unlike
adults, do not display the asymmetry which would be expected if they performed true
scalar implicatures rather than simple exclusion inferences. While adults understand
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that the same mismatch between question and answer should lead to rewarding the
character in one case (e.g., ‘Did he color some of the stars/he colored all’ ) but not in
the other (e.g., ‘Did he color all of the stars/he colored some’ ), children do not appear
to make this distinction and withdraw prizes at the same rates in both cases. Crucially,
they do display the asymmetrical ratings in a case where the result is displayed in a
visual way rather than described linguistically, which suggests that choices are indeed
driven by surface mismatch in linguistic form. This bias towards simple associative
or matching processes is reported in other works where children’s rates of choices
for different types of quantifiers (some of the horses/all of the horses/none of the
horses) are significantly closer together than in adults, suggesting choices based on
NP matching alone (i.e., the picture with horses only) (Horowitz, Schneider & Frank,
2018). Similarly, children appear to succeed in scalar implicature paradigms involving
matching pairs and fail when faced with mismatches (cf., Noveck, 2001; Papafragou
& Tantalou, 2004; Syrett et al., 2017a, 2017b). In terms of reasoning profile, children
might thus behave in a more ‘all-or-nothing’, exclusive manner (‘if P, not Q’, i.e., if one
answer is easily available, other cues are not considered) when performing inferences
while adults (and possibly bilinguals) are more Bayesian in their probabilistic weighing
of available cues. This is, again, consistent with a constraint-based model of inference
whereby interpretation derives from the simultaneous integration of multiple constraints
originating from different sources (cf., Hanna et al., 2003; Degen et al., 2015; Heller,
Parisien & Stevenson, 2016).
This being said, our last set of experiments (Experiment 5 and 6) show that children
can succeed at performing pragmatic inferences for word learning using a single cue
in specific types of settings. Following Csibra and Gergely’s (2009) natural pedagogy
theory, we would like to suggest that some ostensive environments and signals prepare
listeners for receiving referential or generic knowledge and allow children to allocate
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their attention more efficiently and make better use of a pragmatic cue. However, while
both groups of children succeeded in using ostensive cues for subordinate category
learning in Experiment 5, only the bilingual group succeeded in using such a cue to
extend a novel word to a novel action in Experiment 6. The results of these experiments
further strengthen our conclusion that the ability to make use of ‘social cues’ for word
learning has to be distinguished as an ability which is acquired earlier and does not
necessarily entail the ability to perform spontaneous pragmatic reasoning. Indeed,
while very young children do appear able to learn words in ‘non-ostensive’ paradigms
(e.g., Tomasello, Strosberg & Akhtar, 1996), it is an open question which amount
of pragmatic reasoning is involved in performing word learning inferences in such
paradigms (i.e., there may not be any reasoning about informativeness per se but
mechanisms which are more akin to associative processes).
The topic of the thesis allowed us to explore several outstanding questions regarding
pragmatic inference. We briefly touched upon the question of informativeness as
understood through specificity (‘narrowness’) or through relevance (‘relation’) of a
meaning hypothesis. We discussed specificity more particularly and ranking referents
according to the Size Principle as well as the role of alternatives. We also examined a
developmental interplay between defaults and reasoning strategies. Finally, we drew a
line between the use of social cues and pragmatic inference for word learning as related
but separate skills with potentially separate acquisition processes.
With a broader perspective in mind, we believe our results to bear interestingly on
questions related to the impact of social experience on humans as opposed to other
species. Indeed, it is controversial that other species have the ability to represent the
states of mind of other intelligent entities and the use of social cues in other animals,
such as point following in dogs, appears to pertain to the domain of simple associative
learning (Elgier, Jakovcevic, Mustaca, & Bentosela, 2012). However, our work and
6.3 Quantitative discussion 177
those of others investigating the influence of bilingual exposure on pragmatic inference
contribute to show that social experience has an effect which in humans goes beyond
low-level skills such as attention and associative learning, to affect the development of
mind reading and social reasoning.
In the next sections, we discuss our results from a quantitative perspective, to
assess the accuracy of predictions from a Bayesian framework in modelling the type of
pragmatic inference and examine each of our experiments in turn, offering potential
avenues for explaining discrepancies when they arise.
6.3 Quantitative discussion
6.3.1 Experiment 1a
In our first experiment, children had to infer the target referent of a novel word from
the use of a stressed or non stressed modifier (e.g., ‘Touch the WET/wet gorp’ ). The
participants were given a display with four novel ‘aliens’, of which two had the property
mentioned by the modifier (e.g., two dry aliens and two wet aliens). Thus a purely
literal listener should have been at chance in choosing between the two aliens which
semantically satisfied the modifier’s requirement (i.e., between the two wet aliens), that
is, each of the relevant aliens should have been chosen about 50% of the time.1.
However, a pragmatic listener might have noticed that one of the semantically
relevant wet aliens had a dry counterpart (i.e., there was only one alien of type B,
which was wet, but there were both a wet and a dry alien of type A). This pragmatic
listener should then have inferred that the wet alien which was not the only one of
1This assumes that both aliens were equally salient and thus had an equal prior probability of
being chosen. We controlled for a potential bias by having two lists and switching which pair of aliens
was being referred to (i.e., in one list it was the ‘dry’ pair and in the other the ‘wet’ pair in the picture
stimulus, each pair involving different distractors)
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its kind in the display was more likely to be referred to using the modifier than the
wet alien which was the only one of its kind. The reason for this is that the use of the
modifier (i.e., saying ‘the wet alien’ ) for the single alien is not required by the context
to for informativeness, just as using the expression ‘the tall glass’ when there is only
one glass would be considered overinformative, as modifiers usually imply a contrast
between members of the same class in referential contexts (cf., Sedivy et al., 1999).
In other words, there is a cost incurred by uttering the additional word which does
not increase informativeness. While speakers are not expected to always be optimally
informative in their use of modifiers, especially when it involves salient features such
as colours (cf., Rubio-Fernández, 2016), listeners can generally assume a reasonable
level of efficiency and base their referential inferences on this assumption (Davies &
Katsos, 2009, 2013). For example, in Gelman and Markman (1985), four year old
children presented with a display including several members of a given category (e.g.,
three crayons) and one member of a different category (e.g., one record) along with
statements of the type ‘Show me the broken one’ were more likely (73%) to pick the
non-single item in a category (e.g., the broken crayon rather than the single broken
record). Three year olds, however, were overall at chance (51%). Interestingly, the
three year olds performed above chance for some adjectives, which were also the ones on
which the four year olds performed best (little, broken, clean, but no colour adjectives).
According to the quantitative predictions from a Bayesian framework such as the
Rational Speech Act (Frank and Goodman, 2012), this inference can be modelled using
Bayes’ rule as the following




Where m is the meaning hypothesis and a the adjectival modifier used, P(m)
constitutes the prior probability to refer to a specific referent or meaning (crayon or
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record) and P(a|m) is the likelihood of a specific referent or meaning (crayon or record)
given the use of an adjectival modifier. In this framework, each meaning hypothesis
should be chosen with a frequency proportional to its informativeness, or in this case its
specificity. This means for each meaning we have a likelihood inversely proportional to
the extension of the modified referent in context, i.e., the ratio between the extension
of the modified referent and the full meaning extension.




Where|a| is the extension of the modified objects (the number of objects of a certain
type which have the mentioned property) and |m| the extension of all objects for this
meaning (i.e., all objects of a certain type). If we consider a uniform prior (i.e., that






























Because the modifier in Gelman and Markman is three times as informative for
the target than for the distractor referent (i.e., the property of ‘brokenness’ is three
times more specific for the broken crayon among the three crayons than it is for the
single broken record), the broken crayon should be chosen three times more often than
the broken record (75% vs. 25%). As we can see, this prediction is very close to the
numbers found in the 4 year olds (73%). In comparison, in our study, as there were
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only two members in the category of the target referent (i.e., only two aliens of type




















Again, this is very close to the numbers we obtained in adult participants in the
stressed condition (66%) when removing incorrect choices (i.e., dry alien choices when
participants were asked to pick a wet alien). It is worth noting that we are only able
to compare Gelman and Markman’s results to the results in our stressed condition,
as the authors indicated that primary stress was also placed on the adjective in their
study. From the results in both adult and children participants, it seems like the
RSA’s rationality parameter α which modulates the strength of the pragmatic inference
should be adapted in non-stressed cases, i.e., if listeners are expected to be maximally
rational (α=1) when hearing stressed modifiers, α should be set closer to 0.88 when
modifiers are not stressed. It is interesting that this ratio appears to be almost exactly
the same in adults and children.
However, children’s performance in our stressed condition was lower (58%) than
expected from model predictions (67%). This could be due to several factors. First, it
is unclear how the use of a novel word (‘the wet gorp’ ) should influence contrastive
inferences, compared to the use of a neutral pronoun (‘the wet one’ ) as in Gelman and
Markman. Some have argued that novel words have a special status compared to other
linguistic components such as facts and that they prompt the formation of categories
(Behrend, Scofield, & Kleinknecht, 2001). It is possible that children found the novel
words more distracting and/or confusing than they would have a neutral pronoun like
one.
This brings us to a second concern with regard to the assumption of overinforma-
tivenes which forms the basis of the contrastive inference. Indeed, if the inference is
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produced through reasoning about alternatives, the listener has to assume that the
speaker is unaware of the listener’s lack of knowledge about the meaning of the novel
word. In this scenario, the listener can reason that if the speaker had meant to refer
to the modified single alien (i.e., the wet alien which had no dry counterpart), they
could simply have used that other alien’s name (e.g., ‘Touch the dax’). In contrast, in
a scenario where the speaker is aware that they are using unknown words, the same
inference could not be derived (i.e., the speaker could not have simply used ‘the dax’
since it would have been uninformative for the child). The issue with this assumption
is that it makes the same use of modifier overinformative in the control trials (asking
for ‘the wet gorp’ when there was only one modified object in the array, e.g., one wet
alien). This could have undermined the strength of the pragmatic inference in the
critical trials, as the speaker would have been seen as relatively unreliable in their level
of informativeness (Grodner & Sedivy, 2011). This is particularly likely given that
only about half of the filler instructions in Gelman and Markman (1985) included an
adjective and thus an overinformative expression (e.g., ‘the red one’ when there is only
one red object) while the other half used a simple noun (e.g., ‘Show me the chair’ ),
thereby reducing the level of overinformativeness and ‘unreliability’ of the speaker (cf.
Pogue, Kurumada, & Tanenhaus, 2016).
This contextual effect probably also explains why performance in the non-stressed
condition was significantly lower in adults (and at chance in children): as demonstrated
in Weber et al. (2006), the presence of stressed adjectives in the discourse context
tends to reduce or inhibit contrastive inference for non-stressed adjectives (which do
not appear as contrastive in comparison).
A final possibility mentioned a posteriori by some adult participants in our study
was that the modifications (e.g., drops of water) partially hid some of the characters
and made it difficult to perceive the difference between them, which could in some trials
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have led to the impression that both modified objects were part of a set (e.g., that both
wet aliens had a dry counterpart). This would then have led to chance performance as
it would have resulted in the use of the modifier being equally informative for both
modified objects.
In conclusion, the predictions of the model were overall very close to the quantitative
results obtained, however some factors such as stress and speaker reliability impacted
the reliability of the inference. Next we briefly describe how such a discussion is not
warranted in the case of our second experiment, precisely for the same reasons, we
hypothesise, which lead to the difference between bilingual and monolingual groups to
appear in one experiment but not in the other.
6.3.2 Experiment 2
The virtual impossibility of giving quantitative predictions for the results of Experiment
2 in a Bayesian framework acts as a further confirmation that this experiment is different
in nature from our other tasks. Indeed, as we said before, performance relied entirely
on the ability to recognise one emotional affect and pair it with the appropriate referent,
without having to reason about speaker’s intentions. In this way, the task was in fact
akin to recognising the semantic meaning of a word and pairing it with an appropriate
image (e.g., ‘Show me the picture where he is happy’ ). If an inference took place, it
was related to world knowledge about how likely each modification (e.g., flower or star,
dirt or breakage) was to have caused happy or sad emotions. Thus, this was in a way a
semantic task which relied on knowing the meaning of each type of affect, whereas in
our other experiments, knowledge of semantic meaning was either not sufficient (e.g.,
knowing the meaning of ‘wet’ in Experiment 1, or ‘kitten’ in Experiment 2) or not
needed (e.g., for interpreting prosodic stress in Experiment 1, or for performing the
correct inferences in Experiments 5 and 6).
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We next turn to the results of our third and fourth experiments.
6.3.3 Experiments 3a, 3b and 4
In these experiments, participants had to infer the meaning of a novel word on the
basis of its frequency in context. Thus, when a speaker identified a referent using a
novel word (e.g., singling out a character and exclaming ‘Oh, a kitten with a dax!’ ),
participants were expected to infer that the novel word referred to a feature of the
referent which was informative, that is, rare enough to be remarked on. For example,
if three kittens entered a room and a speaker pointed at one who had a bow and
flower, the listener could use the frequency of each feature to choose between them as
extension for the novel word. If all kittens had a bow and flower, the listener should
be at chance between the two features (ratio between the two features=1). If the three
kittens had a bow but only two had a flower, the flower would be a slightly more likely
candidate (ratio between the two features=2/3), more so if two kittens had a bow but
only the target one had a flower (ratio between the two features=1/2), and yet more if
all three kittens had a bow but only the target one had a flower (ratio between the
two features=1/3).
Once again, we can model this inference using Bayes’ rule
P (f |w) = P (f)P (w|f)∑
f ′∈F P (f
′)P (w|f ′)
(6.6)
Where f is the referent’s feature and w the word used. Given that the novel word
(e.g., ‘dax’ ) is unknown, it is by itself uninformative with regard to the referent’s
features being mentioned, which leads to w simply representing the utterance of any
word. In other words, P(f |w) is the probability of a certain feature being referred to,
given a word has been uttered to describe its referent. If we assume that all features
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have an equal prior probability of being referred to, this is simply P(w |f ), or the
likelihood of a word having been used to refer to a certain feature, which we can
compute (according to the Size Principle, Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001) as inversely
proportional to the ratio of the extension of this feature against the others
P (w|f) = |f |
−1∑
f ′∈F |f ′|−1
(6.7)
These predictions were tested with adults online and with children in a laboratory
setting by Frank and Goodman (2014). They found that adults’s predictions were
closely matched to the predictions made by a parameter-free model based on the
equation above in four different conditions corresponding to the ‘kitten’ cases we
outlined above. Thus, with equal ratio (e.g., one bow and one flower, or in their case
one headband and one bandanna)














With a 1/2 ratio (e.g., one headband and two bandannas)














With a 2/3 ratio (e.g., two headbands and three bandannas)














And with a 1/3 ratio (e.g., one headband and three bandannas)
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Agreggate performances in adults (responses were given in the form of quantitative
‘bets’ as to which feature was being referred to) in all four conditions were as follows:
m=0.50, sd=0.14 (model prediction: 0.5), m=0.56, sd=0.23 (model prediction: 0.60),
m=0.67, sd=0.28 (model prediction: 0.67) and m=0.70, sd=0.19 (model prediction:
0.75), the three latter significantly above chance. Children were tested in a simplified
version of the second case (ratio=1/2) and found, in a first experiment, to actually
perform above model predictions (m=0.81, sd=0.39 for 3-4 years old and m=0.88,
sd=0.33 for 4-5 years old, model prediction: 0.67). In a first follow up experiment, the
authors used a different construction (‘Here is a dinosaur with a dax’ instead of ‘This
is a dinosaur with a dax’ ) to reduce the likelihood that the phrase would be stressed
and/or interpreted contrastively and investigate if the results were specific to this
particular construction. They found slightly lower, but still above chance performance
(m=0.69, sd=0.47 for 3-4 years old and m=0.69, sd=0.47 for 4-5 years old). In a second
follow up experiment, they investigated whether the salience of the unique object could
have driven performance in the first two experiments by using a ‘non-linguistic salience’
condition where no novel words were used, and found that this did not seem to be the
case.
In experiment 3a we attempted to replicate these results in adults and children
of similar age (4 to 6 years old) by using a slightly modified version of Frank and
Goodman’s (hereafter F & G) paradigm implemented on a touchscreen laptop. To
our surprise, we found performance to be significantly below chance in children and
at chance in adults. This was hypothesised as the result of uncertainty introduced
regarding the target character, which was singled out by a red circle in our case whereas
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it was singled out by a more unambiguous point in F & G. This uncertainty had made
available an alternative salient answer which adults and children had taken up on
in similar proportions. However, examination of answer patterns revealed that the
proportion of consistent target answers (across all four trials) in adults was about
40%, whereas they were absent in children. To further investigate this, we conducted a
follow up experiment (Experiment 3b) where the target character was made explicit
(‘The kitten circled in red’ ). Here again, adults produced the target answer, this time
according to the model’s quantitative predictions (as it was not balanced by alternative
answers): i.e., 66%, but children did not seem to derive the target pragmatic inference
and performed at chance.
One crucial difference between F & G’s study and ours is that, to make computer
implementation easier and reduce as much as possible the memory component of the
task, we displayed both training and test items on the same screen simultaneously.
This effectively made our display a version of the 2/3 ratio condition in F & G (two
instances of target object, e.g., blue novel object and three of non-target, e.g., pink
novel object). This condition, however, is set apart from the other ones. Indeed, it
is the only one in F & G’s where the target object is not unique in the display. This
makes this case the only one where the frequency inference cannot be substituted by
an easier contrastive or exclusion inference. Indeed, in the other cases it is possible
to interpret the phrase as ‘This is a dinosaur with a dax [and these other ones are
not]’. Thus, it is an open question to which extent the low level of adult performance
in the 2/3 condition (0.56) was simply due to the extension ratio being highest (2/3
vs. 1/2 or 1/3) or was also influenced by the unavailability of this contrastive reading.
One way of verifying this would be to organise a display where the ratio is constant
but the target object is not unique (e.g., 2 headbands and 4 bandannas). However,
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this introduces another variable which might impact performance, namely the visual
complexity of the display.
In view of this, we would like to suggest that the reason children succeeded in
F & G but failed to derive the target frequency inference in our experiment is that
they were actually performing an exclusion inference (‘That was a dinosaur with a dax
so the other one was not’ ), which was not warranted in our display since the target
object in it was not unique to the target character. This is in line with recent work
showing that children are able to perform ‘simpler’ exclusion inferences but fail to
display asymmetries in answers which would indicate full reasoning on the basis of
informativeness in scalar implicature paradigms (J. Sullivan et al., 2017). This would
also explain the relatively high levels of performance, as this type of reasoning functions
by definition in an ‘all-or-nothing’ rather than graded manner. The authors did attempt
to check for a contrastive or uniqueness effect in their follow up experiments. However,
we would argue that the use of a locative (‘Here is a dinosaur with a dax’ ) does not
completely rule out a contrastive or exclusion explanation. Similarly, the ‘non-linguistic
salience’ condition of the second follow-up experiment does not rule out a preference
for the unique object, as the training and test question were simply phrased as ‘Here
is a dinosaur’ and ‘Can you find another one?, which arguably would lead children
to believe that the referent of ‘another one’ is ‘dinosaur’, and to perform at chance.
Ruling out an effect of uniqueness of target could only be achieved by using a display
where the target object was not unique and finding that children still performed the
expected inference (as adults do). Contrary to this, we found in our experiment that
this display seemed to prevent children from performing the target pragmatic inference.
We now turn to the results in our fifth experiment, which investigated level of
extension of a category based on presentation of exemplars.
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6.3.4 Experiment 5b
In our fifth experiment we used a paradigm similar to Xu and Tenenbaum (2007a)
to investigate sensitivity to sampling in extension of novel categories. These authors
propose a Bayesian model for word learning which combines prior beliefs and given
evidence to yield a probability distribution over the possible extensions of the new
word. Since this model is inferential in nature and involves reasoning, it makes different
predictions than a purely associative model regarding how information about the source
of the evidence should be treated by learners. In an associative model of word learning
(where word extensions are learned cross-situationally through simultaneous exposure
to word and referent), there should be no effect of sampling and only number of
labelled referents should have an influence over subsequent extensions by strengthening
the associative relation between word and referent. E.g., In the absence of negative
feedback or information to the contrary, a dalmatian being labelled ‘dax’ twice should
drive learners to the same conclusions regardless of the process which led to the
labelling. In a Bayesian framework, on the other hand, exemplar choices performed
by a knowledgeable teacher with ostensive educational purposes should be regarded
as informative, whereas choices performed by an ignorant learner with a different
goal should be seen as uninformative and dismissed from the reasoning process. In
their study, Xu and Tenenbaum (2007a) presented children and adults with a picture
showing sets of novel objects which could be grouped into broad ‘basic-level’ categories
(similar level as dogs) based on shape, and narrower ‘subordinate’ categories (similar
level as dalmatians). In the teacher-driven condition, the experimenter pointed at three
objects from the same subordinate category in turn and labelled them with the same
novel word, e.g.,‘blicket’. In the learner condition, the experimenter pointed at and
labelled one subordinate exemplar and asked the learner to label two other exemplars
on the picture themselves, promising a reward if they ‘got it right’, which prompted
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conservatism instead of exploration in learners’ choices, and insured that the exemplars
chosen would be of the same subordinate category (regardless of participant’s beliefs
about the true extension of the novel word). The test of extension then consisted in
the experimenter pointing a five different objects in turn, including objects from the
same subordinate category, different subordinates from the same basic-level category
and objects from a different basic-level category, and asking the participant ‘Is this a
blicket?
Our adaptation of Xu and Tenenbaum’s experiment provided us with an opportunity
to test the predictions of their model in a slightly modified paradigm. Indeed, in our
version we provided participants with only two exemplars of the target subordinate
category to avoid potential ceiling effects. The exemplars were also presented separately
rather than singled out in a picture containing all objects, to increase retention in short
term memory. This is because our experiment was implemented as a computerised
task which meant the screen would switch between training and testing.
Formally, the Bayesian inference can be written as




Where m is the meaning hypothesis (or possible extension of the word: ‘subordinate
level’ or ‘basic level’) and e is the evidence or exemplars provided (e.g., one labelled
examples, two labelled examples, etc.). P(m) constitutes the prior belief about
extension, or tendency to extend the novel label to the subordinate or basic-level
prior to seeing any exemplars, whereas P(e|m) is the likelihood of having sampled the
exemplars given a specific meaning or extension level.
As previously described, Xu and Tenenbaum’s model assumes taxonomic categories
where the probability of sampling from each level is proportional to the ‘height’ of
its branch, i.e., the higher the level, the more likely it is to sample from it as it is
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broader (e.g., animals are more likely than dogs which are more likely than dalmatians).
In this particular paradigm, the extension of each category is approximated as the
number of exemplars seen. The Size Principle which follows from this reflects the
intuition of a ‘suspicious coincidence’ whereby exemplars from a lower-level category
have a higher chance of having been sampled from this category only than from a
higher-level category (in which case you would expect more variety/other subordinates).
This ‘suspicion’ increases exponentially with each additional exemplar. Thus, for each
exemplar the sampling probability is the inverse of the category extension, and the





Where n is the number of exemplars. In the teacher condition, where every exemplar







In the learner-driven condition, on the other hand, only the first exemplar (given
by the knowledgeable teacher) is informative regarding the true meaning distribution,
thus in effect equating a likelihood where n=1. As we have seen before, the prior over
extension type is not uniform between subordinate and basic-level choices (i.e., there is
a bias towards basic level choices). Given this and the need for all meaning hypotheses
to sum to one, the authors fit as prior a beta distribution uniquely described by one
parameter β=5 whereby all things being equal, basic level hypotheses are believed
to be five times as likely as subordinate hypotheses (e.g., 0.17 vs. 0.83). In Xu and
Tenenbaum’s (2007a) paradigm (hereafter X & T), each of the two basic level categories
has three subordinate categories which each contain five objects. Thus in the teacher
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condition the likelihood for subordinate level after three exemplars from the same
subordinate category have been labelled is (1/5)3=0.008, which combined with prior
yields a posterior probability of 0.84. In the learner condition, since only the first
exemplar is informative, the likelihood for subordinate level is 1/5=0.2, which combined
with prior yields a posterior probability of 0.37. The numbers obtained by X & T were
slightly lower in children (mean age 4;0, 71% subordinate choices in teacher condition
and 29% in learner condition) and slightly higher in adults for the teacher condition
(92% subordinate choices in teacher condition and 35% in learner condition). This
is interesting as it confirms a previous tendency found in (Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007b)
whereby children appeared less likely than adults to display a basic-level bias.




0.008 ∗ 0.17 + 00.0002963 ∗ 0.83
= 0.84
(6.15)




0.2 ∗ 0.17 + 0.0667 ∗ 0.83
= 0.37
(6.16)
In our paradigm, there were only six objects which could be seen simultaneously
at test time: two target subordinates, two other subordinates (one of each) from
the same basic level and two objects from another basic level category. Thus the
extension for target basic level was 4 objects (against 15 in X & T) and the extension
of the subordinate category was 2 objects (against 5 in X & T). If we conserve a β of
value 5 (which is appropriate given our number of basic and subordinate categories
is approximately equal to that of X & T’s, i.e., 2 basic levels and 5 subordinate
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categories in total, whereas they had 6 subordinate categories, three in each basic level).
This means in our teacher condition the likelihood for subordinate level should be
(1/2)2=0.25, which combined with prior yields a posterior probability of 0.44, whereas
in the learner condition the likelihood is 1/2 which combined with prior yields 0.28.




0.25 ∗ 0.17 + 0.0625 ∗ 0.83
= 0.44
(6.17)




0.50 ∗ 0.17 + 0.25 ∗ 0.83
= 0.28
(6.18)
This proportion of subordinate choices is lower than the numbers we obtained
in children in both the teacher and learner conditions (72% and 42% respectively).
This could be due to several reasons. First, as we said before, X & T themselves
acknowledged a lesser basic-level bias in children, which means the β parameter which
accounts for this preference might be better set at a lower value when modelling
children’s choices compared to adults. Another reason why β should perhaps be set
lower than the (relatively high) value of 5 in our paradigm, especially in the teacher
condition, is that (unlike in X & T, and in our learner condition) the two exemplars
were presented simultaneously and separately from the other objects, thus increasing
the salience of the subordinate category. It is also worth noting that even in the test
part of the trials, the objects were not ‘bundled’ together as in X & T and we had a
lesser number of each type, which might have lowered the salience of the basic category.
It is an interesting question whether the type/token ratio would have any influence on
prior biases or choices after seeing exemplars. Finally, it is likely that a basic level bias
would be impacted by the level of similarity between subordinate categories, i.e., the
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more similar they are, the more likely they are to belong to the same basic level and
thus the more likely a participant will be to give a basic level answer. It is possible
that our subordinate categories differed from each other to a greater extent than that
of X & T, or that, as we mentioned before, the grouping of a high number of objects
from the different subordinate categories together made their similarities more salient.
We would also like to suggest the possibility that participants might have reasoned
in a simpler way, i.e., they might have considered that providing two exemplars from the
same subordinate category was twice as ambiguous evidence as different subordinates
would have been. Indeed, two different subordinates would have unequivocally lead
to learning the word for the basic level category, whereas two same subordinates
could mean either the subordinate or basic level category. If reasoning by exclusion,
participants might have simply thought that if the teacher had wanted to teach them
the basic level category, they would have used different subordinates, similarly to the
classic some-but-not-all scalar implicature (cf. Figure 6.1). This type of reasoning could
then have boosted the subordinate choices in teacher condition, either because they
relied on exclusion ‘all-or-nothing’ reasoning, or because they reasoned that getting
two same subordinates was twice as ambiguous as getting two different ones, and thus
twice less likely to be used for basic level category teaching (i.e., 67% vs. 33%, which
numbers are closer to the ones we obtained).
In conclusion, while the model in Xu and Tenenbaum (2007b) does provide explana-
tory power, it is delicate to give definitive values for free parameters, such as the beta
parameter for basic-level bias, which they set at the value of 5 in their study, a value
which might be too high in a different paradigm such as ours, where the similarity
between basic level objects is not as salient.
194 Conclusions
6.3.5 Experiment 6b
With our last experiment we enter unknown territory in terms of quantitative predictions.
Indeed, to our knowledge this type of pragmatic inference has not previously been
modelled using a Bayesian framework. In this experiment, participants witnessed a
‘teacher’ perform a novel action with a novel object while uttering a novel word. In a
control condition there was no previous preparation, whereas in the ‘action-emphasised’
condition, this was preceded by the teacher performing another action with the novel
object before performing the target action and uttering the novel word. This emphasised
that the novel action was a more likely referent for the novel word, since it was more
recent to the common ground (i.e., if the novel object was the intended referent, why
would the speaker not have labelled it immediately?).
Previous studies have shown that young children are able to infer that the referent
of a novel word is the most novel referent in the common ground between speaker
and listener. In Akhtar et al. (1996), two-year olds were given three novel, nameless
objects. Both experimenter and child played with them and performed several actions
on them. The three objects were then placed in a clear plastic box along with a fourth,
yet unseen object, also novel and nameless. The experimenter then uttered a novel
word enthusiastically (five times in total, given that parents were instructed to produce
similar utterances) while looking at the box with objects (e.g., ‘Look,I see a modi!
A modi! I see a modi in there! ). After this, participants played again with all four
objects to ensure equal level of familiarity and exposure. At test, children were first
asked to choose between the four objects (comprehension test) (e.g., ‘Show me the
modi’ ). Half of the children (n=8) successfully picked the target object. In addition,
five children produced the novel word appropriately, either spontaneously or through
elicited production (production test). Akthar et al. then concluded that 10 children in
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total (62.5%) could be considered as having learned and correctly extended the novel
word.
In another experiment similar to ours, Tomasello and Akhtar (1995) examined
whether this ability to use discourse novelty for word learning extended to being able
to distinguish between novel object and novel action as the referent of a novel word. To
this end, they constructed an ‘object novel’ condition and an ‘action novel’ condition.
In the object novel condition, child and experimenter performed the target action
with multiple novel objects for a length of two minutes before performing the target
action with the target object five times and uttering the novel word, then repeating
the full sequence (a total of ten utterances of the novel word). In the action novel
condition, child and experimenter performed multiple actions with the target object
before performing the target action with the target object five times and uttering the
novel word, then repeating the full sequence (again for a total of ten utterances of
the novel word). Thus the last sequence was the same in both conditions, whereas
the play and preparations that had led to it were different. Crucially, there were no
morphosyntactic markers (no article or tense) as to which part of speech (noun or verb)
the novel word belonged to. Here again, children were credited with having learned
the novel word either through comprehension (they were asked ‘Look over there! Can
you show me modi?’ by the experimenter while designating the area of the room
where training had taken place) or through spontaneous production. Children who
picked or performed another action with the target object were credited with an object
response, while children children who performed the target action with another object
were credited with an action response. Children who performed target action with
target object (n=2 in the action novel condition) were credited with action responses
on the basis of their performance at pre-test, where they had never produced an action
in reponse to a prompt for a familiar object. In total, 9 out of 12 children (75%)
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produced an action answer in the action novel condition, against 3 (25%) in the object
novel condition. Tomasello and Akhtar (1995) then concluded that two year olds were
reliably able to use pragmatic inferences based on discourse novelty of a referent to
learn and extend the meaning of a novel word to either action or object.
We can tentatively try and model the inference using Bayes’ rule as




Where r stands for a specific referent or part of speech (action or object, verb or
noun). Thus, P(r |w) is the posterior probability of a referent given a novel word has
been uttered, P(r) is the prior probability of the referent or part of speech and P(w |r)
is the likelihood of a word being given at a certain time for a specific referent.
This inference is, in fact, also a type of frequency inference (cf. Experiments 3a and
3b) where frequency is expressed in terms of novelty and here again, the novel word by
itself is uninformative. However, because novelty is a temporal measure, inference is
based this time on the timing of the novel word utterance relative to the introduction
of the referent. Thus, P(w |r) is the likelihood of a label being provided at a certain
time for a referent, which is proportional to the novelty of this referent, or inversely
proportional to the frequency of the referent in context at the time of the labelling
event (how much it has been seen before the novel word is given).
The difficulty here resides in defining a quantitative measure of novelty for each
referent. This is more difficult than for the frequency inference case in Experiments 3a
and 3b, where objects can be counted, as they are discrete units. Time, on the other
hand, is by nature a continuous and relative measure. A simplifying assumption could
be to count as a discrete unit each event of performing an action with an object and
record the occurrence of each referent across all events in the relevant context. Thus,
in the action emphasised condition of our paradigm we would have an extension of
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1/2 for the target action (which appeared in one out of two events) and 2/2 for the
novel object (which appeared in both events) and the likelihood for action would be
computed as

















However, such a measure is problematic for at least two reasons. First, this measure
does not take into account exposure to an object when no actions were performed,
which should still lower the novelty of the object. Second, it attributes the same weight
to all events involving a referent after it has been introduced, whereas it could be
expected that the exact number of events performed, or length of time elapsed since
introducing the referent, matters less than the fact that one introduction took place
simultaneously with, or much closer to, the utterance of the novel word.
Another way of measuring novelty could be simply to quantify in units of time, e.g.,
minutes, the fraction of the time occupied by each referent between the introduction
of the first referent and the labelling event or utterance of the novel word. However,
if we consider a 10 minute-training where the second referent had been introduced 1
minute before the label (which already seems a longer period than in the experiments
described), this would yield a likelihood of 0.91, a much higher number than the
one found in Tomasello and Akhtar (1995) (hereafter T & A). For a simultaneous
introduction of word and referent (and thus an exposure of, or close to 0), which was
the case in our paradigm, we would actually have a likelihood of, or close to 1, whereas
the results we obtained were much lower and only above chance in the bilingual group
(0.57).
Despite this, it is likely that the difference between ours and T & A in terms of
length of exposure contributed to the quantitative differences found in the results,
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despite the older age of our participants. Precisely with, in our mind, the goal of being
able to distinguish and quantify exposure to each referent, ours was a very stripped
down and brief experimental manipulation, with each training video lasting about ten
seconds. This means that participants had less time to form and retain the mapping
between label and referent, compared to T & A where the sequence and labelling were
repeated a total of ten times in each condition, which helped strengthen the result of
the pragmatic inference made from the previously seen preparations. In addition, two
competing effects are at play in terms of salience resulting from frequency. While it is
true that more rare (or more novel) objects and properties are more salient, it is also
true that the additional exposure resulting from greater frequency will lead to objects or
properties in high numbers being also salient and more lastingly retained (Tarenskeen,
Broersma, & Geurts, 2015). Think about entering a living room which is entirely filled
with blue furniture and objects. You attention will probably be attracted by the one
red cushion on the sofa, but equally the colour blue is likely to be salient to you and
memorised even after leaving the room. In this view, when relatively short periods
of time are involved (as in our videos), the salience from length of exposure is likely
to be competing with the effect of the novelty-based pragmatic inference, resulting
in performances being closer to chance. Similarly, we were surprised to find that
performance in the neutral control condition was at chance between action and object,
while previous research and the ‘whole object constraint’ (e.g., Markman, 1990) would
have led us to expect a bias towards mapping a novel word to a novel object. However,
once again, it is possible that the manipulations of the object in our action-emphasised
condition also had the effect of attracting further attention to the object, thus partially
cancelling the effect of the novelty inference.
In conclusion, computational models of pragmatic inference, cross-situational word
learning and exemplar learning which use Bayesian inference prove to be useful ways
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of formalising these processes and providing quantitative predictions. However, when
dealing with behavioural data, quantitative outcomes are sensitive to a variety of
factors which can have a substantial impact on performance. Going back to the puzzle
of the bilingual lexicon outlined in the introduction, and the poor performance of the
model when faced with multilingual input, we would like to suggest, in light of our
findings, that a Bayesian model of cue integration for bilingual word learning needs to
be adapted with more flexibility in combining cues, i.e., less weight from prior ‘default’
biases towards similarity matches, whole objects or basic level, or less tendency to
‘jump to conclusions’, and a higher willingness to let go of these priors in order to
consider pragmatic cues, as well as a more optimally rational behaviour in deriving
inferences from these cues.
6.4 Future directions
As with all works which are limited in time, this thesis leaves open some avenues for
further research, along with unanswered questions.
One concerns the exact part played by the pragmatic abilities described here in
previously found advantages in word learning paradigms in the work of Yow and
colleagues. Indeed, while our work demonstrates that such advantages could not have
been solely due to better inhibitory control or attentional biases towards social cues,
we do not know to which extent the abilities we examine here contributed to these
results in addition to other potential differences. Further research will thus have to
investigate whether these different skills can be examined separately and whether a
specific developmental timeline can be established for each of them. This should then
help us have a better understanding of pragmatic mechanisms for fast mapping and
word learning in general in allowing us to model the flexible process of cue integration
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whereby individuals will use and rely on different types of cues depending on their
experience.
In this view, it would also be useful to investigate the domains where cue integration
is performed in a graded ‘Bayesian’ manner from those where reasoning happens in a
more exclusive, ‘all-or-nothing’ fashion. As we have seen, exclusion reasoning seems to
be more prevalent in children, who might use it as a stepping stone for acquiring a
full pragmatic competence. However, the type of evidence received can also influence
the reasoning process, as we have seen in the case of hierarchical category extensions,
which are sometimes performed in a graded manner (e.g., when one exemplar is given)
and sometimes performed in a more extreme manner (e.g., when multiple exemplars
are given).
In the course of this research, we were sometimes faced with children’s inability to
derive pragmatic inferences which adults could succeed at. While we provided a number
of hypotheses for why this might have been the case, relying on both the developmental
literature (e.g., recent work showing that children need a higher number of, or more
reliable cues for performing certain types of inference) and on follow up experiments
where we further explored some open questions (e.g., distinguishing between frequency
and exclusion inference in Experiment 3b, or showing that children could succeed in
using a single pragmatic cue in an ostensive context), there is more than enough room
for future research to examine the factors, including methodological, which impact
successful performance of pragmatic inference in certain paradigms.
All in all, lazy humans appear to engage in pragmatic reasoning when they have an
incentive to do so (it is necessary) or are more used to doing it (it has become more
default). Since bilingually exposed individuals check both boxes, it stands to reason
that they should demonstrate it more prevalently.
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‘This is my friend Mr. Puppet. He has made a lot of new alien friends with strange
names and he has given them some toys, but now he needs them back. Can you help
him get his toys back by finding the right alien?’
Warm-up:
‘It’s very important that you touch the right alien or Mr. Puppet will never find his
toys. You have to be careful to choose the right alien, some aliens might be dirty, or
wet. For example, here are some gloops. Can you touch the wet gloop? And the dirty
gloop?’
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Fig. A.1 Warm-up stimulus Experiment 1
Table A.1 audio stimuli experiment 1
control display
‘Touch the wet flurg’ four aliens (two of the same kind, two different ones),
‘Touch the dry dinkoo’ one wet one and three dry ones
‘Touch the clean patam’ four aliens (two of the same kind, two different ones),
‘Touch the dirty tweep’ one clean one and three dirty ones
stressed modifier display
‘Touch the WET plonk’ four aliens (two of the same kind, two different ones),
‘Touch the DRY yubba’ two wet ones and two dry ones
‘Touch the CLEAN moozie’ four aliens (two of the same kind, two different ones),
‘Touch the DIRTY ral’ two clean ones and two dirty ones
unstressed modifier display
‘Touch the wet gorp’ four aliens (two of the same kind, two different ones),
‘Touch the dry pitack’ two wet ones and two dry ones
‘Touch the clean rapook’ four aliens (two of the same kind, two different ones),
‘Touch the dirty lep’ two clean ones and two dirty ones
(list 2) display
same audio files stressed/unstressed pictures switched
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Fig. A.2 stressed/non stressed condition
Fig. A.3 stressed/non stressed condition
Fig. A.4 stressed/non stressed condition
Fig. A.5 stressed/non stressed condition
Fig. A.6 stressed/non stressed condition
Fig. A.7 stressed/non stressed condition
Fig. A.8 stressed/non stressed condition
Fig. A.9 stressed/non stressed condition
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Fig. A.10 control condition
Fig. A.11 control condition
Fig. A.12 control condition
Fig. A.13 control condition
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Fig. A.14 Warm-up stimulus Experiment 2 ‘Oh, look at these! Have you seen these?’
Fig. A.15 Warm-up stimulus Experiment 2 ‘Can you show me the pencil?’
Fig. A.16 Warm-up stimulus Experiment 2 ‘Can you show me the spotik?’
A.2 Experiment 2
Puppet’s story:
‘Do you want to see more objects that the aliens brought? Oh, but Mr. Puppet has
been playing with them, so some of them got dirty or broken, but he also decorated
some with pretty things’
222 Stimuli
Table A.2 audio stimuli experiment 2
preparation neutral affect display
‘Oh look at these have you seen these’ (neutral tone) ‘Oh, look at the spoodle, mud/star
can you touch the spoodle?’
‘Oh look at these have you seen these’ (neutral tone) ‘Oh, look at the nurmy, flower/slime
can you touch the nurmy?’
‘Oh look at these have you seen these’ (neutral tone) ‘Oh, look at the goti, pink/broken
can you touch the goti?’
‘Oh look at these have you seen these’ (neutral tone) ‘Oh, look at the fopal, hole/spark
can you touch the fopal?’
preparation positive affect
‘Oh look at these have you seen these’ (happy tone) ‘Oh, look at the figoo, star/slime
can you touch the figoo?’
‘Oh look at these have you seen these’ (happy tone) ‘Oh, look at the dazee, mud/spark
can you touch the dazee?’
‘Oh look at these have you seen these’ (happy tone) ‘Oh, look at the grof, flower/broken
can you touch the grof?’
‘Oh look at these have you seen these’ (happy tone) ‘Oh, look at the pilk, broken/spark
can you touch the pilk?’
preparation negative affect
‘Oh look at these have you seen these’ (sad tone) ‘Oh, look at the zarp, hole/star
can you touch the zarp?’
‘Oh look at these have you seen these’ (sad tone) ‘Oh, look at the mook, flower/hole
can you touch the mook?’
‘Oh look at these have you seen these’ (sad tone) ‘Oh, look at the slarp, spark/slime
can you touch the slarp?’
‘Oh look at these have you seen these’ (sad tone) ‘Oh, look at the klem, mud/pink
can you touch the klem?’
preparation list 2
same audio files pictures switched between conditions
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‘Let’s carry on helping Mr. Puppet! The aliens left a bag with objects from their
planet and animals have stolen some of them. Can you help Mr. Puppet find the
animals that have taken the aliens’ objects?’
A.4 Experiment 5
Puppet’s story (teacher condition) ‘Mr. Puppet wants to show you some of his new
toys’/(learner condition) ‘I found the bag that the aliens left! Let’s shake it and see
what funny objects are inside’
A.5 Experiment 6
Puppet’s story: Now we’re going to watch Mr. Puppet’s friend Katie play with some
of his toys’
A.5 Experiment 6 227
Table A.3 audio stimuli experiment 3a
control display
‘Oh, a kitten that has a cup! two kittens, one with cup, one with novel object
Can you touch the FROG that has a cup?’ two frogs, one with cup, one with novel object
‘Oh, a dog that has a clock! two dogs, one with clock, one with novel object
Can you touch the FROG that has a clock?’ two frogs, one with clock, one with novel object
‘Oh, a bird that has a tree! two birds, one with tree, one with novel object
Can you touch the FROG that has a tree?’ two frogs, one with tree, one with novel object
‘Oh, a fish that has a chair! two birds, one with chair, one with novel object
Can you touch the FROG that has a chair?’ two frogs, one with chair, one with novel object
disambiguation display
‘Oh, a kitten that has a gabo! two kittens, one with pencil, one with novel object
Can you touch the FROG that has a gabo?’ two frogs, one with pencil, one with novel object
‘Oh, a dog that has a keef two dogs, one with apple, one with novel object
Can you touch the FROG that has a keef?’ two frogs, one with apple, one with novel object
‘Oh, a bird that has a fid! two birds, one with carrot, one with novel object
Can you touch the FROG that has a fid?’ two frogs, one with carrot, one with novel object
‘Oh, a fish that has a razee! two birds, one with shoe, one with novel object
Can you touch the FROG that has a razee?’ two frogs, one with shoe, one with novel object
frequency display
‘Oh, a kitten that has a fep! two kittens, one with object 1, one with objects 1, 2
Can you touch the FROG that has a fep?’ two frogs, one with object 1, one with object 2
‘Oh, a dog that has a toma two dogs, one with object 1, one with objects 1, 2
Can you touch the FROG that has a toma?’ two frogs, one with object 1, one with object 2
‘Oh, a bird that has a tuki! two birds, one with object 1, one with objects 1, 2
Can you touch the FROG that has a tuki?’ two frogs, one with object 1, one with object 2
‘Oh, a fish that has a zef ! two birds, one with object 1, one with objects 1, 2
Can you touch the FROG that has a zef?’ two frogs, one with object 1, one with object 2
(list 2) display
same audio files switched
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Table A.4 audio stimuli experiment 3b
control display
‘Oh, a kitten that has a cup! two kittens, one with cup, one with novel object
Can you touch the FROG that has a cup?’ two frogs, one with cup, one with novel object
‘Oh, a dog that has a clock! two dogs, one with clock, one with novel object
Can you touch the FROG that has a clock?’ two frogs, one with clock, one with novel object
‘Oh, a bird that has a tree! two birds, one with tree, one with novel object
Can you touch the FROG that has a tree?’ two frogs, one with tree, one with novel object
‘Oh, a fish that has a chair! two birds, one with chair, one with novel object
Can you touch the FROG that has a chair?’ two frogs, one with chair, one with novel object
disambiguation display
‘Oh, a kitten that has a gabo! two kittens, one with pencil, one with novel object
Can you touch the FROG that has a gabo?’ two frogs, one with pencil, one with novel object
‘Oh, a dog that has a keef two dogs, one with apple, one with novel object
Can you touch the FROG that has a keef?’ two frogs, one with apple, one with novel object
‘Oh, a bird that has a fid! two birds, one with carrot, one with novel object
Can you touch the FROG that has a fid?’ two frogs, one with carrot, one with novel object
‘Oh, a fish that has a razee! two birds, one with shoe, one with novel object
Can you touch the FROG that has a razee?’ two frogs, one with shoe, one with novel object
frequency display
‘Oh, the kitten circled in red has a fep! two kittens, one with object 1, one with objects 1, 2
Can you touch the FROG that has a fep?’ two frogs, one with object 1, one with object 2
‘Oh, the dog circled in red has a toma two dogs, one with object 1, one with objects 1, 2
Can you touch the FROG that has a toma?’ two frogs, one with object 1, one with object 2
‘Oh, the bird circled in red has a tuki! two birds, one with object 1, one with objects 1, 2
Can you touch the FROG that has a tuki?’ two frogs, one with object 1, one with object 2
‘Oh, the fish circled in red has a zef ! two birds, one with object 1, one with objects 1, 2
Can you touch the FROG that has a zef?’ two frogs, one with object 1, one with object 2
(list 2) display
same audio files switched
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Fig. A.17 frequency inference
Fig. A.18 mutual exclusivity
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Table A.5 audio stimuli experiment 5a
teacher display
train: ‘Mr. Puppet wants to show you a pok. Look, this is a pok. one object
And, look, Mr. Puppet has another pok that he wants to show you!’ one object
test: ‘Can you touch the other poks?’ six objects
train: ‘Mr. Puppet wants to show you a skol. Look, this is a skol. one object
And, look, Mr. Puppet has another skol that he wants to show you!’ one object
test: ‘Can you touch the other skols?’ six objects
train: ‘Mr. Puppet wants to show you a liput. Look, this is a liput. one object
And, look, Mr. Puppet has another liput that he wants to show you!’ one object
test: ‘Can you touch the other liputs?’ six objects
train: ‘Mr. Puppet wants to show you a murbil. Look, this is a murbil one object
And, look, Mr. Puppet has another murbil that he wants to show you!’ one object
test: ‘Can you touch the other murbils?’ six objects
random display
train: ‘Oh, look what fell out of the bag, it’s a pok! A pok fell out of the bag! one object
Ah, look, another pok fell out of the bag!’ one object
test: ‘Can you touch the other poks?’ six objects
train: ‘Oh, look what fell out of the bag, it’s a skol! A skol fell out of the bag! one object
Ah, look, another skol fell out of the bag!’ one object
test: ‘Can you touch the other skols?’ six objects
train: ‘Oh, look what fell out of the bag, it’s a liput! A liput fell out of the bag! one object
Ah, look, another liput fell out of the bag!’ one object
test: ‘Can you touch the other liputs?’ six objects
train: ‘Oh, look what fell out of the bag, it’s a murbil! A murbil fell out of the bag! one object
Ah, look, another murbil fell out of the bag!’ one object
test: ‘Can you touch the other murbils?’ six objects
(list 2) display
same audio files switched
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Table A.6 audio stimuli experiment 5b
teacher display
train: ‘Mr. Puppet wants to show you a pok. Look, this is a pok. two objects
And, look, Mr. Puppet has another pok that he wants to show you!’ two objects
test: ‘Can you touch the poks?’ six objects
train: ‘Mr. Puppet wants to show you a skol. Look, this is a skol. two objects
And, look, Mr. Puppet has another skol that he wants to show you!’ two objects
test: ‘Can you touch the skols?’ six objects
train: ‘Mr. Puppet wants to show you a liput. Look, this is a liput. two objects
And, look, Mr. Puppet has another liput that he wants to show you!’ two objects
test: ‘Can you touch the liputs?’ six objects
train: ‘Mr. Puppet wants to show you a murbil. Look, this is a murbil two objects
And, look, Mr. Puppet has another murbil that he wants to show you!’ two objects
test: ‘Can you touch the murbils?’ six objects
learner display
train: ‘Oh, look what fell out of the bag, it’s a pok! A pok fell out of the bag! one object
Can you show me one more pok?’ three objects
test: ‘Can you touch the poks?’ six objects
train: ‘Oh, look what fell out of the bag, it’s a skol! A skol fell out of the bag! one object
Can you show me one more skol?’ three objects
test: ‘Can you touch the skols?’ six objects
train: ‘Oh, look what fell out of the bag, it’s a liput! A liput fell out of the bag! one object
Can you show me one more liput?’ three objects
test: ‘Can you touch the liputs?’ six objects
train: ‘Oh, look what fell out of the bag, it’s a murbil! A murbil fell out of the bag! one object
Can you show me one more murbil?’ three objects
test: ‘Can you touch the murbils?’ six objects
(list 2) display
same audio files switched
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Fig. A.19 teacher condition
Fig. A.20 learner condition
234 Stimuli
Fig. A.21 random condition
A.5 Experiment 6 235
Fig. A.22 test
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Table A.7 audio stimuli experiment 6a
action highlighted display
train: silence non-target action with target object
‘Dalp’ target action with target object
test: ‘Can you show me dalp?’ target action with other object/other action with target object
train: silence non-target action with target object
‘Drook target action with target object
test: ‘Can you show me drook?’ target action with other object/other action with target object
train: silence non-target action with target object
‘Pef ’ target action with target object
test: ‘Can you show me pef?’ target action with other object/other action with target object
train: silence non-target action with target object
‘Wige’ target action with target object
test: ‘Can you show me wige?’ target action with other object/other action with target object
action neutral display
train: ‘Fup’ target action with target object
test: ‘Can you show me fup?’ target action with other object/other action with target object
train: ‘Dorp target action with target object
test: ‘Can you show me dorp?’ target action with other object/other action with target object
train: ‘Glay’ target action with target object
test: ‘Can you show me glay?’ target action with other object/other action with target object
train: ‘Squel’ target action with target object
test: ‘Can you show me squel?’ target action with other object/other action with target object
(list 2) display
same audio files switched
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Table A.8 audio stimuli experiment 6b
action highlighted display
train: silence non-target action with target object
‘Dalp’ target action with target object
test: ‘Can you show me dalp?’ target action with other object/other action with target object
train: silence non-target action with target object
‘Drook target action with target object
test: ‘Can you show me drook?’ target action with other object/other action with target object
train: silence non-target action with target object
‘Pef ’ target action with target object
test: ‘Can you show me pef?’ target action with other object/other action with target object
train: silence non-target action with target object
‘Wige’ target action with target object
test: ‘Can you show me wige?’ target action with other object/other action with target object
action neutral display
train: ‘Dalp’ target action with target object
test: ‘Can you show me dalp?’ target action with other object/other action with target object
train: ‘Drook target action with target object
test: ‘Can you show me drook?’ target action with other object/other action with target object
train: ‘Pef ’ target action with target object
test: ‘Can you show me pef?’ target action with other object/other action with target object
train: ‘Wige’ target action with target object
test: ‘Can you show me wige?’ target action with other object/other action with target object
(list 2) display
same audio files switched
238 Stimuli
A.5 Experiment 6 239
240 Stimuli




To be filled in by one of the child’s main caregivers (e.g. mother, father, grand-
parent, guardian, foster carer).
Your relationship to the child
(e.g. mother, father, grandmother, guardian, foster carer, etc.):
Your full name:
Today’s date:
Note: The data will be anonymised. No one apart from the researchers will have access to
your or your child’s name. No real names will be used in any report or publication.
Thank you very much for taking the time to fill in this questionnaire!
Please return it to your child’s school. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to be
in contact with the researcher, Dr Özge Öztürk - ioo21@cam.ac.uk or +44 (0)1223 760354.
1. General information about the child
Child’s full name:
Child’s date of birth:
Child’s age:
Child’s gender:
Child’s place of birth (city/town and country):
1.6. What language(s) can your child speak and/or understand? Tick for English, and write
any additional language(s) in the appropriate box of the table. Please write every language
the child can speak/understand even if she/he has little ability in it.
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English :
Other language A :
Other language B :
Other language C :
If you have ticked English only, please proceed to Section 4, ‘Information about
the Family’ (p.6). If you have written down additional languages (A, B, C),
please continue with Section 2.
2. Information about the child’s language abilities and exposure
2.1. At what age did your child start receiving consistent and significant exposure to each of
his/her languages?
Language : Age in years and months:
English :
Other language A :
Other language B :
Other language C :
What we mean by consistent and significant: the child started attending a school (e.g., primary
school/kindergarten/daycare) where instruction was held in that language, or one of the main
caregivers (e.g., babysitter, caregivers) of the child started to consistently use that language
with the child. 2.2. How much is your child exposed to each language? (Please circle one of
the numbers from 1 to 5)
1 2 3 4 5
English never English rarely English 50% English usually English always
Language(s) A, B Language(s) A, B Language(s) A, B Language(s) A, B Language(s) A, B
and/or C always and/or C usually and/or C 50% and/or C rarely and/or C never
2.3. How fluent would you say your child is in speaking his/her languages? Please tick the
appropriate box for each language.
Not fluent Littlefluency
Somewhat

































2.4. How competent would you say your child is in understanding his/her languages for
































































































































2.7. Does your child codeswitch when they speak? (Please circle) YES / NO (codeswitching
is using English and Language A/B/C words in the same sentence, and is a normal aspect of
being multilingual.)
2.8. Is your child exposed to any of their languages in any of the following ways? (Please









































































3. Information about ideas about languages
3.1 I want to encourage my child to learn their home language(s). . . (Please tick any that
































































3.2. How proficient are you aiming for your child to be in their home languages? (While we
may all aim at fully equal status of both (or all) languages, there are many different types of
multilingualism. Please read the statements below and tick the most appropriate box for each
skill.)
I don’t mind; I will be
led by my child in this I am aiming for this









A good amount of ver-
bal vocabulary
A solid understanding
of grammar rules in
speaking
Being able to read ba-
sics (books for children
a few years below their
actual age)
Advanced reading
(books at their actual
reading level, or no
more than two years
below)
Basic writing (writing
short sentences or texts,
with errors in spelling)
Advanced writing (com-
posing own texts, al-
most secure spelling,
one or two years below
English level)
Fully equal status of
both or all languages
3.3. Is your child interested in learning their home language(s) at the moment? YES / NO
3.4. Please indicate how often (if at all) you use the following materials to support home























































































4. Information about the family
4.1. Please circle the level of education the child’s MOTHER or PRIMARY CAREGIVER
has completed







4.2. What language(s) do YOU speak? (Please write any other languages)
How did you learn that language?
(e.g. from parents in the home, at
school, through moving to a new
country)
How regularly do you speak or
use the language? (never – rarely






4.3. What language(s) does the child’s OTHER MAIN CAREGIVER (if applicable) speak?
(Please write any other languages)
How did she/he learn that lan-
guage? (e.g. from parents in the
home, at school, through moving
to a new country)
How regularly does she/he speak
or use the language? (never –






5. Information about school experience
5.1. What does your child like most about being at his/her school?
5.2. What does your child like least about being at his/her school?
5.3. Why did you choose SCHOOL for your child?
5.4. What do you think about the education at your child’s school overall?
5.5. I want my child to learn a foreign language at school (please circle): a) as early as
possible b) later primary school only c) only in secondary school
5.6. How often do you. . . ? (Please tick)
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5.8. What would make the biggest difference in your decision to participate in these activities?
(Tick as many as applicable)
If my work schedule allowed it
If I had transport
If I had childcare for younger chil-
dren
If I felt more comfortable at
school
If there were more support in my
home language(s)
If school staff invited me more
5.9. How often do you and your child do the following things together in a typical school
week?
















6. Information about your views on language learning
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6.1 Thinking of your child and what you know about schooling in England in general, how far






















guage is an im-
portant part of
education



























. . . so that they
have better job
prospects
. . . because it
introduces them
to other cultures






6.3. How proficient would you like your child to be in another language? (Tick one box for
each skill)
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I don’t mind; I will be
led by my child in this I am aiming for this









A good amount of ver-
bal vocabulary
A solid understanding
of grammar rules in
speaking
Being able to read ba-
sics (books for children
a few years below their
actual age)
Advanced reading
(books at their actual
reading level, or no
more than two years
below)
Basic writing (writing
short sentences or texts,
with errors in spelling)
Advanced writing (com-
posing own texts, al-
most secure spelling,
one or two years below
English level)
Fully equal status of
both or all languages
Thank you very much for completing this questionnaire!
